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Abstract 
This is a study of drug use in China with an emphasis on the southwestern province of 
Yunnan and o-n the Golden Triangle. For more than a thousand years, opium and other .drugs 
have been used in China for medicinal, religious and recreational purposes. Opium was 
smoked for relief from pain, for relaxation, as a stimulant, and as an aid for entering a 
religious trance. It was also believed that opium helped to relieve the physical strain of 
labouring and the mental pain of homesickness. The arrival of the Europeans during the 
seventeenth century brought about the use of tobacco-opium mixtures (madak), which 
originated in t4e East Indies (probably Java) and is thought to have spread from there to 
Formosa, Fu}lfan and the South China coast. This led to widespread addiction in China. 
Even after the Opium War in the 1850s, the opium trade and its cultivation continued 
because prohibition was not equally enforced throughout the different parts of China. It was 
not until the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 that opium use was effectively 
controlled. Control of the drug problem in China was strictly maintained for almost 30 years, 
but since 1978, the drug problem has become serious again, partly because of the shift from 
opium to heroin and other narcotic drugs. Drug smuggling became easier as the opening of 
the country to external trade allowed drug traffickers to smuggle heroin into southwestern 
China through the bordering regions of Burma. Control of drug growing in the China 
produced alternative production into the Golden Triangle. 
Heavy involvement by local tribes people and Han Chinese resulted in increased drug 
production in the Golden Triangle, which rapidly replaced supply from China. Poppy 
cultivation eventually spread from Yunnan to Burma and the hill countries of Laos and 
Thailand, with drugs being eventually being transported to Europe and the United States. 
Illicit drug use became connected with complex problems of highly specialized .criminal 
groups and organised crimes, both in Mainland China and in overseas Chinese communities. 
The CIA involvement" in drug trafficking during the 1950s and 1960s is merely one 
contemporary example of drugs being used to achieve 'higher' political goals, a strategy 
formerly used by the British and French governments, Chinese warlords and the Kuomintang 
Government, and some minority warlords as well. If the government itself is actively 
involved in the drug trade, what hope is there of convincing local people that they should not 
be involved in drug trafficking? 
.. 
Vll 
Responses to the drug problem in China and internationally have had limited effect for 
various reasons, and the problem has continued to grow. Different approaches may be 
appropriate in-different social, political and economic conditions. This thesis addresses the 
question of what are the different approaches of the Chinese government and its neighbouring 
countries? The various policies and suggestions are discussed. Another question which arises 
is whether the drug problem requires a response from the United States and the different 
Southeast Asian countries as well since they are also affected by the high rate of drug 
addiction, crime, and the resulting threats to social order, including health risks, rising 
corruption, and unemployment. This second question is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Vlll 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
One 1najor problem that affects the social, health, legal, and economic sectors of life in 
China is drug addiction. The use of "recreational" drugs is deeply embedded in Chinese 
culture and is a sensitive issue that touches on many aspects of law, family and 1norality in 
China. Although China was quite successful in controlling opium and other illicit drugs from 
the 1950s to the late 1970s, drug abuse has emerged as a serious problem for China since 
1978 with the development of the open door trade policy and economic reform. Drugs such 
as heroin, 'ice' ( crystal methamphetamine ), and ecstasy tablets began to appear and drug-
related issues became particularly prominent in China's southwestern Province of Yunnan, 
adjacent to the 'Golden Triangle'. 
Opiu1n and heroin have been and are the most common and popular drugs in China. 
Heroin is derived chemically from opium but is more concentrated. 1 Heroin comes in 1nany 
fonns and people have often been unaware of its strong properties. In the past, many Chinese 
believed that heroin tablets could be used to cure an addiction to opium and morphine. 
Smokers found that heroin pills could replace opium smoking and the fact that these pills 
were cheaper reinforced its use. As ·Camwath and Smith state in Heroin Century, twenty 
cents' worth of heroin pills was equal to fifty cents' worth of opium during the 1920s. This is 
a big difference. In fact, because of its concentration, heroin is the most dangerous of all drugs 
and in most countries heroin is the leading drug of abuse. Compared with heroin, opium can 
be categorised as mild or not serious. 
There are some countries where the legal production of narcotic plants occurs. By 
'legal', I am referring to drugs produced for medical and scientific needs, in other words, for 
health purposes. Opiates in the form of morphine and its derivatives are important for pain 
relieving or analgesic purposes. Illicit drugs are those used primarily for non-medical and 
1 The final product of heroin weighs only about IO percent of the original raw opium used. This means that I 0 
kilograms of raw opium produced I kilogram of morphine base, which turns out to a bit more than I kilogram of 
heroin through the additional ingredients gained during processing. 
See the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) World Drug Report, Oxford 
University Press Inc. , New York, 1997. 
1 
non-scientific purposes without legal sanction.2 Legal production of opium and coca account 
for approximately 10% and 1 % of all production. Most of the legal opium production sites lie 
in Australia, France, Spain, and Turkey. 3 
What is the nature and scale of the drug problem in China and how has it changed over 
time? (By 'drug problem', I mean drug-related crime, drug-taking and its harmful 
consequences for public health, social stability and cohesion, corruption, illegal financial 
flows and economic distortion, resulting from in part poverty, lack of a strong social security 
system, low levels of education, and ineffective policing and legal controls.) Who is involved 
in the drug production, consumption and the sale of drugs? What can be done about the 
proble1n? If all opium poppy cultivation was eliminated, would the drug problem be solved in 
China? Would atte1npts to eradicate heroin use by the use of another drugs only complicate 
things further? Can heroin be replaced by synthetic opiates? How is China tackling its drug-
related problems and what are the international responses to drug cri1ne? These are some of 
the 1najor issues this thesis addresses. 
In the past, most studies on drugs have been conducted on common drug abuse and 
initiators of drug use, particularly in the western countries. Studies have included 
confidential questionnaires, peer-conducted surveys, and mixed interviews. In Western 
societies, where opiu1n is not as prevalent as in Asian societies, drug studies tend to focus on 
substance abuse as a form of deviant social behaviour. Studies have tended to associate the 
beginnings of drug use with alcohol consumption, cigarette smoking, and peer and family 
pressures.4 Peer pressure has been particularly identified as a major factor in increasing drug 
risk. Overall, however, the drug problem still requires more examination and needs to be 
understood in greater depth. Studies in China have regularly failed to associate the broader 
cultural 1neaning attached to drug use. 
This study exa1nines the impact of the drug use in China, focusing on opium and its 
derivatives and adopting a socio-cultural perspective on the issues. Since China is a country 
which has undergone a huge social transformation and one with a long history of drug use, 
Chapter 2 attempts to highlight the cultural significance and recreational use of opium from 
2 UNDCP World Drug Report refers to 'illicit drugs' as drugs that are under international control (and which 
1nay or may not have licit medicinal purposes), but which are produced, trafficked and /or consumed unla~lly 
or illicitly. 
3 Martin Booth, Opium: A History , St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, 294. 
4 Zunyou Wu et al. , 'Risk factors for initiation of drug use among young males in southwest China', 
Addiction, vol. 91 , no. 11 , 1996, 1676. 
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before the Opium War until the time after the Chinese Revolution in 1949. It also explores the 
factors behind the rapid expansion of drug use and the shift from opium to heroin in the 
twentieth century. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the drug problem in conte1nporary China, the first during the 
period 1949 to 1978, then the period of economic reform, since when drug usage and drug 
crime have grown enormously, partly because of access to drugs produced in Southeast Asia. 
As trafficking and the production of drugs increases, more resources have to be spent on 
treating drug addicts through health and rehabilitation programs, as well as to finance 
hospitals and clinics for treating HIV/ AIDS. Rising crimes and violence, social instability, 
lack of economic performance, political violence, official corruption and growing force of 
international organised cri1ne mean that China has to allocate more public resources to the 
field of law enforcement. 
This short study cannot deal with illicit drug use throughout China as a whole. My 
main concern is with the border province of Yunnan. There are several reasons to confine the 
geographical scope of this study to the southwestern province. Since Yunnan is adjacent to 
the parts of Bunna, Thailand and Laos, known as the 'Golden Triangle', a major centre of 
illicit drug production, the province has been particularly at risk. 5 The ethnic minorities that 
inhabit the Golden Triangle have fostered the trafficking of drugs across and along the 
Chinese borders. The Golden Triangle has become a big source of drug problems and 
drug-related crimes in China, so Chapter 4 discusses the region in detail. 
Chapter 5 deals with the issue of international drug trafficking. It considers the role of 
government officials and agencies, including the CIA and the crucial role of international 
Chinese organised crime and its impact on the Chinese society globally. Is the CIA involved 
with cove1i operations in the Golden Triangle region? There is evidence that the CIA has 
been involved in the trafficking of drugs since the time it supported the formation of the 
Nationalist Chinese army for an invasion of southwestern China in 1951. When the invasion 
failed to eventuate, the Nationalist Army turned the Shan States of Burma into a major opium-
5 
'Burma' and 'Myamnar' refers to the same country. The name Burma was changed to Myanmar ( officially, the 
Union of Myanmar) and its capital from Rangoon to Yangon in 1989 by the military government. The name 
'Myanmar' honours the indigenous 'Mramma' people (also known as the Bamars) , who transformed the country 
into a n1ajor power during the ninth century. Myanmar means "the first inhabitants of the world". Although 
Myanmar has been recognized as the country's official name in international organizations and forums since 
1989, s01ne Western countries continue to use Burma to show their disapproval of the military government. To 
avoid confusion, I will be using the term 'Burma' in this essay. Laos is officially known as Lao People's 
De1nocratic Republic . 
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producing region during the following decades. The CIA also allied itself with the Hmong 
n1inority in Laos fighting the Laotian Communists near the border of Northern Vietnam 
during 1960-1975. Since opium production was a vital part of the hill tribe culture and an 
important source of revenue for the anti-communist groups, drug lords, govermnent agencies 
and officials,-both for political and personal gains, there is good reason to suspect government 
involvement, both Asian and American. 
Since international drug trafficking brings both political and economic proble1ns for 
China and foreign neighbours, the drug problem needs to be handled thoroughly. The 
question of stability largely lies in the relations between China, Southeast Asia, and the 
United States. Solving the drug proble1n has to be comprehensive and aimed at all facets of 
the issue, rather than on specific aspects. This would require an inclusive strategy that 
emphasises both supply disruption and demand reduction and approaches have to be taken 
from the social, political, legal and educational angles in China. How the Chinese 
government tackles drug problem and what are the different approaches and policies by the 
United States and countries of the Golden Triangle region, will be explored in Chapter 6. 
To realize the goals mentioned above, I have based my analysis on wide variety of 
sources. Since no fieldwork has been involved in my study of the nature of drug use, drug 
trafficking, and drug crime in China, I have tried to make use of all the available materials 
from the library of the Australian National University and the National Library of Australia in 
Canberra. These include both historical and contemporary books, magazines, major 
govermnent newspapers, journals, government reports, official docun1ents, electric journals, 
online resources, and surveys. While most of the sources are in English, I have also make 
extensive use of Chinese and Thai sources. Primary sources have been used to develop a 
comprehensive view of the current drug situation, both at the national and international levels. 
Drug-related statistics both historical and current, have been used wherever possible to 
indicate the extent of the drug problem. At various places in the study, I have incorporated 
charts and tables for better understanding of opium production and drug-related trends in 
China and the associated countries of Southeast Asia. 
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Chapter 2 
Historical Drug Use in Chinese Culture 
When gold and jade are inserted into the nine orifices, corpses do not decay. When salt and brine are 
absorbed into flesh and marrow, dried meats do not spoil. So when men ingest substances which are able 
to benefit their bodies and lengthen their days, why should it be strange that (some of these) should confer 
life perpetual?6 
- Joseph Needham (Science and Civilisation in China) 
1. Introduction 
Any discussion of "drugs" is generally confused because of their modem negative 
associations. When talking about drugs nowadays, people associate drugs with addiction and 
what is harmful, unbeneficial and unhealthy. However, drugs are not necessarily substances 
that are unpleasant, dangerous, evil, leading to drug abuse and crime. Doctors, pharmacist and 
the public often have different views of drugs. Anything that produces an effect on our body 
can be categorised as a drug whether ginseng, coffee, traditional herbs, aspirin or heroin. 
People from cultures around the world long have been taking drugs by drinking, smoking, 
eating, sniffing, inhaling or injecting. Drugs can be used as medicine, an aid to religious 
knowledge, or a type of recreation, and addiction may occur in any or all contexts. 
Today, China is a country with a large population and drugs come in a wide variety of 
fonns and have an even wider variety of uses. Traditional and herbal medicine exists side by 
side with W estem pharmaceutical drugs. The Chinese authorities attempted to use herbal 
medicine to counter the recent SARS outbreak. To reduce the complexities of this study, I 
will li1nit my study to the use of "illegal drugs". 7 The purpose of this chapter is to present a 
6 Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China , vol.5 part 2 section 33 , Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1974, 284, quoting Baopuzi (The Book of the Preservation of Solidarity Master) , by Ge Hong 
( c.283-343). 
7 UNDCP World Drug Report, l O. The current population of China is estimated to be around 1.27 billion 
according to the statistics published by the World Health Organization 2002. In this paper the term 'drug' will be 
used to refer to the range of narcotic drugs, as opposed to pharmaceutical or medication. The World Health 
Organization defines 'drug ' as any substance that when taken into a living organism can cause a change in one 's 
5 
detailed picture of China as a society with a long established drug culture, which at times 
since the early nineteenth century has been encouraged by both Chinese and foreign 
governments. By doing so, I hope to deepen our understanding of how the cultural tradition of 
drug use in pre-modem China could have a profound impact on the modem pattern. 
China has a long history of drug use, with the view that drugs could play a role in 
sustaining life appearing very early in its history. Herbal ren1edies were widely used in 
ancient China. Like many other people, the people of ancient China used many different 
herbs, son1etimes for reasons that seem odd to the contemporary mind. A plant, for example, 
was supposed to be effective against the disease of an organ that it resembles, or the name of 
the plant could resemble the name of a particular disease. The Chinese ginseng root 
rese1nbles the shape of a man: the two tips of the roots have the shape of human legs and the 
two upper branches look like human arms. 8 The herb was believed be the "herb of eternal 
life", to give immortality and promote sexual powers, regulate blood pressure and invigorate 
the central nervous system. 
In early times, Chinese scholars withdrew from normal life in order to search for drugs 
of imn1ortality or deathlessness, both in mineral and plant form. Ancient scholars closely 
examined anything that could give clues to the drug of im1nortality, encouraging research in 
health science and pharmacology as well as more esoteric fields. Although many people died 
painfully from the substances with which they experimented, there are also records of the 
euphoria drug users experienced.9 Many used euphoric drugs publicly, especially the 'five 
1nineral powder' or wushisan. There was also a belief that artificial gold, not natural gold 
would bring about longevity. Gold transmuted from base metals, it was thought, would 
contain the essence of different chemical substances, making it superior to natural gold.10 
perception, mood, and cognition behaviour. However, this does not apply to medicinal, non-psychoactive 
substances but includes tobacco, alcohol, and solvents. 
8 Victor W. Sidel, Serve the p eople: observations on medicine in the People 's Republic of China , Josiah Macy, 
Jr. Foundation, New York, 1974, 132. 
The idea of immortality existed long before the rise of Taoism. References were made to the "land of no death", 
"medicine of deathlessness," and "people who do not die" in the Shan Hai Jing (Book of Mountains and Seas). 
In fact, the author and its age have not been traceable, but it is generally attributed to Da Yu and Bo Yi in the 
time of Emperor Yao and Emperor Shun (2357-2205 B.C). 
9 Keith McMahon, The Fall of the God of Money: Opium Smoking in Nineteenth Century China, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc. , Maryland, 2002, 115. See also Joseph Needham's Science and Civilisation in China, 
vol.5 part 2 section 33:3c on 'The Physiological Background; Verification of the Efficacy of Elixir '. Needham 
says that the sympt01ns of metallic poisoning include extreme weakness which can later lead to infected boils 
and ulcers, nausea, fevers , vomiting, diarrhoea, headache, gastric and abdominal pains. There are records of 
chronic and acute poisoning by arsenic, mercury and lead, with also the harmful effects of prolonged exposure to 
sulphur, selenium, and antimony for instance. 
10 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol.5. part 2 section 33 , 69. Gold that has been transformed was 
considered better than natural gold because of long processing and exposure to high temperatures. Gold that is 
6 
Plates and bowls made from artificial gold would bring longevity to anyone eating and 
drinking from them. 11 
The invention of Chinese medicine was commonly attributed to the legendary emperor 
who introduced agriculture and who had personally tasted hundred types of plants to discover 
their magical and medicinal values. He was known as Shennong or "the Heavenly 
Husbandman", said to have lived around 2700 B.C. He is regarded as the patron saint of 
Chinese physicians. 12 The book "Pharmacopoeia of the Heavenly Husbandman" or Shennong 
bencaojing was believed to provide indications of medicinal substances and included 365 
items of medicine of plant, mineral, and animal origin. The book has been associated with 
sections on nourishing and prolonging life, restoring the patient's condition, and combating 
diseases. 13 During the Spring and Autumn Period (722 B.C to 480 B.C.), shamans who came 
fro1n the State of Qin in modem Shaanxi province, also tried to find ways to avoid physical 
death through the ingestion of the elixir of life. Historically, medicine and magic have been 
closely associated and continue to be so in the belief systems of shamans of North Asian 
indigenous minorities today. 
Exa1nples of the Chinese desire for immortality have been seen through ancient 
Chinese legendary figures. Some were said to have lived for many hundreds of years. There 
was a story about Jie-Yu-Lu Tong of the Ch'u state whose diet consisted of only tubular 
flowers of the Lycians, wax-myrtles and turnips. He was said to be seen at Mount Emei. 
Peng Zu of the Shang Dynasty was said to live on cassia bark and fungus and lived from the 
Xia Dynasty to the Shang Dynasty, a total period of eight hundred years. Master Rong 
h"~e \:,~Y\ 
Cheng, who was said to• the teacher of Laozi or an advisor of the Yellow Emperor, was 
believed to have maintained his longevity through drawing the essence from woman. His 
grey hair became black and his lost teeth grew back. 14 
It was not until the sixteenth century that Chinese medicine came to a peak. This was 
h 
when Li Shizen wrote "The Great Pharmacopoeia" or Bencao gangmu, which describes a 
" 
placed in the red sap of a plant was vermilion herb and was something like gold jam. Artificial gold is to be 
soaked in wine for 100 days. 
11 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol.5. part 2 section 33 , 69. 
For fmiher information, see Joseph Needham's Science and Civilisation in China, vol.5 part 2 section 33:3b on 
'Gold and Silver in Ancient China'. 
12 P .Y. Ho and F.P. Lisowki, Concepts of Chinese Science and Traditional Healing Arts: A Historical Review, 
World Scientific, Singapore, 1993 , 8. 
13 Michel Strickmann, Chinese Magical Medicine, Stanford University Press, California, 2002, 23. 
14 David C. Yu, History of Chinese Daoism, University Press of America Inc. , Maryland, 2001, 12. It has been 
said that Master Rong Cheng was at least two thousand years old in the sixth century B.C. , when Laozi lived. 
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huge array of plants and substances of animal origin, minerals and metals, together with their 
medicinal properties and applications. 15 
2. Drug Use-in Pre-Modern China: A Smoking Society 
The first narcotic drug in general use in China was the opiu1n, readily obtained from 
the sap of the opium poppy (Papaver somniferum ). 16 There have been many theories about 
when opium was actually introduced to China. One source suggests that opium ca1ne to 
China as early as the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220). There is a possibility that during the 
first century B.C. opium was brought by Chinese seafarers who travelled as far as Africa. It 
has been suggested that opium came to India via Burma, where Chinese had a jade and 
gemstones trade during the third century B.C., or that it may have been introduced by 
Buddhist priests fro1n Tibet during the first century A.D. 17 
Another view is that opium was not introduced to China until the Tang Dynasty ( 618 -
907 A.D.), by Arab traders. 18 Opium at this time was a trade good carried on the Silk Road to 
India and China, though it was never a major item. Jewels, ceramics, and spices were 
considered far more valuable as cargo on camels. This is plausible because during the Tang 
Dynasty, China maintained trade ties with Central Asia through the Silk Road. The Chinese 
na1ne for opiu1n, a-fu-yong was also similar to the Arab's name of af-yum. It is believed that 
the Arabs came to China as early as the sixth century and had established communities there 
by 900 A.D, but eventually shifted their trading patterns to trade with Chinese merchants in 
Malacca, dealing in silks and silver. 19 
15 Li Shizhen was known as "The Great Pharmacologist" and was born in Hubei province in 1518. His text 
c01nprised of over one million words and describes in detail 1,800 kinds of medicinal plants, 300 of which had 
never been cited in other works. 
16 Edward R. Slack, Opium, State, and Society: China 's Narco-Economy and the Guomingdang, 1924-193 7, 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 2001 , 15. Originally opium was commonly known as tu, the Chinese 
word for earth or dirt. This was because of its physical appearance, its raw form was dark brown in colour and 
had a hard texture. Opium produced in Yunnan was known as yuntu, in Guizhou as qiantu, in Sichuan as 
chuantu, and Gansu as gantu. 
17 Booth, Opium: A History, 103 . 
18 Frank Dikotter et al. , 'Narcotic Culture: A Social History of Drug Consumption in China' , British Journal of 
Criminology, vol. 42, 2002, 317. 
19 Booth, Opium: A History, 103. 
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Irrespective of the precise time of the introduction of opium into China, there is little 
doubt that it has been extensively used there for more than 1,000 years and that its perceived 
efficacy in promoting well-being and longevity was a major factor behind its popularity. 
The effects of opium on the human system depend very much upon its quality and 
frequency of use, as well as the age, temperament, and habits of the individual. Its first and 
most common effect is to excite the intellect, stimulate the imagination and heighten feeling. 
This may lead to unusual vision and brilliancy in conversation and at the same time to a state 
of dreaminess or subjective well-being. An unconscious person could be in a state of ecstasy. 
The following is a general sketch of the state of an opium smoker from a mid-nineteenth 
work: 
He would leave his humble station, his honest toil, his comfortable home; he would be great. He runs 
with ease the path of distinction; he distances rivals; wealth and power wait upon him, the mighty take 
him by the hand. His dress is costly, his fare sumptuous, his home a palace, and he revels in the pleasures 
he has read of and believed to be a fiction ... And as he advances a step, he reels and staggers wildly, and 
competitors, guests, minstrels, magnificence, all fade from his vision, and the gray cold reality of dawn 
breaks upon his heated brain ... And when night comes in gloom, he seeks again the sorceress into whose 
power he has sunk . . . 20 
Before the seventeenth century, opium use in China had been primarily medicinal where 
drugs were confined to health concerns, longevity, and religion. The arrival of the Europeans 
during the seventeenth century brought about the use of tobacco-opium mixtures (madak), 
which began i~ the East Indies (probably Java) and is thought to have spread from there to 
J 
Formosa, Ful(ian and the South China coast. The smoking culture became widespread during 
the final decades of the late Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and became even more popular 
during the Qing Dynasty. 
Opiu1n was strongly associated with sexual activity during the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911 ), as argued by Joseph Needham. In southern China particularly, it was commonly used 
in brothels. One of its main uses by the late eighteenth century, was as an aphrodisiac, for the 
drug was believed to stimulate sexual potency, strengthen sperm, and renew vigour.21 By the 
20Allen, Nathan M.D., The Opium Trade: Sketch of Its History, Extent, Effec ts, Etc., Lowell, Massachusetts, 
1853, 31. 
2 1 Yangwen Zheng, 'The Social Life of Opium in China 1483-1999 ', Modern Asian Studies , vol. 37, no. 1, 2002, 
12. An interesting section about female smokers in China is Chapter 6: 'Opium in the Late Qing Fiction ' in The 
Fall of the God of Money by Keith McMahon. 
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year 1793 in Canton, opium smoking becmne a recreation on boats that were used for sex. 22 
These boats, luxuriously decorated, were know as 'huafang' and became a major industry on 
the Qinghuai River. The mnbience on these riverboats is conveyed by the following: 
Lanterns hang at the comers, low beds are set in the middle ... decoratively placed, everything is 
exquisite. There is no curtain on either side so it is easy to look out. When the boats set out at sunset, 
the two oars move in ... the fragrance of snow-white lotus root stirs the heart, songs charm the ear and 
ravishing won1en surround you ... Everyone had [hair] buns and sprayed temples, wore light make-up. 
They were dressed in wide sleeves and long skirts. I was asked to pick a prostitute. I chose a very young 
one, her figure and appearance looked like my wife, but her feet was were extremely small and pointed, 
her name was Xi 'er [happy girl]. We let the boat anchor in the middle of the river and had a feast of 
food and wine for few hours. The gate of a sea town closed at sunset. After dinner, some lay down to 
sn1oke opium while others held their prostitutes in their arms to tease. 23 
By the 1830s opium smoking accompanied by sex had become a preferred means of 
recreation for scholars such as Zhao Guisheng, a scholar official of Sichuan and Huang Yue, 
Minister of Ceremony and Finance. 
It was in the sex industry, with its recreational use of opium, that opium created jobs 
for woman. It was a" unique means of survival", to borrow Zhang Yanwen's phrase. A poor 
woman had few choices; prostitution could offer a way of earning a living when nothing else 
was available. If she was unfortunate, this would be her job for life; if lucky, she would be 
able to find a dependable man to purchase her freedom or grant her status as a concubine. By 
contributing to the family income, this could be regarded as serving filial piety, which was the 
most important virtue in traditional Chinese society. In this way, a woman showed gratitude 
for her parent' s love and care. 
It was also believed that opium helped to relieve the physical strain of labouring and 
the mental pain ofho1nesickness. Migrant workers turned to opium smoking as a mean of 
escape from their miserable, oppressed life in China, while migrants and locals alike turned to 
opium for help to cope with long hours of hard work. It reduced hunger and tiredness. Some 
found in the hallucinatory experience of smoking opium an escape fro1n psychological pain as 
22 Huafang (boat recreation industry) eventually declined in Canton and became popular in Shanghai instead 
after 1842-1856, especially the 1853 Taiping Rebellion. 
23 Zheng, Modern Asian Studies, 12. See Shen Fu (translation by Leonard Pratt and Chiang Su-hui), Six Records 
of a Floating Life (Fusheng Liuji) , Penguin, Harn1ondsworth, 1983. 
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well.24 It was commonly used by hardworking people such as guards, rickshaw pullers, 
waiters and waitresses, and prostitutes. Chinese peasants during the late Qing Dynasty 
experienced great hardships due to poor administration and starvation. Increased taxation 
made life intolerable for many, and the upheavals of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) 
caused still greater privations. 
By the early nineteenth century, opium was used in China in the same way as alcohol 
was used in the West. It increased sociability when used in moderation. Its use and abuse, 
however, became much more prevalent after the 1830s when British merchants began 
importing Indian opium China in large quantities. Foreigners thought that a large number of 
drug users were coolies, but in fact they were people who occupied all levels of the society, 
from the imperial court to the beggars in the street. During the 1830s, almost all men under 40 
years s1noked opium. Even children (mostly boys) were heavily addicted, when drugs were 
given to them by parents to help stimulate growth and help cure illness. China could not 
export enough silk and tea to balance its trade. Trade was therefore balanced by the export of 
Chinese silver. In 1835-1846, China exported 4.5 million Spanish dollars worth of silver.25 
This led to an attempt by the Chinese authorities to control or suppress the opium trade 
because of the devastation of the Chinese currency. 
When the emperor of China attempted to suppress opium smuggling, the Opium War 
broke out in 1839 between England and China. Basically, the British went to war in order to 
continue bringing opium into China against the wishes of the Chinese national government 
and is an excellent example of the European imperialist, racist and colonialist attitudes of the 
time. The war lasted for two years and led to the British take over of Hong Kong under the 
terms of the Nanking Treaty. 
This treaty changed the entire relationship between China and the Western nations. 
China was opened up to foreign trade as a result. About 100 foreign businesses were 
competing with each other along the Chinese seaboard during the mid-1840s.26 The treaty did 
24 Kathleen L. Lodwick, Crusaders Against Opium: Protestant Missionaries in China, 1874-1 917, The 
University Press of Kentucky, Kentucky, 1996, 20. 
25 See Carl A.Trocki, Opium Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade 
1750-1 950, Routledge, New York, 1999, 58. 
China was going through silver and copper crisis. China 's economy had a bi-metallic standard of copper and 
sliver. Silver was worth much more than copper, the exchange rate being around 1,000 copper cash coins for 
one ounce (tael) of silver. 
26 Booth, Opium: A History, 139. 
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not specifically mention opium, but had the indirect effect of sanctioning the British sale of 
opium. 
Not until 1858 was the opium trade legalised. Approximately 40,000 chests of opium 
were stored in Hong Kong and 75% of India's opium was traded. 
In Opium: A History, Martin Booth says: 
Opimn was also retailed to local Chinese in Hongkong ... the Canton Register predicted 'Hong Kong will 
be the resort and rendezvous of all the Chinese smugglers. Opium houses and gambling houses will soon 
spread; to those haunts will flock all the discontented and bad spirits of the empire. '27 
Table 1 shows the general estimate of Chinese opium supply in the year 1879. Before and 
after the Opiun1 War (1839-1842) and in the 1870s, the export trade in opium fron1 India to 
China increased significantly, peaking in 1879-1889, when 98,535 chests of opium were sent 
to China. Small quantities of opium were domestically produced in Jiangxi and Guangdong; 
in the southwestern provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Sichuan much larger quantities of 
opium were produced, as seen in Table 1.28 Imported opium still represent less than half of 
the total available opium at that time. 
As they stand, the figures indicate that opium production in Sichuan was more than 
five times higher than that of Yunnan, Sichuan producing 140,000 chests of opium and 
Yunnan only 27,000 chests.29 A plausible explanation for this high variation stems fro1n the 
fact that even though the largest amount of opium was produced in Yunnan, it was later 
transported to Sichuan. Custom officers stationed in Yunnan and Sichuan stated that the two 
provinces traded through their ports, even though accurate figures of opium production could 
not be found in either province. As Kathleen L. Lodwick stated: 
There was a considerable amount of interprovince trade in the drug ... For example, Yingkou officials 
reported that native opium was cultivated throughout Manchuria, Tianjin officials reported production 
27 Booth, Opium: A History, 142. 
28R.K. Newman, 'Opium Smoking in Late Imperial China: A Reconsideration', Modern Asian Studies, vol. 29 , 
no. 4, 1995, 770. 
29 Lodwick, Crusaders Against Opium: Protestant Missionaries in China, 1874-1917, 15. There are no accurate 
data on the amount of opium produced in Sichuan. This was because since poppy cultivation was illegal during 
the late nineteenth century and opium was smuggled from one province to another to avoid custom officials. The 
figure in Table] was the only complete chart that I was able to find. According to Lodwick in Crusaders Against 
Opium: Protestant Missionaries in China, 1874-1917, Hankou officers stated that 150,000 piculs of opium was 
produced in Sichuan, while officers in Jiujiang estimated it to be only 40 ,000 piculs per year, and officers in 
Shanghai said it was only 10,000 piculs. 
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in Zhili, and Yantai and Yichang both reported local production. Hankow reported in1portation frmn ten 
of the eighteen provinces, the largest amount arriving from Sichuan, which, with Yunnan was the usual 
place of origin of most of the opium traded with China. 30 
Table 1: The Chinese Opium Supply in 187931 
Foreign Chinese Estimates of In piculs 
Average annual landings output by provinces (1 picul*=133.3lbs) 
in Hong Kong for 1878 
and 1879 
Bengal/Patna 35,585 Anhui (2000)** Guangxi (3,125) 4,150 
2,660 
Bengal/Benar 19,397 Zhejiang 10,000 Guangdong 500 
es 
Malwa 40,590 Zhili32 (3,000) 3,990 Guizhou 15,000 
Total: 95,572 Fukian (1,000) 1,330 Manchuria 2,000 
Henan (6,000) 8,000 Shanxi (4,000) 5,330 
Persian 5,863 Hunan (1,000) 1,330 Shandong (1,000) 1,330 
&Turkish 
Bengal 2,100 Hubei (2,500) 3,300 Shaanxi 5,000 
(smuggled) 
Less: Gansu (5,000) 6,600 Sichuan 140,000 
Exports from 5,000- Jiangxi 500 Yunnan 27,000 
Hong Kong to 
non-Chinese 
destinations: 
Total foreign: 98,535 Jiangsu (2,500) 3,330 Total Chinese 241,440 
Grand Total 339,975 
All prepared 213,624 All usable 209,612 All Substances 423,236 
opium ash 
Source: Newman, Modern Asian Studies, 770-771 
* 'Picul ' is a Chinese weight that is slightly less than an Indian chest. Normally, an export weight of a chest of 
Indian opium was 140 pounds. A chest of Indian opium weighting 140 pounds is said to reduce to the Chinese 
weight of one picul or 133.3 pounds. This is because opium dries out and loses weight, as it gets older as it 
reaches the destination. ** The figures in brackets indicate variations in data sources 
T bl 2 S r th ch· o· s l . 1879 a e . ummaryo e 1nese 'PIUID uppty Ill . 
Opium Supply Chests Kg (1 chest= 60kg approx.) 
Imported 98,535 5,912,100 
Local ( all province) 241,440 14,486,400 
Total 339,975 20,398 ,500 
Source: Adapted from Table 1, for a concise understanding of the opium situation in 1879. 
30 Lodwick, Crusaders Against Opium: Protestant Missionaries in China, 187 4-1917, 15. 
31 Newman, Modern Asian Studies , 770. The information shown in Table 1, was complied from estimates and 
guesswork. Data for 1879 are available because it was a year when custom officers and British consuls around 
China were required to provide estimates of the native opium production in each province of China. Some of the 
estimates of the opiu1n in the three southwestern provinces were provided by Colboume Baber, the British 
counsul in Chongqing in 1878 and his successor Alexander Hosie in 1882. Their estimates were based on 
personal observations, interviews conducted with Chinese, and agricultural surveys. Numbers for other Chinese 
provinces were attained from the Maritime Customs' officers. 
32 Zhili is present-day Hebei. 
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Lodwick also noted that opium production in Sichuan eventually declined in the 
1890s, as there was a change in patterns of trade. At much the same time, migrants were 
flocking into southwestern China, which was largely unsettled, hilly and unsuitable for food 
crops, and opium cultivation intensified. It appears that the geographical relationship of 
Yunnan with Mainland China has also affected the drug trade in the Golden Triangle. 
Yunnan was isolated from Central China. As observed by Chiranan Prasertkul, Yunnan Trade 
in the Nineteenth Century: 
The Mountains which set Yunnan apart from the rest of China have had the double effect of giving a 
geographical separation which has fostered independence, and of keeping unchanged many customs 
which since the revolution have been modified in districts more in contact with the western world. Nor is 
there amalgamation within Yunnan itself. High mountains and deep rivers break the province into 
sections isolated from each other, and wherein the customs and vernaculars of the various tribes have been 
33 preserved. 
Towards the end of the century, opium was a major crop in southern China. It has been 
estimated was that by 1883, Yunnan Province grew twice as much opium as it imported, in 
response to regional demand. Cross-border trade increased among the local inhabitants. 
North Yunnan exported opium to Sichuan, Guizhou and Hunan. Opium produced in the 
southern and western Yunnan went to Burma, the Shan States, Thailand and Laos. The 
Yunnanese also traded their opium for silver with the Tai minorities in the markets of the 
Shan States, Northern Siam and Laos. Not only was opium traded but also all kinds of tools, 
hide, silk, deer antlers, straw hats, and cheap musk oil. 34 
Overseas Chinese became an essential part in the history of opium smoking, especially 
from around the middle of the nineteenth century. In an effort to forget their loneliness and 
suffering, many Chinese labourers turned to the smoking of opium during their time off. 
Others took opium as a relief from heavy labour. In certain circumstances, opium was used an 
incentive to emigrate because it was legal in many places outside China. The main places for 
Chinese emigration outside Southeast Asia were the USA (mostly California), Canada, South 
America, South Africa and Australia. 
33 Chiranan Prasertkul, Yunnan Trade in the Nineteenth Century: Southwest China's Cross Boundaries 
Functional System, Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1989, 37. 
34 Prasertkul, Yunnan Trade in the Nineteenth Century: Southwest China's Cross Boundaries Functional System, 
64. 
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In Australia, opium smoking was one of the recreational activities common among the 
1nale dominated Chinese communities in regional areas. For example, 50,000 Chinese 
labourers and miners came to Australia in the gold rushes. Many established themselves in the 
Lower George Street area of Sydney and the Little Bourke Street of Melbourne where opium 
smoking was common in 1870. In 1890, huge imports came into Australia, with 
approximately 17,684 pounds of opium entering, and only 400 pounds being devoted to 
1nedicinal use. 35 The Chinese in Australia were found to work in groups, instead of interacting 
with the general population of the gold fields. A census by Reverend William Young of 
Ballarat of Chinese settlements in regional Victoria in 1867, showed that there were 
approximately 50 Chinese gambling houses and 80 opium shops in 9 centres across regional 
Victoria. It was also argued that about 1 in 2 Chinese gambled repeatedly and that at least 4 
out of 10 Chinese used opium regularly. 36 
In ref erring to overseas Chinese, I want to emphasise that in the late nineteenth 
century, ethnic Chinese, whether : born in China or abroad, had commonly been exposed to 
the s1noking culture. Opium consumption was commonplace, familiar, even to the extent of 
being part of Chinese identity. This was especially true of those with a good inco1ne. 
3. Modern Drug Use and Social Attitudes (1912-1949 &Later) 
Poppies possess as it were a cooling power, therefore the leaves and head when boiled in water bring 
sleep. The decoction is also drunk to remedy insomnia ... They must be crushed when still green, shaped 
into tablets then dried for storage. If the heads themselves are boiled in water until the liquid is reduced to 
half then boiled with honey until a syrup forms, they may make a sweetmeat. 37 
-Martin Booth (Opium: A History) 
Before its prohibition in 1949, opium smoking was a pleasurable activity that could be 
engaged in by 1nembers of all social strata. It was a common social activity that was not 
li1nited to either the rich or the poor. On almost every public or private occasion, at feasts , 
funerals or weddings, s1noking roo1ns were prepared for smoking with beds, pipes, and 
35 Booth, Opium: A History, 59 . 
36 
'Fear of the Chinese' , Victorian Cultural Collaboration , http: //www.sbs.com.au/gold/story.htrnl?st01yid=46 
[ Accessed 20 June, 2003 J 
37Booth, Opium: A History , 17. 
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lamps. 38 Opium houses were also a place where rich merchants or wealth elites joined 
together for business gatherings or conferences. Ordinary Chinese people enjoyed the 
smoking of opium with Chinese sweets and melon seeds in places like theatres, teahouses, or 
opiu1n dens. Even the poorest members of society visited opium houses, but these were 
furnished witli little 1nore than straw mattress and iron couches, where they were sometimes 
joined by homeless migrants. An opium den was regarded as a place where they could spend 
a night with bathing facilities and get something to eat. 
By the 1930s, opium smoking could also serve as a measure of face, wealth, and 
status. Both wealth (Ju) and high social status (gaogui) have been important values in the 
Chinese culture. Guests expected to be entertained with opium and if there was no opium, it 
was assumed the status of that particular family was not high. Just as wines and liqueurs are 
served at parties in the West, the quality of the opium provided was regarded as an important 
measure of the social standing and refinement of the host. Opium and tea were alike in that 
their qualities allowed people to make a judgement of the host. The colour, flavour, opium 
preparation, and quality of pipes came into consideration, just like the preparations for a 
Japanese tea ceremony. Complex preparation could signify how privileged a senior official or 
a rich merchant was. 39 
If recreation and conspicuous consumption were reasons for the extensive use of 
opium in China, so too was the lack of medical care. As already discussed, opium had long 
been used in China for pain relief and to promote health. The absence of medical care was one 
factor behind the low average life span in China, estimated to be 34 years in 1930.40 There 
were only 519 modem hospitals in the entire country in 1929. 
Morphine had become popular in China, especially Shanghai, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, and was cheaper than opium.41 It was regarded as a cure for opium 
addiction and due to its foreign origin, (it was first isolated from opium in 1803 by Friederich 
Sertumer) morphine became a prestige drug that commanded respect.42 It was not until 1856, 
38 Slack, Opium, State and Society: China 's Narco-Economy and the Guomingdang, 1924-193 7, 41. 
39 One 's wealth can also be denoted by the kind of pipe used. For example, a more prosperous family would 
possess jade or ivory pipes in the living room 
40 Ho and Lisowski, Concepts of Chinese Science and Traditional Healing Arts: A Historical Review, 50. For 
recent information of health care in China, see Xingzhu Liu et al. , 'The Chinese experience of hospital price 
regulation ', Health Policy and Planning, vol. 15, no.2, 2000, 157-163. 
41 According to the book Alcohol, Tobacco, and Drugs, morphine is a natural narcotic derived from opium and is 
widely used as a means of pain relief. It is found in various forms such as crystals, pills, powder, or capsules. 
The proportion of morphine in opium varies according to the soil in which the poppy plant grows. 
42 Zheng, Modern Asian Studies, 327. 
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when the hypodermic syringe was invented, that morphine became valuable for its medicinal 
use, for example morphine was used as a staple treatment in army field hospitals during the 
A1nerican Civil War. During the Chinese opium suppression campaign, 1norphine was used 
widely as both a "cure" and as a narcotic. As described by Ma1iin Booth: 
The man who swallows a dozen morphia pills a day has swallowed more physical destruction than the 
average opium smoker, and he does it without the loss of time involved in the laborious smoking 
proce.ss ... many coolies divide their daily quantum into three parts; two are eaten during the day and the 
third smoked in the leisure of the evening. 43 
Morphine imports to China were not restricted until after 1902, when 195,133 ounces 
of the drug entered legally. From 1903 on, it was heavily taxed and the traffic went 
underground. The government then banned its import and refining in 1909. As a result, a 
pound of morphine which was sold in the London pharmaceutical industry for 12 pounds cost 
210 pounds in Shanghai.44 Not surprisingly, morphine smuggling became popular. It was 
carried out by the Japanese, who came into China through Formosa, Manchuria, and Hong 
Kong, French Indo-China and Korea. 
Heroin entered China in 1912 and soon became particularly popular in the south of 
Shanxi and in parts of Hebei; it also reached the northern part of China, Manchuria and from 
cities along of coast of Tianjin and Shanghai. Heroin was sold not only in pills or powder but 
also in the shape of a cigarette or a pen. These were known as machine guns. It was said to 
produce an immediate effect. The drug could be exchanged for materials like jewellery, cloth, 
pets and furniture. By 1936, it was recorded that the Chinese people preferred to use heroin 
instead of opiun1 due to its cheapness. 45 
In China during the early 1900s, the production of heroin and morphine was located in 
the factories and industrial centres of the opium cultivation region. The location of these drug 
factories and heroin refineries also impacted on drug production, export markets, and 
processing. For instance, opium were produced in the southwestern area of Kunming in 
Yunnan, Chengdu and Chongqing of Sichuan province. Refineries in Kunming imported 
opium from Burma's Shan region. Kunming, in tum, sold back refined morphine to Burma. 
43 Booth, Opium: A History , 163. 
44 Booth, Opium: A History, 161. 
45 Julius Merry, 'A Social History of Heroin Addiction' , British Journal of Criminology, vol. 70, 1975, 307-308. 
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Heroin and 1norphine were also produced in other parts of China. Production from the 
Northeastern region came from Dalian, Shenyang, Jinzhou, and Jilin. In North China, 
1norphine and heroin supplies were located in the refineries of Beijing and Tianjin and in 
Taiyuan of Shaanxi province. Morphine was produced in the Eastern cities of Shanghai and 
Hangzhou. fu South China, heroin and morphine factories were located in Canton, 
Guangdong. 46 
During various drug suppression periods, for example 1906-1916, opium cultivation 
especially in the southwestern part of China, did not completely stop though it appears to have 
fallen te1nporarily and caused problems of supply. For instance during 1911-1917, there was a 
high de1nand for Burmese opium in Yunnan. There was smuggling from Burma and 
Thailand. Smuggling became an organized business that involved huge amounts of 
investment but brought a good profit. An investigation conducted throughout the Chinese 
provinces between 1925-1926 by the International Anti-Opium Association, revealed that 
opium production had not decreased despite measures initiated by the government. There was 
not a single province where prohibition was strictly enforced except in Shaanxi and Suiyuan, 
now assimilated into Inner Mongolia. 47 
It was not until 193 5 that Chiang Kai-shek' s Nationalist government (Kuomintang) 
strictly enforced prohibition. This was largely due to the New Life Movement. A national 
opiu1n suppression bureau was organized whose regulations involved penalties of life 
i1nprisom11ent or death for pushers. In the report to the League of Nations in 1935, the 
General Commission for Opium Suppression claimed that the ten provinces of Henan, Hebei, 
Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong and Shanxi had been established 
as "entirely free fro1n poppy cultivation". Hunan and Chaha'er became poppy free in 1937.48 
The use of opium in China did not drop until the Communist Revolution in 1949. 
China had been a major international supplier of opium, but when an opium eradication 
46 Jaines H. Turnbull, Chinese Opium Narcotics: A Threat to the Survival of the West, Foreign Affairs 
Publishing, Richmond, 1972,15. 
47 Opium Cultivation and Traffic in China: An Investigation in 1925-1926, The International Anti-Opium 
Association, Peking, 1926. 
Suiyuan is a former province in Northern China. Suiyuan was made a puppet state controlled by Japan and was 
included in the Mongol Border Land (Mengjian) in 1937. In 1954, the province later became part of Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Region after Japan lost the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945. 
48 Slack, Opium, State and Society: China 's Narco-Economy and the Guomingdang, 1924-193 7, 150. 
Chaha ' er was a former province in Northern China. It was abolished as a province in 19 52 and most of it was 
incorporated in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. The rest was divided between Shanxi and Hebei 
provmce 
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programme was introduced by the Communist government, opium supplies to neighbouring 
countries sharply declined. It was estimated by the Chinese govermnent that China had 
twenty million drug users by that time. Opium prohibition eventually became a law in a 
19 5 0 proclamation. 49 
4. Conclusion 
As discussed in the first chapter, the use of drugs was not a new phenomenon to 
China, as opium had long been valued for its medicinal, social, and recreational value. Like a 
typical cup of tea, opium was associated with pleasure and luxury, as a form of designating 
social status, used in social rituals or as a spiritual and everyday medicine. Opium poppy has a 
foreign origin and is said to have reached China for more than 1,000 years ago. It was not 
until the seventeenth century that tobacco and opium was smoked together, leading to 
widespread addiction. In fact, can opium and Westerners be blamed for introducing opium to 
China and addicting the Chinese to it? Can this be justified? Opium was already extensively 
grown in large scale to meet the market demand, particularly in the southern provinces. 
Even though suppression programs were carried out, the practice became entrenched 
and laws were not put into effect, due to the long established drug custom in China. Opium 
cultivation did not completely disappear but it continued to be grown extensively in the 
southwestern regions. The transition of opium into a market commodity, combined with the 
changing political situation in China later led to the development of drug producing regions in 
Southeast Asia. How the development of the Golden Triangle filled the gap left by China and 
how China is strongly affected by drug problems will be discussed in the following chapter. 
49 McMahon, The Fall of the God of Money: Opium Smoking in Nineteenth Centwy China , 41. 
19 
Chapter 3 
Drugs in Contemporary China 
After the governor gave a speech proclaiming the government's resolve to fight drug problems, 4,000 
kilograms of heroin and opium were set on fire in sixty immense electrical pots at a comer of the 
stadium. The flames rose as high as thirty feet in front of the excited spectators, who were applauding 
and cheering enthusiastically. The atmosphere was highly charged. 50 
-Yongming Zhou (Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China) 
1. Introduction 
After the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the Chinese 
govermnent took initiatives to reconstruct the country. During the earlier period, the country 
has been largely involved with land refonn, civil war and suppressing counter-revolutionaries, 
putting drug problems behind. Opium suppression programs during the earlier phase were not 
tightly controlled. During the second half of 1952, drug campaigns became more consistent 
and were carried out with 1nore severity. There were harsher punishments on a nation-wide 
scale and 1nore well formulated plans. China in the mid- l 950s was largely free of poppy 
cultivation and opium use and the Communists maintained this reputation for 1nore than three 
decades, by ilnplementing strict policies. The scale of drug use after 1949, and how it changed 
after the economic reform in 1978 will be the focus of this chapter. 
2. Drugs in China during 1949-1978 
What was the drug situation like in China after 1949? Little is known about the scope 
of the drug problem in China during the period of 1949-1978. Researchers have had to rely on 
national crime rates for a limited time period and research could only be conducted in the 
fields of criminal rehabilitation and law enforcement. This has been a serious problem and 
there is a need of deep understanding of Chinese official statistics in the criminal justice 
50 Yongn1ing Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. , Maryland, 1999, 1. 
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system, drug-related social issues, policy implementation and policy changes in China. 
Research has also been co1nplicated by the political struggles within the Cormnunist Party. 51 
Another factor that has made drug-related studies of the period difficult is that reliable 
cri1ne data has not been publicly available. 52 Sometimes information relating to drug 
campaigns was concealed from the public and therefore the public had a distorted view of the 
drug proble1n. For example, records and data concerning the campaigns of 1952 have been 
kept secret. The only information available on 1952 has been from a government 
documentary archive. 53 In 1952, there was no reference made on the drug campaigns through 
the media, whether it is through magazines, newspapers, radio, posters, cartoons or even 
public exhibitions. 54 
Variations in reporting of levels of drug-related crime may also stem from 
underreporting to underestimation throughout China. After the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China, the Communist government claimed that they had completely eradicated 
the problems of drugs, prostitution, pornography, concubinage, bride-selling, and slavery by 
maintaining a tight control of individual life, and isolation from the rest of the world. It 
argued that such problems only existed in a capitalist or feudal society and consequently was 
unwilling to admit or discuss publicly the drug problem. Any lingering issues during the 
1950s could be dismissed a result of the old system of government and foreign capitalism. It 
seems that sometimes problems resulting from the effects of drug use within the communities 
were settled within a day or two by non-professionals. This suggests that the central 
government had given authority to local groups of citizens to solve disputes quickly and 
efficiently. The session often ended with written agreements or stipulations. There were no 
51 Lu Zhou and Mei Cong, 'Criminology in China: Perspectives and Development' , in Crime and Social Control 
in a Changing China, edited by Jianhong Liu et al. , Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001 , 158. 
52 It was not until 1987 that the Chinese Law Yearbook was first published, which has a section devoted to crime 
and crinunal justice statistics. Criminal statistics come from the Ministry of Public Security and are sent to the 
State Statistics Bureau. Information is then gathered and selected for the Yearbook publication. Chinese law 
journal, Cheng-fa yen- chiu (Studies on Politics and Law) ceased to appear in mid-1966 due to the Cultural 
Revolution. For more information see, Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan 
Province Documents. 
53 One plausible explanation for this the 1952 secrecy could be the Chinese's attempt to hide drug-related issues 
from foreigners. Since the Chinese government was accused by the Americans of exporting drugs to Japan in 
19 51 , the Chinese have been very conscious about their image to the world. This explanation seems to be 
plausible since the Chinese city of Tianjin had been a major drug centre during the time of the Japanese 
occupation. Most of the drugs in Tianjin originated from the Yuda Company and opium was transported to 
Hong Kong for the production of heroin. These drugs are later returned for sale in China through the city of 
Guangzhou. 
54 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 103. 
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procedures presented, no legal code and no lawyers. This was done to avoid the appearance 
of 1najor problems. 55 
The first phase of opium suppression prograin was established between October 1949 
and early 195Z. The General Order on Prohibiting Drug was initiated by the State Council in 
1950.56 It is important to note that the founding of the People's Republic of China had laid 
the foundation for a new social order. The evidence suggests that, initially the anti-drug 
campaign was not rigorously implemented or effective. Punishments were not mandatory and 
could be bought off with fines. For instance, the total number of drug offenders arrested in 
Nanjing from May 1949 to December 1949 was 472. However, out of this 472, only 26 were 
sentenced to imprisonment by the court with periods ranging from six-months to two years. 
In 1950, when 2,090 were arrested, only 345 were sent to prison.57 By 1956, the number of 
recorded offences had considerably decreased. However, drugs during the early 1950s cannot 
have been completely eradicated, for the Chinese authorities simply lacked the means to 
enforce the prohibition. Reorganisation of the countryside under the commune system, 
however, will have made opium cultivation much more difficult from the late 1950s. Whereas 
before 1949, China had been an opium exporter, henceforth it would receive most of its 
opium from the Golden Triangle. After 1978 this cross-border trade grew enormously. 
The various provinces of China subsequently initiated their own rules and regulations 
in response to the anti-drug initiative. In Yunnan, for instance, an Opium Suppression 
Directive was issued on June 27, 1950 and the Enforcement Regulations were initiated by the 
Southwest Military Control Commission on July 31, 1950. In adjacent provinces like Guizhou 
too, opium dens were closed and drug addicts were rehabilitated. Those smuggling or 
trafficking in drugs were arrested. In Guizhou, a total of approximately 3,310 hectares of 
poppy farms were destroyed. As many as 3,000 opium dens were shut down, 6,333 drug 
traffickers were arrested and 11,7000 opium addicts were rehabilitated. 58 Out of the 6,333 
drug traffickers who were arrested, 4,163 were sentenced to prison, 445 to labour camps and 
55 Dean G. Rojek, 'Chinese Social Control: From Shaming to Reintegration to Getting Rich Is Glorious ', in 
Crime and Social Control in a Changing China , edited by Jianhong Liu, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001 , 
93 . 
56Peter Liu and Yingyi Situ argue in Chapter 3: 'Narcotics Control in China: A Growing Challenge' in Crime 
and Social Control in a Changing China that in 1949 there were over 300,000 drug dealers and over 20 1nillion 
users . By 1953 , 220 ,000 drug cases had been tried and over 80 ,000 drug offenders sentenced. The aims of the 
General Order included wiping out cultivation of poppies in areas where the military once operated, prohibiting 
trafficking and the selling of opium, asking the public to participate in the rehabilitation process and conducting 
propaganda to mobilise the masses. 
57 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, Hist01y and State Building, 97. 
58 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, Hist01y and State Building, 96. 
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two were sentenced to death. These numbers were not considered favourable since Guizhou 
had an estimate of three million drug addicts in a total population of 14 million in 1950, and 
less only twelve thousands drug addicts were processed. 
During the second phase of the drug suppression program in late 1952, punislunents 
were highly enforced and well-defined plans and propaganda were put in place. The Three 
Antis (1951) campaign and the Five Antis (1952) targeted corrupted officials, many of whom 
were involved in drug-trafficking and smuggling. 59 Both the Three Antis and Five Antis 
aimed to gather information on drug trafficking and make lists of drug offenders. 
Infonnation obtained by the Three Antis and Five Antis programs later contributed to the 
Directive on Eradication of Drug Epidemics. Areas with drug cultivation areas were targeted, 
whether they were large or medium. The focus was on drug warlords. 
During 1952, nationally an estimated 369,705 drug traffickers were found and out of 
this total, 82,056 or 22 percent were arrested, according to the Luo Ruiqing, Minister of 
Public Security. In these 51,627 were prosecuted, with 34,775 being sent to prison and 2,138 
sent to labour camps, 6,843 placed under surveillance and 3,534 released and a further 4,337 
left uncategorized. 60 Table 3 shows the number of execution by area on 14 December, 1952. 
Statistics in the table show that Yunnan had the highest number of executions and arrests, 
followed by Guangxi and Guizhou, while Changchun has the lowest number of executions 
and arrests. 
Table 3: Number of Drug-Related Executions versus Arrests in Major Areas in China, 
1952 
Areas Executions Arrests Executions as percent 
of arrests 
Yum1an 38 6,239 0.61 
Guizhou 25 3,915 0.64 
Fujian 27 1,659 1.62 
Guangxi 24 4,476 0.54 
Tianjin 10 667 1.48 
Changchun 3 148 2.03 
Nanjing 19 1,153 1.65 
Xuchang 4 107 3.74 
Source: Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 108. 
Data on 1952 was obtained from governmental documents, case studies, archival research, participant 
observation, and a field trip to China of the author in 1992. The author conducted archival research in Kunming, 
Beijing and Nanjing, as well as participating in the fieldwork in Yunnan and observation in Baoshang City and 
Dehong Prefecture in 1994-1995. 
59 The Three Antis program included anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucracy. The Five Antis include 
anti-bribery, anti-tax evasion, anti-embezzlement of state assets, anti-shoddy work, and anti-pilferage of state 
information. 
60 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 100. 
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Table 4: Drug Offenders in China by Region in 1952 
Areas Number Total Percentage 
South Central China 38 ,000 22.8 
Northern China 28 ,000 16.8 
Southwestern China 43 ,000 25.6 
Eastern china 23 ,000 13.8 
Northeastern China 23 ,000 13 .8 
Northwestern China 12,000 7.2 
Total 167,000 100 
Source: Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 99. 
Table 4 shows the number of drug offenders in China by region. However, it has been 
argued that the anti-drug campaign of 1952, although carried out in many cities and towns, 
did not penetrate far into drug prevalent areas of the southwestern provinces, partly because 
there was no systemic approach and the issue was not regarded as the highest concern during 
the 1950s. Sometimes the government were too occupied with other tasks for example, with 
the restoration of the country and building social order after the civil war. 
The United Nations has published data on regulations during 1953-1965. For 
instance, The Regulations For the Control of Narcotic Drugs was amended and promulgated 
on March 27, 1954. Under this regulation, narcotic drugs could not be imported without the 
authorization of the Ministry of Interior. Drugs used for medical purposes were to be 
purchased directly from the Narcotics Bureau and the Narcotics Bureau was audited from 
ti1ne to time by the Ministry of Interior. This included data on drug manufacturing, trade, and 
stocks. 61 Other regulations included the Regulations for the Suppression of Opium and Other 
Narcotic Drugs during the Period of National Emergency in 1956. This aimed at wiping out 
opium use in the country and also punishing drug sellers, manufacturers and transporters. The 
penalties were death or life imprisonment (which is not less than ten years). Those found to be 
addicted were to be fined 10,000 yuan. Others introduced were the Administration Rules 
Made Under the Regulation for The Control of Narcotic Drugs, promulgated in 1963 and the 
Application of Control to Nicodicodine and its salts as a New Drug Prepared from Opium, 
which came into force on July 19,1965. 
The issue of drug-related crimes was suppressed during the Cultural Revolution of 
1966-1976. Statistics for the post-1966 period generally are not available. In this period, 
61 See 'China: Regulations for The Control of Narcotics Drugs ', United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/legal library/index-countries-en.html [Accessed 2 May, 2003] 
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there were few interviews and researchers were not allowed to attend legal education classes 
or visit Chinese courts or prisons to study criminal trials. In Criminal Punishment in 
Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents, Hungdah Chiu provides a 
general glimpse of drug-related crime in China at this time.62 It includes information on 
offences which are considered as criminal in China and the type of response made by the 
Chinese legal system. 
One general assertion concerning drug offenders is that more lenient punishments and 
treatment would be imposed upon offenders who surrendered voluntarily. Among the 
interesting cases of punishments imposed upon the residents of Yunnan province is that of Ma 
Shao-Wu. Ma was a 20 years old 1nale of Wei-Shan County in Yunnan, who committed the 
crime of selling opium. He made big profits when selling ten ounces of opium on May 1973, 
then in February 1974, pretended to be a government official and illegally purchased 130 
ounces of opium on a business trip to Juili County. He attempted to transport it to Wei-Shan 
County. His failure to cooperate with the authorities resulted in a sentence of fifteen years of 
in1prisonment.63 Another drug offender, Ma Shu-ying, a female of 29 years old was sentenced 
to five years of i1nprisonment, also for pretending to be a state employee to purchase opium. 
But because she confessed her crime, the punishtnent was much less severe. 64 
It would be impossible not to mention here the importance of the Golden Triangle and 
its connection with drug-related crimes in China. Before 1949, China was the main producer 
of opium in East Asia, with the southwestern provinces supplying a large propo1iion of the 
opiu1n consu1ned in other parts of the country. After the Communist Revolution, poppy 
cultivation moved across the border to the Shan Plateau and the border areas of Burma, 
Thailand and Laos. First largely organised by the Kuomintang, the opium trade was later 
extended by the local warlords, the Burmese military, and the support of the CIA in the global 
heroin drug trafficking. As already mentioned, the drug suppression campaigns of the early 
1950s were not effective everywhere, especially in remote and border areas where minority 
groups played significant roles. This was certainly so in southwestern China, particularly 
62 Hungdah Chiu, Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents, 
School of Law University of Maryland, Maryland, 1977, 1. The author was able to carry his research by 
gathering data from Chinese documents, including papers on crimes issued by the local revolutionary 
committees and court judgement and decisions carried by the People's Liberation Army. He also obtained 
information from foreign visitors and former residents of China. 
63 Chiu, Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents, 24. 
64 For other examples of drug offenders, see Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan 
Province Documents. 
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Yunnan Province. China's relationship with the Golden Triangle will be separately discussed 
in the Chapter 4 as it is of great importance. 
3. Drug after --the Economic Reform (1978-present) 
Although the reforms have brought about increased economic growth, a consequence 
has been widespread rising crime, including drug-related crime. However, I am not 
suggesting that the increase in drug-related crime in China is a result of the econo1nic 
1nodernisation alone, for other factors have to be incorporated. The increase in crime has 
been caused by the cultural, political and social changes that accompanied the refonns. An 
increase in drug-related crime was not an inevitable consequence of economic change; nor 
does its occurrence signify that China is unable to control it. 
Rapid modernisations, coupled with widespread political and social disruption, have 
pro1npted the Chinese people to direct their energy towards economic gain. People tried to get 
rich through whatever means were available, resulting in widened income gaps. Before 1979, 
inequality gaps existed, however, the rich and the poor were not living together. Nearly 
everyone was equally poor under Mao. However, Deng Xiaoping's popular slogans were: "To 
get rich is glorious" and " Regardless of its colour as black or white, a good cat is the one that 
catch the 1nouse". 65 In the modernisation period, China has been faced with income 
inequality and rising crime, corruption, drug abuse and prostitution. The Chinese police have 
not been insulated from the effects of the reform as will be discussed below, there was a rise 
in police corruption. The causes of increasing drug crime include the long history of opium 
use in China, the widening gaps in the standard of living and growing income disparities, 
government inefficiency and weak regulation, and weakening control mechanisms in the 
Chinese social system. 
65 According to Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping argued that," It doesn't matter if the cat is yellow or black as long 
as it catches the mouse." Ruan Ming was present at the time Deng gave his speech at the Seventh Plenum of the 
Third Comn1unist Youth League on July 1962. It was said that the cat's colour was later changed from yellow to 
white when the phrase was published. Ruan Ming was a high official who made an analysis of the politics during 
Deng 's period. See Ruan Ming (translated and edited by Nancy Liu, Peter Rand, and Lawrence R. Sullivan), 
Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire, Westview Press, Colorado, 1994. See also, Robert Maxwell, Deng 
Xiaoping: Speech & Writings, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1987. 
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3.1 Trends of Drug Dealing & Drug Crime in China 
In China, drugs of all sorts are available and new drugs have recently appeared on the 
black market. Illegal narcotics are being smuggled into China and drug consumption is 
increasing, threatening Chinese economic development and social stability. According to a 
recent report in 2002 drugs have spread to 2148 cities in China, an increase of 97 cities over 
the previous the year. 66 The majority of smuggled drug cases involved opium, heroin, 
cocaine, and 'ice'. 67 The appearance of 'ice' is not a new incident to China because the 
country has the world largest natural source of ephedrine, a source of the 'ice' drug. 
The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2002 argues that there were 
approximately 1nore than 900,000 drug addicts in China. This was an increase of 200,000 in 
three years. In 2000, it was stated that around 96,000 drug related cases were brought up, an 
increase of 61.4% co1npared with 1999. The 'evidence' in these cases included 22,000 kg of 
heroin, 12,000 kg of opium, 2000 kg of methamphetainine, 640,000 tablets of ecstasy, 
186,000 kg of opiu1n poppy and 408,000 kg of raw materials for manufacturing drugs. Since 
1982 more than 70,000 transit drug trafficking cases were handled in Yunnan Province alone 
and over 80 tons of heroin and opium fro1n the Golden Triangle have been seized by 
authorities. 68 
The article, 'Yunnan renti fandu changjue'in Zhongguo qingnian baa (China Youth) 
provides statistics from the Yunnan Border Control Police that indicate the scale of the 
proble1ns faced in the southwest. In 2002, 254 suspects were caught drug trafficking in the 
hun1an body. 69 The esti1nated amount of drug confiscated was approxi1nately 11,3 799 grams, 
this 1neans that an average of 448 grams of drugs were hidden in the body of each individual. 
66 
'Jintian shi "6.26" Guojijinduri: Yuanlidupin, Guanaiweilai' (Today is 26 June, International Anti-Narcotics 
Day: Stay Away from Drugs, Care for the Future), Zhongguo xinwenwang (China News), 26 June, 2003. 
Approxi1nately 87.6o/o of those living in China are heroin addicts. Teenagers account for 74% and unemployed 
making up to 53%. See also 'Zhongguo zaice renyuan yida baiwan qingshaonian zhanlejuedaduoshu' (China 
Registered One Million Drug Addicts, with Youth As Majority), Zhongguo xinwenwang (China News), 3 May, 
2003. 
67Zhuqing Jiang, 'Drug Problem worsens, upset social stability, China Daily, 10 February, 2001. 
'Ice' or also known as 'crystal 1nethamphetamine' is a mixed of cocaine and other amphetamines. In Thai, 
' ice' is known as 'ya-baa'. It was not until the mid 1980s that heroin trafficking became a serious problem. 
68 Narcotics Control in China, Infonnation Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 
Beijing, 2000, 13. 
69 This n1eans that d1ugs are inserted or swallowed into human body parts. Sometimes they are hidden in 
elaborate hairstyles, at other times, capsules about 4cm long are made by compressing 10-12 gm of heroin in a 
condo1n or plastic bag, tied with dental floss, which can later be swallowed. 
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This amounts to nine times the amount stated by the Chinese Criminal Code as grounds for 
death or imprisonment for anyone caught for smuggling or selling heroin. 70 
According to a survey conducted in Longchuan County in Yunnan between January 1, 
1991 to August 1, 1994, drug use was co1nmon throughout the community. However, the 
majority of drug users were young males living in the countryside along the border of 
Bunna. 71 In 1990, it was reported that there were 6127 reported drug users in Longchuan, of 
who 5198 were opium users and 929 were heroin users. The number of drug users in this 
county overall increased rapidly from 3000 in 1982 to 6500 in 1994. The number of heroin 
users increased from 56 in 1986 to 1855 in 1994. 72 In 1994, 88o/o of all drug users and 99% of 
heroin users were 1nales who were between the 20-40 years old age group. 73 Of those 
surveyed, young males from the Jingpo ethnic group were more likely to use drugs than 
1nembers of other ethnic groups like the Dai and Han. A major question that arises is whether 
reduction in domestic production has contributed to greater heroin use in China. Heroin, a 
refined opiate, is easier to smuggle and transport internationally than opium. 
Drug use among young men in Longchuan increased for a nu1nber of reasons. One 
basic factor is the availability of locally produced and refined heroin. Being adjacent to the 
n1ajor illicit growing poppy areas and the centre of heroin refining (Shan State), drug 
accessibility is not a problem. Other factors leading to drug use were peer pressure, 
experi1nentation, drug use by other family members, and personal cigarette smoking 
behaviour.74 There is no clear explanation why the Jingpo people had higher nu1nber of drug 
use than other ethnic groups. However, it is possible that religious difference and differences 
in education levels affected initial drug use. 
70 
'Yunnan renti fandu changjue' (Human Problem in Drug Trafficking is widespread in Yunnan), Zhongguo 
qingnian bao (China Youth) , 13 September, 2002, 7. 
See also 'Beijing Steps up Attack on Drug Trafficking ', People 's Daily, 
http: //fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200006/24/eng20000624 43843.html [Accessed 1 July, 2003] 
71 Wu et al. , Addiction ·, 1676. Results of the survey may not be accurate. Since most responses and results were 
self-reported, data n1ay have been biased or misclassified. Yunnan Province is divided into 15 districts, 2 cities 
and 127 counties. Of the 127 counties, 40 are located on a border and Longchuan County is one of the counties 
that borders Burma. It is one of the places with the highest rate of drug use and drug dealing in Southwest 
China. 
72 Wu, Addiction, 1676. 
73 Those selected for the surveys included health workers from the Yunnan Provincial Anti-Epidemic Station, the 
Dehong District Anti-Epidemic Station, and the Longchuan County Anti-Epidemic Station. Two were from the 
Dai ethnic groups, two from Jingpo and five from the Han ethnic groups in China. 
74 Wu et al. , Addiction ,1683 . Peer pressure exerts a strong influence especially in an environment where drug 
were prevalent. 
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In another survey which looked at both Yunnan and Guangxi between November to 
Dece1nber 1996, it was found that heroin was the drug most commonly used by males and 
females in all age groups. However, one interesting point was that heroin users were more 
concentrated in Guangxi than Yunnan, as can be seen in the following Table 5.75 Ninety-eight 
percent of drug users in Guangxi started with heroin, while it was only 85% in Yunnan. The 
fact that 13% of drug users in Yunnan started with opium, compared with only 1 o/o in 
Guizhou, is likely to be related to both local availability of opium and local traditions of 
opiu1n consumption. 
T bl 5 T f. ·r 1 d a e . ypes o lDI Ia rug use • (Of«) 0 ft f Ii d d among ms I u Iona se . Ch" rug users In Ina 76 
Region Gender Onset age 
Overall Yunnan Guangxi Male Female <20 >20 years 
years 
Sample size 833 (100) 505(61) 328(39) 734(88) 99(12) 417(50) 415(50) 
N(%) 
Types: 90 85 98 90 94 91 89 
Heroin% 
Opium% 8 13 1 9 5 7 10 
Pethidine% - 0 - - 0 - 0 
Morphine% - - 0 - 0 - 0 
Cocaine% - - 1 - 0 - 0 
Marijuana% - - 0 1 0 - 1 
Other illicit 1 1 0 0 - - 0 
drugs% 
Source: Li et al. , Addiction , 578. 
4. Explaining Rising Drug Crime 
What are the causes of the increase in drug-related crime in China? Aside from the 
official 1noralistic explanation in terms of bad attitudes such as growing selfishness and 
hedonism, drug-related crime can be explained by four main factors: poverty and growing 
inequality, lack of strong legal enforcement, corruption and lack of internal control. By lack 
of internal control, I mean that family and education have the capacity to profoundly influence 
the moral and social values of the individual. The failure or weakening of these institution 
75
. Xiaoming Li et al. , ' Illicit drug initiation among institutionalised drug users in China', Addiction, 
vol. 97, 2002, 57 8. 
76 
'Institutionalised', refers to the social setting where the initial use of drug occurred, whether this is at a 
friend's home, home of relatives, in the company of drug users, at hotels and inns, or 'drug-comers' (a specific 
place where drug addicts gather to use or trade drugs), similar to ' shooting-galleries ' . Participants in this survey 
were 833 drug users (734 1nales, 99 females) selected randomly from Yunnan and Guangxi provinces. 
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means that people have not been properly educated for social consciousness and personal 
responsibility. 
Under Communism, the Chinese state systematically tried to destroy 'feudal' 
traditions and ways of thinking. With the open door policy, the traditions of Chinese culture 
and thinking have been challenged by Western ideology, practices and values. The value 
syste1n of the Chinese has been modified and there exists a high level of disengagement 
following the failure of Communism. Especially, Chinese youth have also been challenged 
by a combination of growing materialism, school-drop-out rates and unemployment. Limited 
opportunities for social and workforce participation, and gaining wealth have been major 
factors in the high rate of drug abuse and rising drug-crime in recent years. 
Due to limited regional employment opportunities and improved levels of education, 
many young villagers began to migrate to the cities to find jobs to cope with this rapid 
change. Agriculture has become less productive, country and city dwellers alike have had to 
cope with unequal benefits, economic corruption, and double-digit inflation. A general rise in 
crime can be traced back to the breakdown of law and social order that began during the 
Cultural Revolution, as well as corruption since the open-door policy. 
4.1 Poverty & Inequality 
One of the biggest problems facing China, especially rural China is growing income 
disparities. 77 There can be no doubt that growing economic inequality has contributed to the 
1ise of drug-related crime in China. Drug smuggling and trafficking have been regarded by 
peasant and workers as an easy and quick way to get money. 78 However, motives for 
involvement in illegal activities vary. There are those who need money to move their fa1nily 
out of poverty, support aged parents, educate children and siblings, or set up a family 
business. They are the 'unfortunate' part of the population with no choice, no jobs, no 
unemployment. Some of them may be illiterate and not even know that the growing or selling 
77 China Human Development Report (CHDR), The United Nation Development Programme, China, 1999, 54. 
Growing income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient. The value numbers range from O to 1. 0 is 
perfect equality and 1 is absolute inequality. 
78 The Australian Institute of Criminology Occasional Seminar Paper 1998 states that an example of a top ten 
drug trafficker involved Ma Yonghua of Yunnan Province. She was noted to possess up to 20 million yuan of 
drug sales in Gansu Province. 
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of drugs is illegal. 79 However, there are also those who want to gain more wealth, lively 
luxuriously, or simply enjoy criminal activities. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is one way to measure the level of inequality in 
China. 80 Since the 1nid- l 980s, regional disparities have been widening, primarily because the 
richer coastal provinces have benefited from increased trade and foreign investment, leaving 
the rural interior provinces behind. Provinces that are economically more developed achieved 
higher human development. The greatest regional disparities occur between the eastern 
coastal provinces and the western interior province of China. All of the western provinces of 
China except Xinjiang are poor. Common characteristics of these areas are difficult and 
unfertile terrain, cold winters, low grain yields, limited resources for subsistence, few sources 
of inco1ne, poor e1nployment opportunities, lack of information, and a low educational level 
among farming families. 81 While China's GDP 1naintained an average annual rate of 11.7 
percent during the period 1991-1995, for the western and central regions, the average figure 
was of only 9 percent, while the eastern areas averaged 16 percent growth. 82 The rural-urban 
gap was 2.4 to 2.1 in 1988 according to the CHDR. 
Uneven economic development and relative poverty have led to the existence of the 
'floating population', groups of people who leave their home to look for work in the cities. 
Some become 'long-term migrants', while others settled permanently in urban areas. 
Esti1nates of the size of the floating population vary. The China Human Development Report 
(CHDR) states that it was approximately 84 million in 1995; census statistics from Crime and 
Social Control in China put the figure slightly higher at around 80 million. 83 Quite a number 
of these people have become drug addicts as they drift about and become exposed to the drug 
79 CHDR, 92. See Appendix 1 for Education Index By Province in China This table shows the inequality in the 
education component of the Human Development Index by province in China. 
80 The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the human development status and was developed by the 
United Nations Development Programme. It measures income, longevity, and educational levels. It has been 
estimated that there were 80 million people (8.8% of the total rural population) at the end of 1992 who did not 
have adequate food, shelter and clothing. The China Human Development Report says that the poverty line for 
urban residents was 1,700 yuan in 1997, which was three times higher than that for rural areas. See CHDR for 
further information on the HDI of China by Province. 
81 Christopher J. Smith, 'Modernisation and health care in contemporary China' , Health & Place, vol. 4, no. 2, 
1998, 131. 
82K wong-Leung Tang, 'Social Development in China: Progress and Problems ', Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
vol. 29 , no. 1, 1999, 98. 
In 1990, the central and western regions of China contributed 44.6 percent of GDP, the eastern regions 55.4 
percent. 
83 Guoan Ma, 'Population Migration and Crime in Beijing China' , in Crime and Social Control in a Changing 
China, edited by Jianhong Liu et al. , Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001 , 66. There have often been variations 
in data because sometimes the number of migrants were not registered. Peasants and local inhabitants have been 
able to move to cities and towns due to increasing flexibility of policy from 1984. 
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culture, though tracing their involvement in it is often difficult. 84 In Kunming for example, 
work on preventing HIV/ AIDS and STDs is targeted at a floating population of an estimated 
300,000 people, with the focus on education, medical care and advocacy. 85 
Members of the floating population often are engaged in undesirable jobs such as 
construction, manufacturing, babysitting, cleaning, manual work on construction sites, 
recycling, po1ier, sewing, restaurant work, and assembly-line production. 86 Peasants are often 
discriminated against and have to take jobs rejected by locals because of bad working 
conditions, low income and low prestige. Migrants are sometimes offered short-tenn work, 
but the employment conditions are not favourable, for example, there are no housing and 
health care benefits and facilities. 87 Those who do manage to find a better job are not accepted 
by the mainstream society. Among those who were treated badly are women. 88 Such 
circu1nstances, combined with an inability to improve their position may greatly increase the 
likelihood of the individual turning to drug use and drug trafficking 
Poverty persists in rural parts of Yunnan. The province has a gross per capita GDP 
output which is approximately 60 percent of the national average and 40 percent of the coastal 
areas. An estimate of 7 million people lived below the poverty line of less than an annual 
average income of 3 00 yuan per capita, this is 9. 7 percent of the total poor people in China in 
1994. Seventy five percent of Yunnan's poorest counties are in the minority areas. Seventy-
three of the 128 counties in the province are regarded as poor and 51 of these are minority 
autonomous counties. Those that live in the ethnic minority autonomous region are much 
poorer than the Han. The value of gross per capita output in these regions is only ten percent 
of the national average and five percent the average for coastal regions. 89 As observed by 
Ko taro Matsumoto: 
84 Liqun Cao and Yisheng Dai, ' Inequality and Crime in China', in Crime and Social Control in a Changing 
China , edited by Jianhong Liu et al. , Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001 , 80. 
85 
'China 1998 ', Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) , http ://www.msf.org/content/page.cfm?articleid=D56D8564-
7332-4F1B-B88D5684DD5DCE8B 
[Accessed 9 August, 2003] 
86 Zhenlai Deng et al. , 'Drug Trafficking and Consumption in China: Two case studies ', International Social 
Science Journal, vol. 169, 2001 , 418. 
87 Ma, Crime and Social Control in a Changing China , 67. 
88 Women have been discriminated in almost every area. They have a difficult time searching for employment 
since they are often uneducated and unskilled. Women are more vulnerable to drug and drug-related activities 
partly because they have been treated unequally and are subject to sexual harassment and sexual violence. See 
CHDR on 'Women's Status '. 
89 Kotaro Matsun1oto, Economic Development Among the Hui of Yunnan, Islamic Area Studies Project/ Tokyo 
Keizai University, Tokyo, 1998, 2. 
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About 5,000 ,000 of Yunnan's "poor population" of some 6,600,000 are minorities, and around 
2,750,000 are regarded as "particularly poor", whose income is still under 200 yuan a year. The 
financially self-sufficient rates of the "poor counties" are mostly under 30 percent. 90 
Table 6: Ayerage Family Member Income in Yunnan (yuan per capita) 
Regions Urban Rural 
1990 1,367 540 
1993 2,376 675 
1994 3,110 803 
Source: John Fitzgerald, Rethinking China's Provinces, Routledge, London, 2002, 193. 
As maybe seen from Table 6, Yunnan province certainly is poor, there is a big gap 
between the rural and urban per capita income, and the gap has been increasing (from 40 
percent of the urban in 1990 to only 26 percent in 1994). However, we cannot assume that 
since Yunnan is a very poor region, drug trafficking has been its only option. This is not true. 
Although there have been li1nited economic opportunities, the main sources of income have 
been touris1n, 1nining, sugar, coal, steel, industrial paper and legal cash crops such as rubber, 
tea and tobacco, as indicated by the Yunnan Statistical Department in Yunnan sishi nian 
(Yunnan's Forty Years). 91 
But if we look at the history of Yunnan, it is clear that drug cultivation has been a 
custom there. Opium poppy growing and involvement in drug trade were normal. Drug 
cultivation and the drug trade persisted because before the liberation there was no energetic 
government program of control, law enforcement was haphazard, and local peasants in 
Yunnan often were not aware that the drug trade was illegal and traditionally, opium 
cultivation has been found to be highly profitable. 
4.2 Lack of Strong and Consistent Legal Enforcement 
It is a generally accepted assumption that a lack of strict law enforcement has 
contributed to the high level of drug crime in China, particularly in the southwest. Strong 
government policy and strict penalties have been difficult to enforce because of geographic 
isolation, poor communication, ethnic diversity, and responsibility for drug enforcement 
90 Matsumoto, Economic Development Among the Hui of Yunnan, 2. 
91 Yunnan sishi nian (Yunnan's Forty Years) , Yunnan sheng tongjiju, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, (Yunnan 
Statistical Department, China Statistic Publishing) , Beijing, 1989, 105. 
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programs being divided between central and provincial authorities, often with little 
coordination. In regard to ethnic diversity, for example, it 1nust be noted that 26 of China's 55 
'minority nationalities' live only in Yunnan, while members of 1nany other minority groups 
also live there. Government policy towards ethnic 1ninorities has changed enormously over 
time, from assimilation to semi-autonomy which has finiher complicated the task of 
coordinating and i1nplementing drug control programs.92 
In so1ne regions, minority populations have not been under strict government control, 
and social and political policies have not been strongly implemented throughout the country. 
In so1ne cases this has been due mainly to geographic remoteness, but in others it has been 
because of particular minorities being treated differently by that authorities. There has been 
no single centre where all activities and concerns are uniformly addressed. Nor has drug 
control been the only casualty of the lack of energetic government programs and investment 
failure to improve the transport and communication network means that trade and economic 
development have not been successful either. 
In Pingyuan for example, a cautious policy regarding the opium issue has been 
implemented because of the difficulty in controlling the Hui community. 93 Since almost all 
n1embers of the Hui community are Muslims, law enforcement has often been difficult due to 
the fear of possible religious and nationalist separation. Since the penalties were less severe 
and not unifonn, conditions for drug trafficking have been relatively favourable. Hui 
Muslims living in the Pingyuan area have often been involved in the smuggling of illegal 
drugs such as heroin and opium, as well as guns, gold, silver, and pornographic products. 
Widespread availability of firearms has made enforcement of law and order a dangerous 
business. One argu1nent has been that Pingyuan has been dominated by the Chinese Mafia, 
including local government officers and managers of mosques, making control difficult. 94 As 
stated in 'Anti-Drug Ca1npaigns and Ethnic Minorities': 
92 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 167. 
93 Pingyuan is located approximately 200 kilometres from the Sino-Vietnamese border. It is located between the 
Wenshan and Yanshan Counties of the Wenshan Zhuang and Miao Autonomous Prefecture in southern Yunnan. 
Many minority groups inhabit the area, including the Han, Zhuang, Miao, Yi and Hui. The Hui comprised of 80 
percent of the total 15 ,000 population. 
94 It has been reported by Matsumoto in Economic Development among the Hui of Yunnan that, when police 
tried to crack down drug problems in Pingyuan between 1988-1991 , they themselves were attacked by Chinese 
Mafia 311 ti111es .The Chinese Mafia were composed of five ring leaders, three of which were cadres of the local 
government and two were managers of the mosques. They were thought of selling huge amount of opium to 
different parts of China, with drug smuggling rings in Hong Kong and Burma. They were also thought to be 
involved in the selling of arms smuggled from Vietnam. 
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Local residents did not pay taxes , did not apply for residence registration, and resident identification 
cards, did not register their marriages, did not obey fanlily-planning rules, and did not have their 
vehicles registered ... When the authorities would attempt to enforce the law, local mosques would 
sound alarm bells to summon hundreds of villagers to surround policemen when they entered the 
village. On a couple of occasions, policemen were humiliated when they had to surrender their guns 
- 95 before being allowed to leave Pingyuan. 
Tensions between the different minorities living in Pingyuan have also undermined 
strict law enforcement. Strained relations between the Hui and the Han co1nmunity, and the 
Hui with other groups such as the Zhuang, Miao, and Yi, have made government officials 
hesitant to get involved. The Taiwanese media have argued that the drug problem in Pingyuan 
has been the result of strict drug controls in Burma, which have led to the development of a 
Chinese drug route. 96 In fact, there is no clear evidence to support this argu1nent and 
researchers are not sure why the Taiwanese media reported the case in such a way. It may be 
due to political reasons. 
From the above observations, we can see that laws have been enforced differently in 
different locations. The Chinese government has approached the opium problem in the 
context of nationality policies and varying treatment of different ethnic groups. It is surprising 
to note that in provinces with high levels of drug crime like Yunnan, Xinjiang, and 
Guangdong, punishments for drug offences have been relatively lenient. For example, drug 
addicts must be imprisoned for five years in Beijing, but in Yunnan or Xinjiang be asked to 
pay a fine or undergo rehabilitatation. 
4.3 Corruption 
To what extent has reform changed the way the Chinese behave? China's transition to 
a socialist 1narket economy has weakened people's respect for legal and administrative rules 
and regulations. Moral commitment to the government ideology, self-control, effective 
institution and the rule of law have diininished sharply since the late seventies.97 People's 
95 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 163. The 
above quote refers to the Pingyuan community during the early 1980s. 
96 Matsumoto, Economic Development among the Hui of Yunnan , 11. 
97 Before the economic reform, Chinese citizens were expected to support the party and Mao's writing. State 
employees had to be civil and polite, cautious, truthful, disciplined and humble. They were expected to lead a 
simple life and conform with the rules and morals of society, and had to put the interests of the party, the 
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social standing before this was determined by their education, power and political conformity. 
This has not been the case since the reform, with wealth being a higher priority. Since 1978, 
the Chinese government has faced serious moral and disciplinary problems. 98 
It is generally accepted that the lack of motivation, faith and commitment to 
government have encouraged corruption, bribery and other forms of official abuse of power in 
China. Although corruption existed was found before 1949, it was not until the economic 
reform period that corruption became a serious issue.99 However, one cannot blame the 
changing political economy as the sole cause of corruption; corruption was not a by-product 
of modernisation alone. Rather, economic and political transition created wider opportunities 
for public officials to seek personal gain through abuse of power. 
Why should officials be poor when 'getting rich' became the basic motive of the 
nation? Public power allowed officials to collude for personal gain. Officials with low 
incomes and poor living conditions viewed corruption and bribery as an acceptable 1neans of 
gaining wealth. According to the People's Daily on June 21, 2003 a former governor of 
Yunnan, Li Jiating was convicted of having received over 18.1 million yuan (2.2 million US 
dollars) in bribes from 1994 to July 2000, when he was appointed as a deputy Party secretary 
of Yunnan provincial committee and vice-governor and governor ofYunnan. 100 Since the law 
for controlling officials was not strictly enforced, officials could regard illicit behaviour as an 
easy way of making money, with opportunities arising in administration, housing, pricing 
policy, enterprise investment, regulatory and fiscal reforms. Low-interests loans from the 
state-run bank were not infrequently used for personal investments. 101 
Drug-selling networks have become increasingly extensive and well organised, with 
police corruption a major factor. Most police officers, it seems, believe that they enjoy a 
certain level of flexibility in enforcement of the law. Chinese police regulations, for example, 
the Security Administration and Penalty Act and the Police Law of 1995, allow this flexibility 
country, and the people before anything else. Officials had to live up to high standards of themselves and had to 
make sure that others did the same. Improper behaviour and corruption were considered inappropriate. 
98 Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 2000 , 155.China ranked as the second most corrupt of all nations according to The 
Transparency International Survey of 1995, in 1996 China ranked as the fifth nation, and in 1997 as the eleventh 
place. The most corrupted sector lies in the criminal justice system. 
99 Even though c01TUption was widespread before 1949, the Nationalist Party did not do anything about it, which 
helped the Comn1unist Party gain popular support. 
100 
'Suspended Death Sentence Verdict for Yunnan's Ex-governor Upheld' , People's Daily, 21 June, 2003. See 
also , 'China corruption linked to triads' , CNN World, IO March, 2002. 
101 Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party, 191. 
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and police officers feel that they do not necessarily have to comply with the criminal court 
procedures, which were more stringent. 102 An example of a corrupted organization is the 
Custo1ns Service office of Shamen city. Among those caught for s1nuggling in 2000 were the 
vice commissioner of the police department of Fujian province, the vice secretary of the 
Communist ·Party's committee of Shamen City, the chief officer of the Shamen City Customs 
Service office, and more than 100 officials. 
Law enforce1nent agencies also obtain private money through fines. Xiaobo Lu argues 
that there was an increase of more than 10 percent in fines by the state administration of 
industry and cormnerce in 1993, compared to the previous year, amounting to an estimated 
800 million yuan. 103 Fines as a form of bribery are routinely transferred to private individuals 
working for the receiving agency. An example of illegal use of fines involves illegal road 
fees. Checkpoints along roadways are set up and those illegally transporting goods required 
paying heavy fines to pass through. It was noted in one report, according to Xiaobo Lu, that 
6,745 such checkpoints were cleared in 1995. This was half the national total in 1994. 
Sometimes, road fines were collected, on average at every 3 .2 kilometres. 104 Given the large 
profits made in the illegal drug trade, and the evidence of official corruption involvement in it 
all around the world, it would be very surprising if corrupt Chinese officials were not strongly 
implicated in its rapid growth. 
4.4 Lack of Internal Control 
Inadequate Education 
The lack of adequate education in China has resulted in low hu1nan development, 
which has had a negative effect on public attitudes towards the law and drugs, as it has on 
1nany other aspects of society. Schooling is the most important means of integrating, 
controlling and socialising people, yet China's education expenditure as a percentage of GNP 
has always been much lower than most other developing countries. It was only 2.3 % in 1997, 
102 Allan Y. Jiao, 'Traditions and Changes of Police Culture: Organization, Operation, and Behaviour of the 
Chinese Police' , in Crime and Social Control in a Changing China , edited by Jianhong Liu, Greenwood Press, 
Connecticut, 2001 , 170. 
103 This figure may not be accurate due to problems obtaining reliable data. 
104 Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party, 213. 
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compared with a 3.9o/o average for developing countries and 5.1 % for developed countries, in 
terms of proper education. 105 
One possible factor behind the rise in drug-related crime is the ignorance of the law. 
People may not understand the law, or may simply be unaware of the illegality of certain 
kinds of acts. One ailn during the reform period has been to restore legal education and 
institutions as an essential starting point for achieving a society ruled by law and responsive 
to its requirements. Law schools and law departments were reopened, among them the 
Southwest Political-Legal Institute in Chongqing. A new Northwest Political-Legal Institute 
was established in 1979. 106 
While a law enforcement system staffed by officials with proper legal training is 
essential, it is education about the law and drugs at the school level that is more urgent for the 
general population. But here there exists the lack of equity in China's educational syste1n. 
Schools are often under-funded by the government and are dependent on tuition, fees, and 
profits from school-owned businesses to generate funds. While, there is a group of high 
achieving students, whose families who can afford the tuition and are educated in high quality 
school, the needs of the less academic and economically disadvantaged students are largely 
ignored. The floating migrant population also suffers when sending their children to public 
schools because of inability to meet formal residence requirements and pay the education 
fees. Poor counties face the most serious challenges due to their very limited resources. 
In 1nuch of China, including Yunnan, in-school drug education is seriously neglected. 
This was true in major areas like Kunming, Mangshi, Ruili, Baoshan, and Longling. 107 
While, textbooks on drug issues have been distributed to students in Kunming and Ruili as 
after-school reading, this had not been done in Longling, Mangshi and Baoshan. This 
highlights the absence of effective drug education in southwestern China. 
There are several reasons why Yunnan has failed to promote drug education and anti-
drug prograins in schools. One argument has been that too much drug education could lead to 
105 Xiaohua, Liu, Overview of Educational Needs & Philanthropic Opportunities in China, International 
Cormnunity Foundation, California, 2002. 
106 Shao-Chuan Leng, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Analysis and Documents, State University of New 
York Press, Albany, 1985, 47. 
107 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 137. 
Despite the distribution of textbooks on narcotic prevention in 1992 by the National Narcotics Control 
Cormnission and the issue of anti-drug textbook in Yunnan in 1993, drug education failed to be effective in 
Yunnan. 
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students becoming curious to try drugs. That this could be a sensitive issue for 1niddle school 
students who have no prior knowledge of drugs was argued by Kunming N o.5 Middle 
School. 108 Another view expressed by education officials was that students are not interested 
in learning about drugs, that rather middle and high school students are concerned with 
university entrance exams. After-school handouts on drug issues were regarded as a 
satisfactory response to the problem. Another line of argument was that drug issues relate 
mainly to school drop-outs, who once have left school are not seen as the responsibility of the 
education system. As long as educators conceive their task in this narrow academic manner, it 
is difficult to see any progress being made in drug education. 
Family 
There is no doubt that according to traditional Chinese culture, the family was the 
main institution where proper thinking, morality, personal and social responsibility are taught. 
The family was where children were taught to be law abiding citizens. Under Confucianism, 
fainily was regarded as the core of society. 109 Filial piety was the basic obligation in the 
family and children are expected to maintain obedience, unity and harmony within the 
society. 
During the revolutionary period (1949-1978) Confucian values and the traditional 
family were strongly criticised and undermined, yet nothing has been put in their place. 
Sometitnes parents have failed to provide children with sound values and moral education. 
Parents themselves may not even be aware of the serious consequences of drugs or have 
information about newly released drugs other than opium. Improper parenting may result in 
children associating with peers who teach them bad attitudes and ideas, and can lead to 
delinquency. 110 The lack of education on the part of the parents contributes to the problem. 
According to The China Human Development Report of 1999, there were 145 million 
illiterates. The illiteracy rate was approximately 70 percent among those 68 years and older, 
but only about 5 percent for those 21 to 25 years old; however it was 12 percent in urban areas 
and 26 percent in rural areas. 111 In the poor province of Guizhou, the figures were 21 percent 
108 Zhou, Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 137. 
109 Ronald J. Troyer et al. , Social Control in the People's Rep ublic of Ch ina, Praeger, New York, 1989, 92. 
11 0 Troyer et al. , Social Control in the People's Republic of China, 54. 
Ill CHDR, 39. 
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and 41 percent respectively. 112 We can assume that illiteracy in Yunnan stood at much the 
same levels, and that therefore it is a serious obstacle to public education on issues such as 
drugs and the law. 
As modernisation has occurred, the Chinese household has become smaller, usually 
with one child. Inhabitants have become accustomed to sharing public toilets and semiprivate 
kitchens and there has been the maintenance of close neighbourhood relations. Jobs and 
chores have been carried out in semi-public area shared by several households. 113 Close 
interaction between neighbours can help detect deviant behaviour and criminal activities. On 
the other hand, rapid modernisation may diminish social control within the family if there is 
less guardianship, such as by grandparents available within the family. 114 
5. Consequences of Rising Drug Crime 
Modem drug use and the drug trade have been linked to other social problems. The 
use of drugs has resulted in dysfunctional family life, emotional and physical stress, low 
1norality, and harm to those closest to the drug taker, whether parents, children, siblings, or 
spouse. A common situation that occurs is that family members become less well housed, fed, 
and clothed. The lack of fulfilment of responsibilities within a family can lead to depression, 
resentlnent and may cause another family members to become drug-sensitive. As stated by the 
Public Security Minister Jia Chunwang in the China Daily in 2001 :"The life of a family is 
ruined when a family member is a drug addict."115 Apart from the material and psychological 
well-being of family members, drugs pose a serious threat to the Chinese society as a whole, 
particularly in terms of public health, rising official corruption, detoriating social order, 
growth in organised crime, low economic productivity and high unemployment. 
11 2 CHDR, 42. 
There has been differences in educational services in China, with most of the government funding having been 
concentrated on the coastal areas. For example in Guangdong, the annual per capita spending on education was 
1053 yuan in 1989, but 397 yuan in rural areas. The poorer areas of China also had to be responsible for their 
own tuition and surcharges despite the aid programmes by governments. 
113 Hong Lu and Terance D. Miethe, 'Community Integration and the Effectiveness of Social Control' , in Crime 
and Social Control in a Changing China, edited by Jianhong Liu, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001, 108. 
114Troyer et al., Social Control in the People's Republic of China, 17. 
115 Jiang, China Daily, 10 February, 2001. 
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5.1 Public Health 
Illicit drug use and particularly heroin injection are often associated with serious 
health consequences. 11 6 Health problems range from HIV/ AIDS to hepatitis, tuberculosis and 
sexually transmitted diseases (STD). Contracting HIV/AIDS is regarded as an incurable 
disease and can be transmitted through sexual relationships and the sharing of needles for 
injecting heroin. The first case was reported there in 1985 and it was there that the first centre 
was established by NGOs to promote public awareness of the disease. Hepatitis is another 
highly infectious disease spread by blood, blood products, injection of drugs and sexual 
contact. Tuberculosis can be easily contacted when because the irmnune system has been 
weakened, so people who are HIV positive also have a high chance of contracting 
tuberculosis. 117 The hallucinatory effect of drug can also delay decisions about safe sex, 
leading to STDs. The high rate of drug injection, drug use with cormnercial sex, sex with 
multiple partners and the trading of sex for drugs, have resulted in the high occurrence of not 
only HIV/AIDS but also STDs. 
According to the UN Drug Control Program in 2001, approximately 70-75 percent 
of all HIV patients in China were drug users most of them men aged 20-29. 118 The largest at 
risk group were the intravenous drug users, primarily those in southwest China. Such drug 
users make up 53 .3 percent of all the addicts and 40 percent of them share needles, as stated 
by Dai Zhicheng, deputy director of the Chinese Association of STD & AIDS Prevention and 
Control, a non-governmental organization. 119 Another study has estimated that 48 percent of 
heroin addicts in China are infected with AIDS, as a result of using sharing bamboo tips to 
inject themselves. Zeng Yi, a researcher from the Chinese Academy of Sciences states that by 
the year 2005, AIDS infection could rise to as much many as 6 million. The United Nations 
believes that there could be as many as 10 million HIV infections by the year 2010 in China. 
Although most drug users are male, there are also many female AIDS cases. 
Prostitution and ho1nosexuality, as well as drug abuse, have become widespread since the 
116 It is important to note that opium and heroin has long been associated with the traditional beliefs of promoting 
longevity and as a natural remedy against general aches and pains in China as noted earlier in Chapter 1. 
11 7 UNDCP World Drug Report, 95 
11 8 Joshua Kurlantzick, 'China' s Drug Problem and Looming HIV Epidemic ', World Policy Journal , vol. 19, no. 
2, 2002, 73 . 
11 9 
'AIDS-a battle that must be won' , China Daily, 30 July, 2003. 
Between 1989 and 1994 in Yunnan, HIV infection was confined to intravenous drug users in the southwestern 
border. It began to spread across the province in 1995. Between 1986 and the end of 1998, a total of 580,036 
people were put under surveillance, and 5,604 were found to be HIV positive. Among these people, there were 
854 females . They make up 15 percent. 
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1980s. 120 According to estimates by the Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine, Yunnan 
Province had a 3.5o/o HIV positive rate for prostitutes tested. It was predicted that the 
infection rate would reach 5.4 percent in 2003. Sex workers constitute the second largest at 
risk group for HIV infection after heroin addicts. Women are regularly kidnapped and forced 
into prostitution, usually in remote areas, where they have no resources of their own. 
Sometimes, a woman living with her spouse may trade sex to support her partner's drug habit 
and so be at risk from STDs and HIV/AIDS as mentioned previously. 121 
Throughout southwestern China 'shooting galleries' have been common. A 'shooting 
gallery' is a drug injecting tea shop where for a fee, a drug user is administered with heroin. It 
is com1non for poor drug addicts to share the cost of one injection of heroin and pass it from 
one person to to other. 122 Sometimes, heroin has been mixed with blood. Needles and syringes 
can be purchased without a prescription, although they are often in short supply. In some 
'shooting galle1ies' heroin is only sold on the condition that it is consumed on the premises, 
which presumably reduces the risk of police activity. The risk of HIV in such environments 
re1nains high because sterilisation of the various injecting ite1ns is rarely a consideration. An 
example of a particularly vulnerable group is the rural seasonal migrant workers of the jade 
and ruby mining areas of Lashio in the Northern Shan State. Many frequently travel between 
their homes and these sites of employment. 123 It has been estimated that as many as 500,000 
workers, some of the Chinese, visited this area in the mid 1990s. 
The number of HIV infections increased during the late 1980s and 1990s partly 
because of changes in drug trafficking routes. This affected different countries around the 
Golden Triangle region. Drug traffickers began to use the new route which passes through 
China, Laos and Vietnam, instead of Thailand. This is one reason why Yunnan has become 
heavily infected, along with Vietnam. However, HIV has also spread from northern and 
western Thailand across the border of Burma, particularly in the Shan state. 124 
120 It is likely that some female use prostitution to pay for their drugs. 
121 UNDCP World Drug Report, 79. See Vincent E. Gil et al. , 'Prostitute, prostitution and STD/HIV 
transmission in Mainland China' , Social Science & Medicine , vol. 42, no. 1, 1996, 1-2. 
The Chinese Public Security estimates that there are over four to six million prostitutes in China in 2000. 
122 Kurlantzick, World Policy Journal, 73. 
123 Gary Reid and Genvieve Costigan, Revisiting The Hidden Empire: a situation assessment of drug use in Asia 
in the context of HIV/AIDS, Centre for Harm Reduction-The Burnet Institute, Australia, 2002. 
124 For further reading on the impact narcotic drugs on the ecology in Northern Thailand, see 'Drug abuse control 
and the environment in northern Thailand, UNODC, issue 2, no. 4, 1992. 
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There is evidence that HIV and STDs are prevalent among the mobile population of 
Yunnan. Ruili in the northwest of China, is known for high rates of intravenous drug use, 
especially since Ruili is a major border crossing-link for Yunnan and the east coast of China 
with Burma. Baoshan city, Xiaguan and other parts of Dali are important tourist centres with 
high drug use and with extensive hotels and sexual entertainment services. Hekou is another 
major centre of drug activities and among Chinese and Vietnamese women working in 
entertainment centres. Service girls in entertainment venues also exist in Simao and 
Xishuangbanna. They are especially popular among truck drivers who make occasional stops 
at bars or karaoke venues. 125 Many of them have contracted HIV through the sex industry in 
Thailand. 
Mobility across border areas has facilitated the rapid spread of HIV infection. Table 7 
illustrates HIV/AIDS situation in China and other countries near the Golden Triangle, 
according to the Asian Development Bank figures for 1999. The Thai -Laos border is one 
exa1nple where working people can cross easily; moving between Mukdahan province of 
Thailand and Savannakhet province of Lao PDR, on the other side of the Mekong River. 126 A 
relaxed border control allows citizens of the two countries to move back and forth in small 
boats outside the surveillance system. The Lao border with China suffers from the same 
situation, and been an important factor in the increase in Chinese HIV infection. Border 
passes in Northern Thailand, in the town of Mae Sai, are available for two weeks, without 
official Burmese visas, permitting travel through Shan State to Mong La and the China 
border. The China-Bunna border areas have been especially vulnerable to drug use, with 
increasing labour mobility due to work in gem mines in the Kachin State of Bunna. 127 
125 
'Mobility and HIV/AIDS in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Country Report-Yunnan Province People 's 
Republic of China ', Asian Development Bank, 
http: //www.adb .org/Docun1ents/Books/HIV AIDS/Mobility/Default.asp, [Accessed 2 August, 2003] 
126 For further reading on population mobility in Thailand and Lao PDR, see Chris Lyttleton and Amomtip 
Amarapibal, ' Sister cities and easy passage: HIV, mobility and economies of desire in a Thai/ Lao border zone' , 
Social Science & M edicine, vol.54, 2002, 505-518. 
127 See Larry Jagan, 'Bum1a faces Aids explosion', BBC News, 25 September 2001. 
Also see Chris Beyrer, 'Shan women and girls and the sex industry in Southeast Asia; political causes and 
human rights implications' , Social Science & M edicine, vol. 53 , no. 4, 2001 , 543-550. 
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Table 7: HIV/AIDS situation for selected countries 128 
Estimated Adult infection HIV Pregnancy Estimated 
Number of rate (0/o) (O/o) Adult Death 
People with 
HIV/AIDS 
Laos 1,400 0.05 n.a. 130 
Burma 
-
530,000 1.99 3.4 48 ,000 
Thailand 755 ,000 2.15 1.8 66,000 
PRC 600,000 1.18 0.2 260 
Source: 'Mobility and HIV/ AIDS in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Introduction Greater Mekong Subregion 
Overview', Asian Development Bank 2003 . 
5.2 Social order & Security 
There has been some confusion of how illicit drug use can lead to social problems and 
lawlessness. Family disintegration occurs, leading to the neglect or desertion of children, or to 
the children themselves leaving home and taking drugs to the street. Children may have 
parents who are on drugs for temporary relief from troubles, and as a result, they too may 
begin to use drugs. They 1nay encounter new drugs and other forms of risk-taking behaviour, 
including alcohol abuse, violence, aggression, unsafe sex, and delinquent behaviour, which 
are likely to lead to long-term emotional, health and educational problems and an unstable 
adulthood. 
Drug-related crime often involves offences such as violence, robbery, theft, sale of 
firearms, and prostitution. 129 Sometimes, men, women, and youngsters sell their own property 
for drugs. Theft and property offences often are committed to support a drug habit. Most of 
the crin1es related to drug use fall on the poor who live in urban areas or cities. They include 
domestic burglary, molestation, and robbery while walking at night in streets or parks. As 
their situation deteriorates, drug users may also become involved in cri1ninal organizations 
and drug distribution networks, committing a variety of serious crimes in connection with 
128 Statistic on HIV/AIDS cases in Lao PDR may not be accurate because the country does not have a complete 
surveillance system and there is not enough data to show the progress of the infection. The actual numbers may 
be much higher. 
See 'Mobility and HIV/ AIDS in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Introduction Greater Mekong Subregion 
Overview', Asian Development Bank 2003 , 
http ://www.adb.org/Docu1nents/Books/HIV AIDS/Mobility/Default. asp, 
[ Accessed 2 August, 2003 J 
129 UNDCP World Drug Report, 97. Resistance by drug traffickers against inspection may have caused increased 
violence in China. For example, of 150 people in Yuexiu district in Guangzhou city of Guangdong Province who 
were caught for criminal offences, 60.1 % were drug users. This was in 1995. Of the robbers caught along the 
highways fron1 Guangzhou to Conghua, 80% percent were drug addicts. 
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illegal adoption, illegal organ transplants, or pomography. 130 Some find such activities as 
glamorous and exciting as well as financially advantageous. 
5.3 Unemployment 
Unemployment is one consequence of drug dealing and drug abuse. 131 Frequently, 
employees who are drug users are laid off. This does not mean that the individual has taken 
drugs during working hours, but rather the acute or chronic effects of drugs i1npair work 
efficiency. As already mentioned, health problems do not only include only HIV/ AIDS but 
also Hepatitis B and C, tuberculosis, and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) as discussed. 
Accidents, increased health care cost, and absenteeism are other possible outcomes of 
drug use. 132 Drug use reduces productivity and performance. Drug users may have consume 
twice the medical benefits consumed by others. Working with addicts may cause stress and 
unease mnongst other workers. There is also the possibility that a drug-using employee may 
steal or embezzle the co1npany' s funds or property. 
6. Conclusion 
As China progressed through the reform period, the existence of official corruption 
within the state bureaucracies, weak security system, and widening income disparities have 
strongly promoted the accumulation of wealth. This eventually leads to a desire for a better 
life, the need for more money, and the motivation of 'getting rich', as was illustrated earlier 
in Chapter 3. Not only was the desire for wealth that promoted drug crimes, but also the 
willingness to take risks. Some Chinese, especially the poor, could not cope with the changing 
economic situation. The introduction of luxurious products and western technologies have 
widened income disparities. The emergence of private business have interrupted the 
traditional life style, changing life and employment chances, both in the rural and urban areas. 
130 T , l\T u.1vDCP World Drug Report, 84. 
13 1 According to Crime and Social Control in a Changing China , in 1995 71.5% of the 611 drug users were 
unemployed in Yuexiu district, Guangzhou. 
132 UNDCP World Drug Report, 101. 
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The number of drug addicts in 2002 was more than 90,000, according to the International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, whether this is the addiction of opium, heroin, 'ice' , or 
methamphetamine. 
The nature and impact of drug problems are considerable, and have resulted in serious 
health, social, economic, and political consequences. News types of diseases have multiplied 
from the sharing of needles and blood transfusion, leading to AID/HIV, sexually transmitted 
diseases, and hepatitis. Unemployment is common among drug users, where many are laid 
off. Since many could not cope with the gap between income and costs, they entered theft or 
prostitution to support their drug habit. 
Since drug cri1ne is one of the easiest ways to earn money, many viewed it as an 
opportunity. Drugs found in Yunnan are transported from the Golden Triangle, the major 
poppy production area in Southeast Asia. Within the Golden Triangle, the Shan State of 
Burma produced the most opium. Opium and heroin were traditionally produced in the 
Golden Triangle, transported to Thailand and Burma and exported to the international market. 
But since the 1980s, drug organizations have opened up new ways to Yunnan, turning China 
into a large market for illegal drugs. Since Yunnan is characterised by high mountain ranges, 
deep valleys, thick forests and jungles, cross-border trade and drug smuggling have been easy 
to conduct. Drug trafficking spread rapidly due to geographical conditions and relations of 
ethnic minorities along the Sino-Burmese border. They will be fully discussed in the chapter 
that follows. 
46 
Chapter 4 
The Golden Triangle and China's Drug Problem 
(Past and Present) 
Some hill tribes, such as the Yao, stagger the planting of poppy seeds so that the flowers in a field 
would mature over a longer period of time. Others, like the Hmong, try to plant an entire field at the 
same time, thus creating a tightly compacted harvest period. They claim that, although the work load is 
intense, it is easier to simply move through the field tapping all the plants rather than having to select 
only the mature ones in several sweeps of the field. 133 
-Edward F. Anderson (Plants and People of the Golden Triangle) 
1. Introduction 
Large amounts of opium and heroin began to enter China after 1978, the 1nain source 
being the Golden Triangle. During period the 1949-1978, the Communist government 
succeeded in suppressing both opium production and consumption. The economic refonns of 
the late 1970s make it easier for a domestic market for drugs to re-establish itself, while, in 
the absence of local production of opium and heroin, the Golden Triangle increased 
production to meet the new demand. 
The 1nountainous remote areas of Burma, located opposite the northern Thai provinces 
of Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Mae-Hongsorn and Tak have always been vulnerable to drug 
smuggling, as argued by Samnagngan Khanna Kamniakarn Phongkhan Lae Phrabphram Ya 
Sep-Thid (Office of the Narcotic Control Board in Thailand) in 2002. 134 Massive a1nounts of 
heroin and opium were smuggled across the Bu1mese border into Yunnan and later distributed 
to other parts of China, including Shanghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Guangxi. The 
Yunnan drug trade route has developed in the last few decades, linking the Golden Triangle to 
133 Edward F. Anderson, Plants and People of The Golden Triangle: Ethnobotany of the Hill Tribes of Northern 
Thailand, Silkworm Books, Chiangmai, 1993, 119-120. 
134 For further reading on the current drug situation in Thailand, see 'Satthanakarn Ya Sep-Thid: Heroin Jakk 
Samliem-thongkamm Pham Prathet Thai ' (Drug Situation: Heroin From the Golden Triangle Through Thailand) , 
Samnagngan Khanna Kammakarn Phongkhan Lae Phrabphram Ya Sep-Thid (Office of the Narcotic Control 
Board in Thailand), http://www.oncb.go.th/document/situation02112603.htm [Accessed 14 July, 2003] 
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Hong Kong via Yunnan Province. Drugs are being transported from the Golden Triangle to 
Guangzhou and Hong Kong by air or truck. As more and more Heroin No.4 refineries are 
being established close to the Chinese border, it is no longer necessary to transport raw opium 
along the Thai-Burmese border in the south. 135 Traffickers can transport heroin easily from 
the no1ihern Shan States across southern China and into Hong Kong. 136 
This new trafficking route stems from the increased prohibition and strong law 
enforcement against opium cultivation in Thailand as well as the changing situation in China. 
From the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, Thailand was a principle route for drug trafficking 
and heroin exportation. But an opiu1n eradication program has been efficient in Thailand, with 
opium production decreasing from 250,000 kilograms in the mid-l 960s to less than 4,000 
kilograms in the year 2000. Areas that still maintained opiu1n poppy farms include the 11 
northern provinces and one northeastern province of Thailand, but opium production is 
gradually being replaced through crop substitution programs and the royal projects. The royal 
projects have been initiated by King Bhumibol Adulyadej and members of the royal fmnily in 
Thailand. They ailn to improve the living conditions of all the Thai people. The royal projects 
concerning opium substitution programs will be discussed further in Chapter 6. Since opium 
poppies have caused problems for the govermnent, the objective has been to educate tribal 
people in growing alternate crops, while allowing them to earn small incomes through 
farming. However, while opium has been significantly reduced during the last 30 years in 
Thailand, there has been an increase in the use of amphetamines in the country. 137 
135 Heroin No.4 is heroin of a purer quality. It goes through four processing stage where hydrochloric acid and 
ether are added to heroin base or heroin no.3. It is soluble in water, injectable and sold as white powder in the 
market, but the price varies according the colour. 
136Bertil Lintner, Cross-border Drug Trade in the Golden Triangle (SE. Asia) , Boundaries Research Press on 
behalf of the International Boundaries Research Unit, U.K., 1991 , 2. 
137 Desmond Ball, Burma and Drugs: The Regime's Complicity in the Global Drug Trade: Working Paper No. 
336, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1999, 2. 
According to the statistics by Samnagngan Khanna Kammakarn Phongkhan Lae Phrabphram Ya Sep-Thid 
(Office of the Narcotic Control Board in Thailand) there were approximately 75 , 071 cases of amphetamines 
where 66.3 million tablets were caught in during the month of January-September, 2002. This was equivalent to 
5, 969 kilograms of amphetamines. 
See also Kirsten Melbye et al. , 'Lifetime correlates associated with amphetamine use among northern Thai men 
attending STD and HIV anonymous test sites', Drug and Alcohol Dependence, vol. 68 , no. 3, 2002, 245-253 . 
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2. Locating the 'Golden Triangle' 
The term 'Golden Triangle' refers to the area where the borders of Burma, Laos and 
Thailand meet and the Sop Ruak tributary flows into the Mekong River. 138 The area contains 
approximately 3.7 million people and is about 92,000 square miles in area, though no one 
knows exactly how large because of its undefined borders. Some reports estimate its area to 
be as big as 97,000 square miles. 139 The Golden Triangle is the world's largest source of 
illegal narcotics, including opium, morphine, and heroin. It is the home of drug warlords, 
arms dealers, rebel armies and bandits, as well as numerous ethnic minorities. According to 
Alan Dupont, Drugs, Transitional Crime and Security in East Asia, the Golden Triangle is 
responsible for 65% of the world's illicit opium production, with a value of at least US$ 160 
billion annually. 140 
According to the Jiefangjun bao (The Chinese Liberation Army Newspaper), for 150 
years and 1nany generations, the Golden Triangle has been involved in opium cultivation. 
This is because opium was easy and cheap to grow and profits were ten times higher than 
growing grain. 141 Of course this was also true of much of southwest China, especially 
Yunnan. Approximately one-third of the arable land in Yunnan Province was devoted to 
opiun1 cultivation by 187 5 and by the end of the century opium became an ilnportant cash 
crop in Guangxi, Yunnan, Sichuan as well as the coastal province of Zhejiang and Fujian and 
other parts of China located near Burma and Laos. Opium cultivation became a cash crop in 
Thailand in the late nineteenth century, due to the arrival of minority groups such as the 
Hmong and the Yao who were escaping the disorders in China. As they migrated, the 
minorities brought with them seeds and knowledge of how to grow the poppy. 
138Peter Chalk, 'Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle 's Heroin Trade: Threat and Response ', Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, vol.23, 2000, 89.Chalk refers to the Golden Triangle as the "breadbasket" of the world's 
heroin trade. I would like to further explain that the rivers that flow into the Mekong River are the Kok, the Sai, 
the Ruak and the Ing. The Sai and the Ruak have their sources in Burma and form the Thai-Burma border in 
Chiang Rai, a northern province in Thailand. The point where the Ruak River joins the Mekong is known as Sop 
Ruak. 
139 Bo Yang (translated by Clive Gulliver) , Golden Triangle: Frontier and Wilderness, Joint Publishing Co. , 
Hong Kong, 1987, 2. 
140 Alan Dupont, Drugs, Transnational Crime and Security in East Asia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra, 1998, 8. 
141 
'Yunnanjingdu: zhimianjingsanjiao' (Prohibited Drugs in Yunnan Targeting in the Golden Triangle), 
Jiefang jun bao (The Chinese Liberation ArmY.) , 25 February, 2002, 10. 
It has been estimated that approximately 89 p~cent of opium comes from Burma, 9 percent from Laos and 2 
percent from Thailand. l 
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The Golden Triangle was originally a region of 'slash-and-bum' or swidden 
cultivation. In this form of shifting agriculture, trees and underbrush are cut down and burned 
before planting is begun, destroying insect pests and disease while leaving layers of ash which 
serve as fertilizer. Many minority people were involved in dry rice farming, and also planted 
maize for both human and animal consumption, and varieties of vegetables including 
cucu1nbers, tomatoes, squash, onions, beans, and melons. These crops are planted along the 
1naize, rice and opium poppy plants. It has been claimed that opium planted with vegetables is 
the most delicious. 142 
Poppies in the Golden Triangle cannot be grown at an altitude below 850 meters; it is 
believed that an elevation of 950-1000 meters is where the best poppies are grown. 
Therefore, growing poppy plants has been restricted to the upland areas of Burma, Thailand 
and Laos. In Burma, this means the eastern mountain range that runs from the north to the 
south through the Kachin, Kokang, Wa and Shan States. In Thailand, opiu1n is mostly grown 
in the N orthem and W estem Central Highland area, including the provinces of Chiang Mai, 
Mae Hong Son, Chiang Rai, Nan and Tak. 143 The opium-producing region of Laos lies in the 
Northwestern hill regions of Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Pong Saly, and Southern Houa 
Phan. 144 In fact, most of the refining of opium occurs in the laboratories located in the Shan 
region of eastern Burma, bordering China, Laos and Thailand. Essential chemicals involved in 
the refining process such as acetic anhydride, thionyl chloride, ethylidine diacetate are 
obtained fro1n either China or India, often imported as substances necessary for perfume or 
industrial dye 1nanufacturing. 145 Table 8 shows the estimated amount of opium produced in 
the Golden Triangle in selected years 1969-1979 and Table 9 for the period 1987-1997. 
142 Paul and Elaine Lewis, People of the Golden Triangle: Six Tribes in Thailand, Thames and Hudson, London, 
1984,16. 
143 Stephen Francis Worobec, International Narcotics Control in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia, 
University Microfilms International, Michigan, 1984,14. 
144 Southern Houa Phan was formerly known as Sam Neua 
145 See Chalk, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 92. 
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T bl 8 0 . P d f . th G Id T . I . I t d (1969 1979) a e . 1p1um ro UC IOn Ill e 0 en r1ang e m se ec e years -. 
Country/Year Area cultivated (hectares) Opium harvest (tonnes) 
Burma 24,800 183 
1969 
Thailand 42,000-135,000 14-45 
1979 
Laos 20,000-60,000 45-160 
1970 
Total (max.) 388 tonnes 
Source: James H. Turbull, Chinese Opium Narcotics: A Threat to the Survival of the West, 23. 
Table 9: Estimated Potential Opium Production in the Golden Triangle, 1987-1997 
(tonnes) 
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Burma 835 1,280 2,430 2,255 2,350 2,280 2,575 2,030 2,340 2,560 2,365 
China - - - - - - - - - 25 19 
Laos 225 255 380 275 265 230 180 85 180 200 210 
Thailand 24 25 50 40 34 24 42 17 25 30 25 
Source: Dupont, Drugs, Transnational Crime and Security in East Asia, 8. 
To put the figures in context, during the late 1960s Burma produced an estimated 183 
tonnes of opiu1n annually, indicating its role as a 1ninor producer of opium. Over the next 
twenty years, during the 1980s, opium production expanded dramatically, signifying that the 
Burmese government was unable to control illicit opium growth due to weak administrative 
syste1ns in the Kachin and Shan States, particularly near the ill-defined border with Yunnan. 
There was an increase of over 290o/o in two years from 1987 to 1989, but since the early 
1990s, the figures have become more or less stabilised. Opium production in Thailand has 
progressively decreased from 1979 to 1987, by ahnost 53%. Since indigenous cultivation of 
opium in Thailand has been brought under strict control, opium production has been limited, 
as expressed in terms of tonnes produced annually. The main problem that concerns Thailand 
is perhaps the city of Bangkok, which became an international transit point for drugs. Laos on 
the other hand, has experienced similar drug growth to Burma. Production rose substantially 
increasingly from 1970 to the late 1980s, but remained stable thereafter. 
Until 1949, the southwestern region of China remained a principle producer of opium. 
Opium production was gradually eliminated when the Communists came into power. 
Growing political discontent within China, the drive against drug addicts, laws prohibiting 
imports of narcotics and domestic drug trafficking within China, have all resulted in an 
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increased production in the Golden Triangle. After 1979, China became a market for opium 
and heroin; high-grade heroin began to appear throughout major Chinese cities, which act as 
centres for international drug markets and global narcotics trade. Chinese cri1ninal groups 
have beco1ne more internationalised, established their own operations independently or work 
in conjunction with foreign criminal organizations, largely confined within the Golden 
Triangle. The Golden Triangle has filled the gap left by the decline of domestic production of 
opiu1n in China and supplemented it by becoming the biggest producer of heroin in recent 
years. 
There are two main heroin routes from the Golden Triangle through China. The first 
route starts from Kokang and Mong Ko regions of the northeastern Shan State. It goes 
through the Chinese cities of Ruili, Wanding and Mangshi to Kunming. The second route is a 
southern route that starts from the refineries in Northern Kengtung, near the Laos border, then 
passes through the area of Jinghong in Xishuangbanna and on to Kunming. 146 In general, 
1nost of the drugs are now smuggled from northern Burma through Yunnan into Southern 
China for transhipment through Hong Kong. Hong I(ong is also a source of criminal 
activities in Africa, Europe and America. The issue of Asian criminal organization and their 
links with markets in North America and Europe will be fully discussed later in Chapter 5. 
2.1 Geography of Southwestern China 
Before 1949, the southwestern provinces of China were largely isolated from rest of 
the Mainland by mountain ranges and largely unnavigable rivers. 147 In assessing the situation 
of the southwestern provinces, especially Yunnan, one has to consider their topography. The 
Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is characterised by mountain peaks and ridges that are cut by deep 
valleys. They run into western Sichuan and northwestern Yunnan. The Yunnan-Guizhou 
Plateau is rugged and elevated. 148 Only 4 percent of land in Yunnan was suitable for 
cultivation in 1946. The Sichuan or Red Basin lies to the east of the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau 
and north of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau and contains the Chengdu Plain. Except for this 
Plain, the whole area is mountainous, with steep escarpments that hinder communication and 
146 Lintner, Cross-border Drug Trade in the Golden Triangle (SE. Asia), 26. 
147 The three major provinces of southwestern China include Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou. 
148 Dorothy J. Solinger, Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-1954: A Case 
Study, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, 4 7. 
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transportation. 149 Due to this rugged terrain, communication has been heavily dependent on 
the navigable sections of Yangtze River and its tributaries. 
This geographic isolation was attractive to 1nembers of the KMT after their defeat in 
1949. The KMT viewed the location as a safe haven for their own regime and settle1nent. 
Many of those who had escaped to Burma after defeat also made their way back to Yunnan. 
According to the case studies by Dorothy J. Solinger, more than a million ex-KMT 
supporters were left in the southwestern region. Among them were approxi1nately 900,000 
~bo\Jr 
turncoat troops, prisoners of wars, surrendered soldiers, .an estimated of 400,000 government 
e1nployees and teachers, and 100,000 state operated enterprise employees. It has been argued 
that there were also possibly other groups, including members of secret societies and spies. 
Spies, possibly as many as 80,000, were left behind by the KMT so they could maintain 
contact with local authorities. Some disguised the1nselves by working within schools, mass 
organizations, trade workshops, factories , mines and government organizations. 150 
The number of former KMT soldiers that crossed the international frontier from 
southern Yunnan increased from about 1,700 in early 1950 to 4,000 by April 1951. The 
Nationalist Army reconstructed an airport in Mengsa in the southern Shan State not only to 
get anns and logistic supplies from the Atnerican military planes but also as a location to 
export opium outside the Golden Triangle. By 1953, the nu1nber of former KMT soldiers in 
the Shan States was as high as 12,000. 151 Production in the Shan States greatly increased and 
an opium tax was imposed on hill farmers and caravans crossing their area. This practice 
allowed the KMT to finance the occupying troops and militias in Yunnan. Opium was popular 
as a source of profit and revenue to maintain their newly established rule in the southwest. 
149 Solinger, Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-1954: A Case Study, 49. 
Transportation of goods has been difficult, slow and inefficient. Often goods were carried by man or animal carts 
or transported by pushing carts along narrow stone trails. However, even these were limited. 
150 Solinger, Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-1954: A Case Study, 83. 
151 Nicholas Tapp, The Hmong of Thailand: Opium People of the Golden Triangle, Anti-Slavery Society, U.K. , 
1986, 26. 
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2.2 Border Trade in Southwestern China 
China's open door policy unofficially opened the gates along its international 
borders. 152 The border provinces are treated differently from the interior provinces because 
they are seen as important for trade development and as a market for border countries. 
Economic and social interactions in border regions have been helped by the fact that members 
of the saine indigenous minorities live across the borders, and in tum has reinforced the ethnic 
identity of those groups. 153 It was observed by Mevlyn Levitsky, US Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Narcotic Matters during his visit to China in 1991, that local and hill 
tribe inhabitants could travel back and forth in trucks loaded with raw materials such as logs, 
rice and fish, and were not seriously inspected by Chinese officials. On the Burmese border 
bridge, there was a young Burmese boy, around the age of 10, performing the duty of a 
guard. 154 There were no strict border controls or policies. 
Initially, after the People's Republic of China was founded, border trade was only 
carried out on a small scale by farmers on both sides of the borders. This reflected the State 
Council's 'Border Trade Policy.' Restrictions were enforced where Chinese fanners were 
allowed to buy only 30 renminbi worth of border goods. In this way, farmers and local 
inhabitants of the border regions were able to cope with the lack of everyday goods and 
n1aterials. 155 Border trade during the years 1949-1978 was confined to a 10-kilometre band 
along the border. However, these restrictions were not strictly enforced due to corrupt 
officials, ineffective border patrols, lack of political will, bribery and smuggling. 156 
Border trade between Yunnan and the neighbouring countries increased dramatically 
during the early 1980s. There was 1nigration from Yunnan to other parts of China as well as 
to Laos, Vietnam, Bunna, and through Burma, Thailand. Sino-Burmese border trade has been 
152The border trade of southwestern China increased from US $650 million in 1989 to US$ l.14 billion in 1991. 
This is an increase of approximately 75 percent. However, I would like to point that there were variations in the 
progress of border trades. This was due to the disparities in transportation, development of infrastructure 
facilities , and environmental differences. Wanding located in southwestern Yunnan is an important border town 
that has contact with much of Southeast Asia. A major border trade market known as the 'The Golden Triangle 
Wholesale Market' held up to of 2,000 stalls in 1993. 
153 Some of the hill tribes that inhabit the Golden Triangle are not indigenous to the region, some have migrated 
from the southern China region during the nineteenth century. They bought with them the custom of growing 
opmm. 
154 Joint Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control of 
the United States Senate, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1993, 25. 
155 Grant Evans et al. , Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social & Cultural Change in the Border Regions, St. 
Martin's Press, New York, 2000, 73. 
156 Evans et al., Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social & Cultural Change in the Border Regions, 74. 
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particularly productive as a result of the economic reforms, as China and Burma have become 
dependent on one another. Large ainounts of commodities from Southeast Asia entered 
Yunnan and Chinese goods such as machinery and electronic products, textiles, and medicine 
have entered the Southeast Asian market via the southern borders of Yunnan. 157 In early 1993 
for example, Burma gained $0.5 1nillion in the motor vehicle transit trade by allowing cars to 
transit from Thailand to China. 158 Yunnan on the other hand, imports wood, food, jade and 
aquatic products from Burma and more than eighty percent of the trade goes through Dehong 
Prefecture. 
Most of the policies initiated during the 1980s aimed to provide traders and investors 
with guidelines for trade and business management. To further illustrate the Chinese open 
border policy, 27 border districts were allowed to establish trade ties in 1984. Local and 
overseas traders could freely engage in trade and border passes and business quotas were 
waived. The Southwestern Cooperation Zone was initiated in 1984, consisting of the 
provincial-level administration of Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Guizhou, and Chengdu, and 
later was extended to include Tibet and Chongqing. The aim was to initiate cooperation in 
terms of resources, technology, capital, technical and management enterprises, business, 
transport and energy resources. 159 In Yunnan, subsequently 94 open cities and counties 
becaine involved, making up 74 percent of the province's total area. Seven state-level and ten 
provincial-level ports and 92 outlets have been established in Yunnan since 1992. The trading 
ports ofRuili and Wanding on the China-Burma border, Mengla on the China-Laos border, 
and Hekou on the China-Vietnam border are the most significant ports. 
A good example of how economic development and cross-border trade have gone 
hand in hand in Yunnan since the late 1970s is Xishuangbanna [Sipsongpanna] Prefecture, a 
region isolated even from the rest of Yunnan. Border trade in Xishuangbanna has been 
dependent on de1nand and supply from other parts of China, particularly the major Chinese 
economic cities. 160 The prefecture's connection to external markets has been maintained and 
developed by growing number of traders, most of them Han Chinese or minorities of the 
prefecture. Since the econo1nic reforms, approximately fifty free trade commodity markets 
157 See Wang Shilu, 'Yunnnan yu dongnanya jingji guanxi yanjiu' (Study of the Economic Relations Between 
Yunnan and Southeast Asia) , Yunnan shehui kexue (Social Sciences in Yunnan) , no . 4, August 1992, 21-23. 
158 David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism, Routledge, 
London, 1994, 306. 
159 Goodman, China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism, 295. 
16
°For further information on the recent economic change in Xishuangbanna, see Irene Eng, 'Historical 
Contingency and Commercialisation in Xishuangbanna', Royal Dutch Geographical Society, vol. 89, no. 4, 
1998, 446-458. 
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have been established in Xishuangbanna. The main exports from Xishuangbanna are sugar, 
machinery, building materials, cigarettes, and electronic hardware. Imported goods include 
from honey, medicinal herbs, preserved food, farm products, forestry products and 
minerals. 161 Xishuangbanna's cross-border trade was worth 222 million yuan in 2001 , an 
increase of 15 percent over the year 2000. 162 
If the open door policy has rapidly increased trade, investn1ent and fostered the 
developn1ent of an export economy in 50 percent of the 27 poor border counties in Yunnan, 
there is good reason to believe that illegal trade has flourished along with legal trade. The 
large scale movement of people and goods involved in legal trade has made it easier than 
fonnerly to move illicit drugs. Customs inspection of commodities have been weak and 
ineffective in Yunnan. There have only been three commodity inspection centres in 
Kunming, Ruili and Wanding. Goods can easily pass across the border without being 
inspected or registered at nu1nerous points along Yunnan's 4,060 kilometres rugged border 
with Burma, Laos and Vietnam. Particularly heavy Sino-Burmese border contact has 
complicated control of drug trafficking. The combination of massive drug production in the 
Golden Triangle and greatly expanded border trade have been major factors behind the sharp 
1ise of drug trafficking within China over the last 25 years. 
3. Ethnic Minorities in the Golden Triangle 
The ethnic 1ninorities inhabiting the southwestern part of China have played a major 
role in fostering the development of the drug trade in the Golden Triangle. Cross-border 
trafficking by ethnic minorities combined with local corruption have facilitated the movement 
of heroin throughout the region in recent years. The southwestern part of China has been 
home to many ethnic groups, often living in remote and isolated mountainous areas. Yunnan 
is inhabited by 24 ethnic minority groups, comprising one-third of the population. According 
to Yunnan sishi niari (Yunnan' s Forty Years), 79 of Yunnan's 127 districts, or 61 percent of 
the province, are minority autonomous districts. 163 
16 1 Eng, Royal Dutch Geographical Society, 54. 
162 
' Simao, Xishuangbanna he hekou bianmao yu guoji datong dao jianshe kaocha baogao' (An Investigation 
Report on Border Trade and Construction of Great International Passages in Yunnan) , Yunnan shehui kexue 
(Social Sciences in Yunnan) , no. 6, December 2001 , 43. 
163The major minority groups that live in the Yunnan Province are the Yi (10 percent) , Bai (3.6 percent) , Rani 
(3 .3 percent) , Zhuang, Dai, Miao, and Hui. 
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Due to shared border areas, religious beliefs, customs, festivals traditions, 
intennarriage, identical spoken and written language, tight controls have been difficult. Since 
people on both sides of the borders belong to the same minority group 1naking trade possible, 
trade has been easy to maintain. The expansion of the Manchu Empire after 1664 resulted in 
the southward migration of ethnic minorities from China that can still be found in many 
Southeast Asian countries. In the eighteenth century, hill tribes such as the Hmong and the 
Yao were pushed further west and south by Han migration, gradually moving throughout the 
highlands of 1nainland Southeast Asia. The political and social upheavals experienced by 
China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the Taiping Rebellion, the 
Nationalist Revolution, World War II and the Communist Revolution, accelerated the process. 
As these 1ninorities scattered and settled, they brought with them the practice and techniques 
of fanning the opium poppy. The major hill people of the Golden Triangle today comprise of 
the Haw (Chin Haw), Hmong, and Yao; the lesser tribes include the Lisu, Kachin and Lahu 
who settled on the border of Burma and Thailand. Many live in the hilltop villages and 
practice 'slash-and-bum agriculture' .164 In order to reduce the complexities of this study, I 
focus only on the Haw and the Hmong. 
3.1 The Haw 
The Haw, also know as 'Chin Haw' or 'Chinese Haw', are the traders of the Golden 
Triangle and the hill tracts which separate Yunnan from mainland Southeast Asia. 165 Many 
Haw have maintained connections with remnants of the Kuomintang army, which fled China 
for Bunna after the Chinese Revolution in 1949. They consider themselves Chinese, and are 
categorised in two distinct groups: the Muslim Chinese or Hui, and non-Muslim Chinese or 
rr 166 [1an. 
See Yunnan sishi nian (Yunnan's Forty Years), 97. 
164For further readings on the Yao minority group, see Hjorleifur Jonsson, 'Yao Minority Identity and the 
Location of Difference in the South China Borderlands, Ethnos, vol.65 , no . 1, 2000, p. 56-82. 
165 They are known to the Burmese as Panthay, and to the Thai and Lao as Haw or Chin Haw. They are Chinese 
hill people and are distinguished from the 'Overseas Chinese ' or hua chiao of Southeast Asia. Since the 
sixteenth century, the term 'Haw' has usually designated caravan traders of the mountain region. The majority of 
the 'Chin Haw' were Yunnanese Muslims and came to be referred as the 'Hui ' by the nineteenth century. 
166 Andrew Forbes and David Henley, The Haw: Traders of The Golden Triangle, Asia Film House, Bangkok, 
1997, 13. 
57 
Who are the Haw and what is their dominant role in the Golden Triangle? Where did 
the Muslims come from? Sop Ruak, where Burma, Thailand and Laos meet, is a long way 
fro1n the Middle East by any standard. 
The Muslims have long maintained trade links between Yunnan and Southeast Asia. 
Broadly speaking, the Muslim population of Yunnan can be categorised into three principle 
groups. The first are the descendants of Uighur military colonists thought to have inhabited 
the Zhaotong area in northeastern Yunnan since 1313. The second are those who live in the 
southeast around the Jianshui area and are descendants of Muslim refugees from the 
northwestern part of China, including Gansu, Ningxia, and Shaanxi. The last group are those 
who live in the southwestern region around Dali and are believed to be descendants of Sayyid 
Ajall and his followers. 167 Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Umar Al-Bukhari (1211-1279) was 
appointed by the Mongol emperor to govern southwestern China. Sayyid Ajall pro1noted 
irrigation works, agriculture, rice farming, and forestry. Muslims were allowed to take local 
women as wives and were allowed to develop trade and commerce. It was at this time that the 
caravan trade to India and Southeast Asia became a monopoly for the Muslims. Muslim 
influence and commercial power of the Muslims in Golden Triangle and the Assamese trade 
routes were later expanded by his eldest son, Nasir al-Din. 168 
Travel between Simao in southern Yunnan and northern Thailand was also undertaken 
for trade purposes. Two principle routes existed. One was through Burmese tenitory, 
passing through Kengtung into the northern province of Chiang-Rai in Thailand. 169 A second 
route was more easterly, through Phong Saly Province in Laos and turning south to Luang 
Prabang Province before heading west to the Mekong River and the Chiang Khong region of 
Thailand. 170 
167 Forbes and Henley, The Haw: Traders of The Golden Triangle , Asia Film House, Bangkok, 1997, 13. 
168 Forbes and Henley, The Haw: Traders of The Golden Triangle, 29. 
169 Thi 1 s was a more western y route. 
In fact today, Simao is a very important exporter for Yunnan. As noted in 'Simao, Xishuangbanna he hekou 
bianmao yu guoji datong dao jianshe kaocha baogao ' of Yunnan shehui kexue , custom officers argued that 
Simao's export in the year 2000 was US$12.18 million. This was an increased of 6.7 o/o compared to the year 
1999. 
17
°Forbes and Henley, The Haw: Traders of The Golden Triangle , 62. There have been arguments about the 
convenience of these two routes. One was in favour of the more easterly route via Nan and the eastern bank of 
the Mekong River. Other account suggested that the westernmost route via Kengtung was the best. Chiang Mai 
authorities and the Haw caravan traders have emphasised the advantages and disadvantages of the eastern route 
for several reasons. One was because the King of Siam did not allowed communication with the Kengtung 
people, who were subjects of Burma and were not trusted by the Thais at that time. 
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By the late eighteenth century and inid-nineteenth century, Yunnanese Muslims traded 
along the eastern frontiers of Tibet, through Assam, Burma, Thailand and Laos and into the 
Chinese provinces of Guizhou, Sichuan, and Guangxi. Among the goods that were traded to 
the south during the winter were fruit, nuts, carpets, brass utensils, salt and finished cloth 
which included cotton, wool and velvet. Goods that returned to Yunnan with the same 
· d · · 171 caravan were opium, tea, raw cotton, gem-stones, an sometimes grain. · 
Opium was cultivated throughout most of Yunnan by the mid to late nineteenth century. 
As Yunnan became a major producer, imports from British India to China gradually 
decreased. On the other hand, opium was also widely cultivated in the Shan States around 
K.engtung and opium produced there was exported to other Chinese provinces as well. 
Yunnan and Kengtung opium were extensively transported into Tonkin via the Red River 
(Lao Cai) caravan trail and into northern Thailand via Chiang Saen. The trade penetrated as 
far as Luang Phabang in Laos, Moulmein in Burma, Tali and Kunming in Yunnan, and 
Chiang Mai in northern Thailand. 172 
The Haws have drifted across the frontier from Yunnan and settled in the hills of 
Burma, Laos, and Thailand. By the early 1900s, many Chinese migrant labourers had 
inigrated to the northern province of Thailand. Many were from Guangdong and Fujian and 
by the inid-nineteenth century had settled in Bangkok. 173 Illicit heroin is inostly produced in 
and along the borders of Burma and in Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son Provinces of Thailand 
by the Independent Chinese Haw. Subin Khuenkaew notes that on 14 September 2002, three 
Chinese Haw drug traffickers with 500,000 speed pills had been killed in a dispute between a 
drug caravan and the Thai Pha Muang task force in Chiang Dao district. 174 The group was 
declared to have joined the drug groups of a United Wa Army, in transporting drugs in Chiang 
Dao. 
171 Forbes and Henley, The Haw: Traders of Th e Golden Triangle, 55. 
172 Forbes and Henley, The Haw: Traders of Th e Golden Triangle, 78. 
173 Ronald D. Renard, Th e Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs & Th e Making of Th e Golden Triangle, Lynee 
Rienner Publishers, London, 1996, 14. Doi Wawi located in Chiang Rai's Mae Suai district is said to be 
populated with 20,000-25 ,000 people, 1nostly Chinese Haw and other hill tribes. 
See Appendix 2 for figure of Problematic Statistics on Opium Production in Northern Thailand, 1917. 
174 Subin Khuenkeaw, 'Three killed in gun battle with Pha Muang task force ', Bangkok Post, 15 September, 
2002. 
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3.2 The Hmong 
The Hmong, or Miao as the Chinese call them, are a scattered ethnic minority that 
dwells in the mountain regions of central and southwest China and beyond the national 
borders. The Hmong live in an environment which is favourable for poppy growing. As the 
Hmong moved south of the Chinese border, they acquired a new name 'Meo', which is 
rendered from the Chinese word, 'Miao' .175 The Shan call them 'Meow' or 'Hka-meow' , and 
in some districts they are commonly known as 'Che-hpok' or white-chinamen for their white 
clothes. It has been suggested that the Hmong originated as far away as Mesopotan1ia, that 
they may have descended fro1n North Asian tribes or peoples from Caucasia and Mongolia 
who later settled in Southern China. Another opinion is that the Hmong long lived around the 
Yangtze River, spreading from there to Sichuan, Hunan, and Guangxi, and later to Yunnan.176 
Despite disagreements regarding about the origin of the Hmong, there is general agreement 
that they have long lived in Guizhou and Hunan, while those in Yunnan and Sichuan 
provinces are recent arrivals. 177 
Opium was an important cash crop for the Hmong and other hill tribes in China. 
Apart from the consumption of vegetables by boiling, the Hmong were able to exchange 
opium for salt, needles, clothes, thread, kitchen utensils, flashlights, guns, radios, silver and 
kerosene lanterns. It is said that during the 1950s, opium could be sold to purchase rice that 
would last up to seven months of the year. Opium was also used in exchange for silver, 
which plays an important role in marriage and transmission of wealth from one generation to 
another. Marriage payments or bridewealth could be as much as US$ 750, which could not b e 
saved without trading in opium. Without opiu1n there would be no silver, and consequently 
little chance of getting married in the H1nong community. As Nicholas Tapps observes: 
Opium doesn ' t go looking for money. Money comes looking for opium. And those who bring it are 
traders who have never effectively been suppressed. 178 
175 Willian1 Robert Geddes, Migrants of the Mountains: The Cultural Ecology of the Blue Miao (Hmong Njua of 
Thailand) , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976, 29. 
The Hmong call themselves 'Hmong ' or 'Mong ' . They dislike the name Miao because it means "rice shoot" . 
176 Bunthorn Orndam et al. , Chiwit -Bon Sendai khong 13 PhaoThai (Life of the 13 Hilltribes in Thailand), 
Dorkya Ltd. , Bangkok, 1994, 70. 
177 Geddes, Migrants of the Mountains: The Cultural Ecology of the Blue Miao (Hmong N]ua of Thailand), 25. 
178Tapp, The Hmong of Thailand, 24. 
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Opium is important in other ways. The Hmong use opium as a means of obtaining 
pleasure and recreation, as well as for medicinal purposes. Opium is used to relieve pain, 
particularly by those with serious illness and where there is an absence of health facilities in 
the highlands, but Hmongs are aware of the dangers of addiction. While some believe it is an 
' 
effective treatinent for snake bites, opiu1n is not regarded as 'very important' in the treatment 
or cure of disease, due to fear of its poison. 179 Opium is also used for religious purposes by 
shamans, to help them enter a trance. This is very com1non in Meto in northern Thailand. 180 
Their long history and involvement of opium consumption makes it hard for 
1ninorities such as the Hmong and Haw to adopt the new attitude that producing and selling 
opium is a cri1ne in the eyes of both the national and international com1nunities. Long-
established traditional use of drugs and integration of them into social codes make it difficult 
for the local hill tribes to accept the fact that opium must be regarded as evil. As one refugee 
fro1n Bun11a stated, "This is the only 1nedicine we have." 181 Moreover, the growth of the 
international heroin trade has presented new opportunities for earning high incomes, so it is 
not surprising to see the involve1nent of poor minorities and farmers in drug trafficking. 
4. Conclusion 
The Golden Triangle and the province of Yunnan have long been a major grower of 
opiu1n poppies. More recently, the area has become a producer of heroin processed from 
opium harvested there. It is a place where the bricks of opium paste were traded for cash and 
gold bars, hence of the name "Golden Triangle". Since the decline of opium production in 
China during the 1950s, there has been a problem of market supply. Heavy involvement by 
local tribal people and the Han Chinese resulted in increased production in the Golden 
Triangle, which rapidly replaced supply from China. As the economy of China developed, 
with growing cross-border trade and investment, notably between the southwestern provinces 
of China and Southeast Asia, the movement of heroin became associated with international 
crime groups. Heroin use in North America and Europe has become popular again and 
179 There has been a case that opium was used as a mean of suicide. The most common case has been those of 
women who do not want to get married or have quarrelled with their husbands. 
180Tapp, The Hmong of Thailand: Opium People of the Golden Triangle, 15. 
181 Rupa Chinai and Rahul Goswami, 'Health-Asia: Golden Triangle Heroin Trade Fuels HIV/AIDS' , Inter Press 
Service, 28 April, 1997. 
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producers in northern Burma have responded to increase the heroin demand, making China a 
transhipment point as well as a market for illegal narcotics. 
Transport and government enforcement in the Golden Triangle have often been 
inefficient. This has created favourable conditions for drug dealers and warlords. Also, with 
the open door policy in place, cross-border trade has become easier for both legal and illegal 
commodities. Since ethnic minorities such as the Haw and the Hmong have maintained a 
cultural tradition of drug use as noted above, it would be unexpected were they not to take 
advantage of the new opportunities. For such people to regard opium production and 
consu1nption as crimes requires a big change in outlook. International drug trafficking, and 
the violence and corruption associated with illicit distribution networks, will be discussed 
next. 
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Chapter 5 
International Drug Trafficking 
Since the prohibition of narcotics in the 1920s, alliances between drug brokers and intelligence agencies 
have protected the global narcotics traffic. Given the frequency of such alliances, there seems a natural 
attraction between intelligence agencies and criminal syndicates. Among all the institution of modern 
society, intelligence agencies and criminal syndicates alone maintain large organizations capable of 
carrying out covert operations without fear of detection. 182 
-Alfred McCoy (The Politics of Heroin) 
1. Introduction 
Within the last decade, China gradually became one of the biggest victims of 
international drug trafficking. Drug production and drug dealing have become substantial 
sources of revenue for criminals, and the development of the drug trade has entailed a 
significant growth in illegal activities, especially the formation and development of criminal 
organizations for drug trafficking. China's role as a major participant in international 
criminal activities has coincided with the country's emerging position in foreign investment 
and the global economy. Drug turnover represented approximately 8 percent of international 
trade and an esti1nated US$120 billion were laundered through banks in 1997 .183 Since this is 
the case, can one argue that the rise of international drug trafficking has been an integral part 
of increased economic development and growth? Or has this been rather a pathological 
develop1nent, the result of the rise of corruption, lack of law enforcement, social inequality, 
moral decline, or simply the desire for more money and power? 
The drug trade has long involved both the state and private sector, both directly or 
indirectly. Involvement of the state in prohibited narcotics ranges from direct support for drug 
production and trade, to imposing taxes, controlling personal behaviour and regulating drug 
182 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Lawrence Hill Books, 
New York, 1991 ,15. 
183 Tom Carnwath, Heroin Century, Routledge, New York, 2002, 193. 
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trafficking by protecting favoured dealers. 184 In the case of China, it is impo1iant to recall 
that the Opium Wars were caused by British state-sponsored opium trafficking, that local 
warlords (including those in the Southwest) regularly relied on income from opium to fund 
their armies and administrations, and that at least some elements of the KMT, before and after 
1949, were involved in the drug trade. The CIA is a late but important example of unofficial 
or covert-official state involvement in the drug trade during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 
mountains and borderlands near Yunnan, opium warlords have maintained protection for their 
opium cultivation by establishing their own armies and alliances with secret agencies or 
brokers. The CIA allied itself with heroin dealers in Laos and Chinese druglords in Burma. 
Covert operations along the border of China and support for a KMT invasion of southwestern 
China in 1951 were handled by the CIA. When the operation failed, the KMT 1nilitary 
caravans continued to move Burma's opium exports into northern Thailand, where they were 
purchased by Chinese syndicates for domestic distribution and for the international market. 
Protection and i1nmunity from investigation may extend to an international level, as 
national police, national politicians, and intelligence organizations become crucial for 
operations in the global market. Sometimes, corrupt officials such as senior police and 
government official work with these drug networks in a 'private' capacity, in return for bribes 
or a share of the profits, as mentioned in the previous chapter O? political con-uption. 
Intelligence agencies may establish contact and limited cooperation with crin1inal 
organizations, for example, in port cities and on national borders. Chinese triads and other 
criminal organizations have also become very active among the overseas Chinese 
communities, giving Chinese criminal groups an international reach. This chapter examines 
the CIA' s involvement in drug trafficking, as an example of state involvement in the d1-ug 
trade and the crucial role of international Chinese criminal organizations and their impact on 
Chinese society globally. 
184 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, 490. Close relations with major 
narcotic traffickers have been established whether this is the Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, Gaullist France, 
French Indochina, the Kingdom of Thailand, Pakistan or the United States. 
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2. The CIA in China and the Golden Triangle 
The Ainerican CIA or Central Intelligence Agency, was established in 194 7 to ca1Ty 
out intelligen·ce activities to promote national security. In theory, its activities are directed by 
the President. 185 They have included counter-terrorism, monitoring adherence to non-
proliferation treaties, defence, arms control, suppression of narcotics trafficking and 
international organized crime. Sometimes, however, in order to pursue one aspect of national 
security, it appears to have participated in activities which from another direction appear to 
subvert it. Drug trafficking is one of these. For the sake of clarity and emphasis, I will only 
explore the background involvement of the CIA in global drug trafficking, for this is relevant 
to our discussion of the drug trade and trafficking in the People's Republic of China and the 
Golden Triangle. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, CIA involvement in the global drug trade was linked to the 
Cold War. The organization was involved in the fight against Communism and to this end 
made alliances and links with local warlords, many of whom were drug dealers. On the 
global level for instance, the CIA wanted to limit the expansion of the Soviet Union's 
influence in Eastern Europe. They wanted to prevent Communism from spreading and 
therefore got involved in the internal politics of Italy and France. 186 There is some evidence 
that the agency helped the leaders of Italian Mafia to seize control of power in Sicily and sent 
1noney to heroin smuggling centre in Marseilles. This was done to "assist" the "battle" against 
Cormnunism. 
In Southeast Asia, the agency proved to be important in terms of its covert action. The 
CIA mobilised troops against Communism in China and the agency became involved with the 
KMT when General Li Mi escaped from Yunnan into eastern Burma after the Chinese 
Communist Revolution in 1949. (See also the discussion in Chapter 4 above the reasons for 
the KMT involvement in Burma and its relation to the Golden Triangle and China.) 
The agency provided support in the form of arms, ammunition and major supplies to 
the KMT as a mean of resistance against the Chinese Communism. 187 There is evidence from 
185 See The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents by William M. Leary. 
LSG McCoy, The Poitics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in The Global Drug Trade , 18 . 
LS
7 
'A Tangled Web: A History of CIA Complicity in Drug International Trafficking ', Congressional Record, 
Institute of Policy Studies, United States, 1998. 
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a Burmese intelligence officer that in 1951, the CIA C-46 and C-47 aircrafts made five 
parachute drops a week to KMT forces in Mong Hsat. With these supplies, the KMT were 
able to establish training and base camps near the border of China. It was also observed that 
A1nerican pilots of Civil Air Transport loaded opium back on their flight to Bangkok. There 
can be no doubt that the CIA was aware that its allies were involved in the trafficking of 
drugs. In late 1952, after abortive attempts to invade China, the KMT suspended its drive 
against Com1nunism and started occupying territory in the Shan States, between the Salween 
River and the China border, including Kokang, Wa, and Kengtung States. These were areas of 
large-scale opium cultivation. As opium cultivation in Yunnan declined during the 1950s, the 
KMT expanded illicit drug production in the Shan States. Sometimes, Chinese men married 
women fro1n the hill tribes, for example, the Lahu, to secure their opiun1 dealing, 1naintain 
control and establish close contacts within the villages. As stated by Alfred McCoy: 
The KMTs took over the control and administration of circles (districts) and village tracts. They started 
opening up revenue collection centers, and local people were being subjected to pay gate-fees and ferry 
fees, on entering their occupied area. Custom duties were also levied on all commodities brought into 
their territories for trade. The taxes were collected in kind as well as money ... By means of threat and 
coercion, these KMT aggressors forced the local inhabitants to comply with their demands. 188 
The CIA 1naintained close ties with the Hmong communities, many of whom were 
opiu1n poppy cultivators. 189 It has been estimated that a secret army of approximately 30,000 
Hmong was used to fight against the Communists in Laos near the border of North Vietnam 
in during 1960-1975. 190 This indicates that the CIA was heavily dependent on troops from 
tribal leaders and warlords in the region. Since the CIA wanted to keep the tribal leaders in 
power, they not only allowed tribal leaders to continue their opium cultivation provided but 
also supplied air transport. This was apparent in 1971 when the Hmong officers loaded 
opium on the CIA helicopter Air America and nothing was done. The information given to 
Alfred McCoy by General Su Yang, a Laos District Officer, showed that American 
helicopters and pilots regularly carried opium back and forth. As stated: 
188 McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in Th e Global Drug Trade , 172. 
189 The Hmong of Northern Lao were influenced by the French to change their cash crop to opium. This 
happened during World War II when the French promised to give the Hmong support in exchange for their 
opium cultivation. 
190 McCoy, The Poitics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in The Global Drug Trade, 18. 
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Meo [Hmong] officers ... came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at one time. The 
helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come back here 
and radioed Long Tieng to send another helicopter. They take the opium back to Long Tien. 191 
CIA involvement has also been confirmed by General Thao Ma, who was the former 
cormnander of the Laotian Air Force. General Thao Ma did not work with General Ouane 
Rattikone, refusing to transport opium for him. 192 
Evidence of the agency's participation in the heroin trade has been gathered in a US 
Congress publication as well. Alfred McCoy argues that experience in the subregion and 
findings from research have allowed him to come to several conclusions about CIA 
collaboration with the Hmong in Laos. He further notes that it was General Ouane Rattikone, 
fonner chief of the Royal Laotian Army, who personally revealed that he was in charge of the 
opiu1n trafficking in northwestern Laos in 1962. 193 The general agreement about Rattikone 
was that he never denied or covered up his involvement in the drug circle, but also never 
actually admitted it. The CIA made no response when General Ouane Rattikone established a 
heroin laboratory. 194 It seems that even though the CIA were not associated with the buying of 
heroin or its production, they were implicated in the shipment of it, and CIA links with the 
tribal and local leaders involved expansion of the heroin business. 
It has been argued that the CIA' s actions helped to establish the huge network of 
heroin laboratories in the Golden Triangle, mentioned in Chapter 4. Some of the heroin 
produced there was exported to American troops in Vietnam. As argued by the New York 
Times, which published an extract from the CIA report, there were twenty-one opium 
refineries in the Golden Triangle. The most important refinery centres were located in 
Tachilek in Burma, Ban Houei Sai and Nam Keung in Laos and Mae Salong in Thailand. It 
has been noted that three of these were managed by allies of the agency, for example, Ban 
Houei Sai was controlled by the Royal Lao Army ( and owned by General Rattikone ), Nam 
Keung commanded by the chief of CIA for northwestern Laos and Mae Salong was looked 
191 Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations, US Congress, United States, 1973, 722. 
192 Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations, 722. 
193 Booth, Opium: A History , 267. 
General Ouane Rattikone controlled international drug trade through different agents in Bangkok, Saigon, and 
Hong Kong. He maintained his own trademark '999' for branding his goods, including morphine blocks. '999 ' 
means 99 .9 percent pure as in the standard of gold. However, Southeast Asian morphine at the time was not 99 .9 
percent pure but only 50 percent pure. See Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations, 722. 
194Booth, Opium: A History, 257. 
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after by the Nationalist Chinese who fought for the agency in Burma. 195 Seven of the twenty-
one opium refineries were capable of manufacturing 90 to 99 percent pure Heroin No. 4. 
Allegations of its involvement in the drug trade have been denied by the CIA, as 
reported in the US Congress publication, Foreign Assistance and Related Program 
Appropriations in 1973.196 The CIA strongly rejected the claim that the agency supported 
heroin trafficking in Southeast Asia. The CIA claimed that the issue of narcotics is, in fact, 
important to the security of the United States. As stated by Richard Helms, the executive 
director of the CIA: 
There is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow involved in 
the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and 
grandchildren as are all of you. As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign 
roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with 
a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problems. 197 
Even though the role of the CIA's involvement in drug trafficking in Southeast Asia 
has attracted the attention of the media, the reports have been heavily focused on the 1950s-
1970s. Books have been written about the CIA drug trafficking by former agents and pilots, 
such as Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA by Ralph W. McGeHee, The Politics of 
Heroin in Southeast Asia and The Politics of Heroin-CIA Complicity in the Global Drug 
Trade by Alfred McCoy. There have also been books on the agency's operation in other parts 
of the world, including Cocaine Politics by Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall, The 
Crime of Patriots by Jonathan K witny, The Big White Lie by Michael Levine, Out of Control 
by Leslie Cockburn, and Bluegrass Conspiracy by Sally Denton. 198 These books testify to the 
continuing involvement of the CIA in the drug trade. However, they primarily focus on the 
organization operations in South and Central America rather than China and Southeast Asia. 
195 Alfred McCoy, 'Third World Traveller', Progressive Magazine, August 1997. 
196 Indeed, there has been disagreement on the CIA and Ralph W. McGeHee argues in his book Deadly Deceits: 
My 25 Years in the CIA that the CIA is not an intelligence agency, rather it is an anti-intelligence agency. The 
CIA produces only information wanted by the policymakers to support their plans and suppress information that 
does not support those plans. McGeHee further notes that the CIA supports the covert action of the President in 
terms of foreign policy. 
197 Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations, 721. 
198 Rodney Stich, 'CIA and DEA Drug Smuggling ', Unfriendly Skies: Saga of Corruption , chapter 19, 
http://www.druggingamerica.com/ [Accessed 1 July, 2003] 
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As far as CIA involvement in drug trafficking in China and Southeast Asia during the 
1980s and 1990s is concerned, studies have been limited and there is little information 
available. I am not sure whether this is because the CIA has ceased to operate in the area or 
because relevant information has been covered up. However, since the goal of the CIA has 
been to protect American security and to oppose Communism, and China is still a communist 
country, it could be argued that the organization would find it no more difficult than formally 
to justify efforts to undermine China, and if necessary use drug trafficking for that purpose. 
For what woud a rise in Chinese power mean for the United States? 
Although the United States has repeatedly stated that it welcomes the rise of China, it 
is at the same time watching China's emergence carefully. As stated by Richard Haass, State 
Department Director of Policy Planning Staff at the National Committee on US-China 
Relations in New York on December 5, 2002, "The United States is also watching expectantly 
to see whether China uses its emerging power to create global opportunities for economic 
growth, a peaceful international order, and personal freedom." 199 There is little doubt that the 
US sees China as the main obstacle to global hegemony. As Frank Ching in the Business 
Times of March 13 , 2003 put it: 
The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy to impose its 
will on the US. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a 
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States. There it is, in 
black and white. The US will see to it that no country can ever equal its military power, not to say 
surpass it. Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great 
economic and political influence. It intends to stay that way. 200 
The United States has been competiting with China for influence in Southeast Asia. 
Since China has been supplying the United Wa force with weapons for its fight against other 
ethnic groups in the region, the United Wa has in tum provided help by constructing a 
network of roads that would allow China to gain land access to ports in Burma. This would 
199 
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make it easier for China's navy to dominate maritime sectors, not only in the South China Sea 
but also in the Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca.201 
The above observations highlight that the emergence of drug trade coincided with the 
long-term involvement by the government and state agencies. The long term-strategic 
interests of nations can be viewed as much more essential than countering the international 
drug trade. The agency's alliance with the Third World brokers have in fact, linked new 
production areas to the global market. Involvement of the CIA in the drug trade is just a 
corrosive example of drugs being used to gain 'higher' political goals, a tactic used formally 
by the British and French governments, Chinese warlords and the KMT, and some minorities. 
Therefore, it is not surprising to see that many nations have had close interactions with major 
narcotic traffickers. If the government has an active control over the drug trade, how can 
production and sales of drug and international narcotics trafficking be conquered? Since 
allegations of connections between drug dealers and state officials have become contentious, 
how can control ever be managed within the state? Can ordinary people's attitudes ever be 
changed? 
3. International Chinese Organised Crimes and Heroin Trafficking 
How is organised crime related to drug trafficking in China, Southeast Asia and the 
international community? One line of argument is that the existence of criminal organizations, 
especially Chinese criminal organizations, has helped international drug trafficking to 
flourish. The opposing argument is that it is the massive profits to be made from drug 
trafficking that have encouraged the proliferation of international criminal organizations. It is 
most likely that both are correct, that causality has been running in both directions. 
In much popular discussion, it has been asserted that the emergence of the 
international Chinese organised crime is a particular manifestation of Chinese culture. 
Chinese organised crime groups include 'triads' in Hong Kong and Chinese 'tong' and 
'gangs' in the United States and elsewhere. Triads are secret organizations that exist for 
criininal purposes. They not only originated in Hong Kong. Mainland societies also known to 
201 
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be active in Hong Kong are the Ching Group and the Big Circle. Those of Taiwanese origin 
include the United Bamboo, the Four Seas Gang, Tien Dao Mon and Chao Tong.202 'Tong' 
are legiti1nate business associations in large Chinese communities. Many do not become 
involved in illegal activities, but some associate themselves with illegal gambling. Some 
historians argue that tongs are have been known to direct enterprises such as drug trafficking, 
robbery and 'people smuggling' and often align themselves with gangs for support. 'Gangs' 
generally consist of young men engaged in independent criminal activities; sometin1es, 
however they also work for tongs and triads organizations. 
Modem triads trace their history to secret political societies fonned in China during 
the seventeenth century to overthrow the Ching Dynasty and to restore the Ming Dynasty to 
power. Their operations became international when Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia, 
Europe, Australia and North America.203 Refugees and overseas Chinese such as workers and 
peddlers turned to triads for help, whether in the form of protection or maintaining law and 
order within their local territories and communities. Triad associations were often seen as a 
place where people could find support if they were discontented or discriminated against by 
the foreign culture, by well-established Chinese elites living abroad, or other ethnic groups. A 
general assumption has been that triads, gangs and tongs originated with those who were 
unable to be assimilated in the dominant culture and became avenues through which Chinese 
were able to express their needs and achieve their political or economic goals. 
One recent concern has centred on the impact on Chinese organised crime of the 
return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Did it encourage them to shift their operations to a 
new environment? It appears the triads have been expanding their networks where large 
numbers of Chinese communities exist in Canada, the United States, Australia, and the 
Netherlands, but it is impossible to say how much this is due to the incorporation of Hong 
Kong into the People's Republic. Is it possible that Chinese criminal groups are seeking new 
locations because they fear the Chinese criminal law system? Does this mean that places like 
the United States and Canada are seen as more lenient than Mainland China? 
Benjamin Liu argues in The Hong Kong triad societies before and after the 1997 
change-over that triads and Chinese criminal organizations have settled in Canada, including 
202 See Asian Organised Crime: the new international criminal asian organized crime: hearings before the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 
One Hundred Second Congress, second session, June 18 and August 4, 1992, United States Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Washington, 1992, 89-101. 
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1najor triads such as the 14K, Kung Lok, Lotus, Jung Ching, Red Eagles, and Gum Wah. 
These groups have maintained strong ties with their groups in Hong Kong and worldwide. 
Heroin No. 4, known as China White in Southeast Asia, was responsible for a large number of 
deaths in Vancouver in the mid- l 990s. 204 Liu argues that the number of triads increased 
because innnigration from Hong Kong to Canada became easier when the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration for Hong Kong was signed in 1985 and Canadian immigration policy changed in 
1993. It has also been suggested by Canadian police that Chinese smugglers and criminal 
groups tend to operate from Canada because Canadian penalties for violating drug laws are 
not as heavy as those in the United States. 
According to an article in the BBC News on June 14 1999, 28 suspects and 54kg of 
heroin were seized in Vancouver. Most of the Vancouver heroin seizure came from a Chinese 
vessel in the city's harbour. Reports showed that most of the suspects were from Vancouver 
area, but the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also charged gang members from New 
York, Las Vegas and Puerto Rico. It appears that the gang had operations which stretched 
from Bunna to Vancouver, and represented a serious heroin threat. 205 The report commented 
that "A million containers pass through the port every year, but police and customs officials 
only manage to search 3% of the vessels ... They have long complained that they are fighting a 
losing battle against the heroin trade." 206 
The influence of Hong Kong triads has extended globally. In the Philippines, the triads 
have become a big concern because the Philippines has been turned into a major transhipment 
zone for international drug trafficking. For instance, police seized 91 kilograms of 'ice' in 
1995 from a member of a Hong Kong triad, believed to be a member of the 14K Triad. A 
member of the triad was shot while delivering 'ice' in San Juan, the Philippines, on May 4, 
1995. Another Hong Kong triad member was found guilty and shot for possession of 140 
kilograms of 'ice' found in the boot of his car. 207 Hong Kong triads have also become a 
primary target in New Zealand, where the most active criminal groups during the 1950s were 
the 14 K, Sun Yee On and Wo groups. In Australia, the triads have become principle targets 
of the Australian Law Enforcement Agency and in Macau, Cambodia, Indonesia, Hungary, 
204 Benjamin T.M. Liu, The Hong Kong Triad Societies before and after the 1997 Change-over, Net e-
Publishing, Hong Kong, 2002, 164. 
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and Netherlands, they have been involved in illegal gambling, money laundering, people 
smuggling, drug trafficking and pornography.208 
From the above information it is impossible to judge whether the Hong Kong triads 
have been responsible for most or all Chinese organised crime in recent years. Because Hong 
Kong triads are large and extensive, they have been blamed for everything. However, not all 
Chinese crime is committed by triads and we have to keep in mind that there are also ethnic 
Chinese gangs from Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, and Mainland China.209 Also, even if 
international crime is committed by ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, they 1nay not be 
members of triads. Individual may join together to commit crime 'independently' or establish 
partnerships with established 'professionals' in the field. They are promoted by experience, 
expertise, wealth, contacts, and networks. Committing a drug crime is just like participating 
in a business enterprise. The Chief Superintendent of the Royal Hong Kong Police has 
observed: 
The popular belief is that all drug trafficking is run by triads. That is not so ... Triad membership is 
neither a prerequisite nor an advantage. It is experience, expertise, contacts and money that count, and 
once involved there are no triad boundaries. A Sun Yee On will happily join a 14K member working for 
a ringleader with no Triad affiliation ... 210 
The general conclusion has to be that there is no evidence of a marked changed in 
criminal activities following the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, though we can say 
that the triads have established their own area of influence in the drug trade. While Western 
countries have been concerned about a rise in criminal activities by ethnic Chinese, there is no 
evidence that it is Hong Kong triads that have been behind it. Nevertheless, it is likely that 
the ethnic Chinese criminal organizations will continue to build up their power in the overseas 
Chinese communities, which could lead to fights for territorial control and further illegal acts. 
It is also likely that as part of globalisation and increased in the tourism, larger numbers of 
Chinese will go overseas and participate in illegal as well as legal activities. Their possible 
involvement in the international drug trade has to be seen in that context.211 
208 For further reading on the triads activities, secret societies, and early history, see The Hong Kong Triad 
Societies before and after the 1997 Change-over. 
209 Yiu-Kong Chu, International Triad Movements: the Threat of Chinese Organised Crime, Research Institute 
for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, London, 1996, 13. 
2 1
° Chu, International Triad Movements: the Threat of Chinese Organised Crime, 17. 
2 11 Asian Organized Crime: the new international criminal asian organized crime, 224. 
73 
Chinese communities in the United States have already expanded as a result of the 
Immigration and Naturalisation Act of 1965. In New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
Boston and Chicago, gangs and tong are believed to have become more prevalent and it is 
assumed that they maintained ties with criminal crime groups in China and Taiwan. In various 
parts of United States and Canada, officials have been disturbed by the criminal 
organizations' activities and Asian and Chinese police units have been established in Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, Monterey Park, New York, Vancouver and Toronto. In New York, 
for instance, 'Group 41 ' or the Asian Heroin Group has been specially set up by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration to fight Chinese drug crime. Law enforcement units targeting 
Chinese gangs are also to be found in cities like Chicago, Boston, Oakland, Dallas, Houston 
and Virginia. Special task forces have been established by the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service in New York, Washington, Boston, Houston, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. All 
these resources have been directed against problems associated with Chinese offenders.212 
To keep the issue in perspective, one has to keep in mind that relatively little is known 
about organised crime in Mainland China, as a research topic it is still in a primary state. The 
same may be said of Chinese organised crime in Hong Kong, Macau, America, and other 
W esterri countries. There is reason to believe that understanding of the nature of the problem 
and how it n1ight be addressed had been hampered in Western countties by lack of knowledge 
of Asian languages and cultures, resulting in frequent communication breakdowns. 
4. Conclusion 
Consideration of China's role in the area of drug trafficking since the 1980s cannot 
ignore the fact that heroin produced in Burma is being transited through the southwestern 
province of Yunnan. For example, recently a routine check on a truck in Yunnan led to the 
discovery of 673kg (1 ,480 pounds) of heroin and the arrest of 21 people, 12 of them from 
Hong Kong. Figures also show that seizures of heroin in China doubled in 2001 to around 13 
tonnes, along with almost five tonnes of the drug 'ice' , also smuggled in from Burma. 213 
Since the 1990s, heroin sold in Hong Kong has been transported through Yunnan and 
Guangxi Provinces into Guangdong Province, and later transported across the border into 
Hong Kong for local consumption. On May 17, 2002, police in Yunnan discovered 357 kilos 
212 Asian Organised Crime: the new international criminal asian organized crime, 214. 
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of heroin hidden in timber headed for Hong Kong. 214 Such evidence suggests that Yunnan is 
an important link in drug s1nuggling countries around the world, with heroin being transported 
to other parts of China and to major international markets of North America, Europe and 
Australia. 
In is clear that during the twentieth century Yunnan has changed from being a major 
opium producer to a major distributor and consumer. Heroin that has been transited in 
southern China through either Yunnan or Guangxi Provinces is transported to Guangdong, to 
the cities of Xiamen and Fuzhou in Fujian Province, or other Chinese southeastern coastal 
areas or port cities, and later to the international markets.215 
The issue discussed in this chapter give an idea of how complicated drug 1natters are and 
how difficult it is to address them effectively. As we have seen, there is evidence that CIA has 
been involved in the drug trade of southwestern China and the Golden Triangle region. This is 
but one exainple of a long series of the state interventions in the drug trade, from colonial 
powers to warlords and the KMT. When governments are involved in producing or trading in 
drugs, can the drug problem ever be solved? This is especially demanding when state 
involvement coincides with local cultures in which the production and use of drugs, 
particularly opium, is regarded as normal and socially acceptable. Why should a Hmong or a 
Haw trader or a Han Chinese, be persuaded that opium or heroin production is wrong when it 
has long been viewed as blameless by local norms and even government agencies regard it as 
a lawful way of making money? 
How to fight drug trafficking also becomes complicated as drug networks expand 
internationally. Even if the Chinese government had the necessary resources and expertise to 
tackle the problem internally, it would not be able to achieve much alone. While Chinese 
nationals and ethnic Chinese living overseas are involved in the international drug trade, they 
are not the only ones. To address the problem internationally, genuine international 
cooperation and commitment on the part of the international community are needed. The 
various policies implemented for drug control, and possible steps for reducing the drug 
problem will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
214 Jaime, FloCruz, ' China' s messy drug war escalates ', Cable News Network (CNN), 17 May, 2002. 
215 
'Drug Intelligence Brief: China Country Brief March 2002', US Drug Enforcement Administration, 
http://www. usdoj. gov/ dea/pubs/intel/02009 /02009 .html [ Accessed 10 August, 2003 J 
75 
Chapter 6 
Drugs and Public Policy 
There is a beautiful photo of a young actress who became addicted before the film she was shooting was 
finished and ended up dying. Ironically, the film was meant to reveal the destroyed lives of actors and 
actresses addicted to drugs. 216 
-Ding Mo ( China Daily) 
1. Introduction 
Drugs are a big problem which penetrates every aspect of the Chinese society, locally, 
nationally, and internationally. 'Illicit drug' activities could not have existed without 
favourable factors and the People's Republic of China serves as an outstanding example for 
this study. While opium poppy cultivation has not been a serious problem in China since 
1949, when compared with the major drug source the Golden Triangle, since 1978 heroin has 
proved a major disaster for the Chinese people. Historically, anti-drug campaigns in China 
have involved intensive activity and severe punishments over a limited period.217 These 
actions may be viewed as a method for reducing drug-related illegal activities in the short 
term, rather than a systematic response to the complex causes of the narcotics problems. The 
evidence suggests that this approach does not work, for the problem has continued to grow. 
Eradication of the illegal drug problem requires both short-term and long-term plans. 
Short-term goals include the prohibition and suppression of the production and selling of 
illicit drugs. The long-term goals are to wipe out drug problems entirely. 218 However, to 
achieve this the Chinese government needs more than the enforcement of drug control laws; 
educational, social and economic initiatives are also necessary. Responsibility for drug 
education and prevention must be extended to schools, the workplace, neighbourhoods, 
2 16 Ding Mo, 'Narcotics-Good Riddance! ' , China Today, vol. 47, no. 10, October 1998, 19 . 
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villages, and the family. Initiatives have to be supported and monitored by international 
authorities, law enforcement officers, lawyers, police, physicians, teachers, sociologists, and 
psychologists, but in the end it is action at the family and community level that matters most. 
The issue of local management is a major obstacle where there is limited 
communication, few suitably trained staffs able to provide support, and resources limited and 
unevenly distributed. Lack of basic data on certain geographical area and population groups 
are also an i1npediment to effective action. In remote and isolated hill areas, for instance in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion and the undeveloped areas of Yunnan, the lack of skilled 
personnel is often acute. It is difficult to attract teachers and other professionals when salaries 
are low and sometimes are paid late or not at all. This has resulted in low enthusiasm, high 
absenteeism and staff turnover. 219 Minorities too, have been neglected when decisions about 
political and social issues are made; they have been hindered from participating in policy 
discussions, programs and project interventions.220 
As argued in the previous chapter, to solve the drug problem, the Chinese government 
cannot work alone. International help and cooperation is essential. Anti-drug policies are 
different in China, the United States, and Southeast Asian nations that are the source of most 
of the drugs. To some extent, different approaches may be appropriate in varying social, 
political and economic conditions. However, international coordination is also necessary in 
the fight against drugs, and for the past few decades China has been an active participant in 
the international effort. The following discussion considers possible approaches in the 
eradication of drugs in the People's Republic of China, focusing on factors and issues which I 
have found to be important. 
2. China's Approach to the Drug Problem 
2.1 Drug Control 
In recent years, China has tried to extend and strengthen its anti-drug policy. 
Before 1990, drug trafficking was not categorised as a specific type of crime. Drug 
trafficking instead fell under economic crime, and penalties for economic crime were not 
2 19
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clearly defined. This meant that penalties for drug-related offences were often lenient.221 
Only the most serious drug offences were subject to the provisions of the PRC Criminal Code. 
The Decision on Prohibition of Narcotics, which came into effect on December 28, 1990, 
1nade it easier to i1npose the death penalty because it allowed provincial courts to sentence 
drug traffickers. As a result, executions increased. The amount of drugs in possession that 
allowed officers to arrest drug addicts was reduced from 2 kilograms to 1 kilogram for opium 
and 100 grams to 50 grams for heroin.222 Persons in possessions of these amounts were 
subject to fifteen years of imprisonment, with proportionally shorter sentences for lesser 
amounts. Measures were also introduced against those who conceal goods for criminals or 
withhold the source of illegal property; they can be sentenced to criminal detention or a fixed-
. · c 223 tem11mpnsonment 1or up to seven years. 
Another notable initiative was the Narcotic Drug Control Act in 1997. This was 
enacted in conjunction with the Drug Administrative Law of the People's Republic of China. 
Its aim is to control narcotic drugs, and maintain safe practice in respect to narcotics in the 
fields of education, medicine and research. 224 
Despite these initiatives, drug control enforcement has not been effective in recent 
years. While legal measures may be helpful in limiting the ainount of harm drug use and 
trafficking cause to individual and society, they do not address the causes of drug abuse. Also, 
although most of the resources spent on drug control are directed towards law enforcement 
through the police, the judiciary and the penal system, they may ignore factors such as 
inadequate training and widespread corruption.225 These need to be specifically addressed. 
It appears there is wide public support in China for the idea that the best way to solve 
the drug proble1n is to impose capital punishment upon drug traffickers and those who are 
involved in drug-related crime.226 Some would argue that addicts should not be rehabilitated, 
but rather should be punished. It is difficult to see how such draconian measures could help to 
221 Zhou, Anti-Drugs Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building, 133. 
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reduce the harmful effects of drugs on society; they could result in brutalisation of society that 
would aggravate the problems rather than cure them. 
2.2 Corruption 
As noted above, official corruption is a hindrance to effective drug control. Since 
1979, the Central Co1nmittee of Supervision and Discipline of the CCP has been responsible 
for the investigation and punishment of officials for criminal behaviour. The criminal justice 
system, including the Prosecution Department of China, also has jurisdiction over officials 
who have been disciplined and punished by the party. According to the Chinese Criminal Law 
of 1979, officials who make use of their power and position for bribes are to be sentenced to 
jail for no less than five years and in 1982 changes were made by the National Congress to 
i1npose capital punishment for more serious cases. 227 In 1999, the Prosecution Department of 
China spelt out strict procedures, 41 pages long, for investigating government officials who 
are thought to be deviant or corrupt. An Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Yunnan Provincial 
People's Procuratorate was set up in April 1990. The bureau manages investigation on 
corruption, misappropriation of public funds and the concealment of deposits outside the 
country. 
Another area that requires attention is police corruption. Police may protect drug street 
dealers if they are paid enough for their services, resulting in the loss of public respect and 
confidence for the police. Chinese police have been subject to the Police Law since 1995, but 
there continue to be concerns about improper and illegal action by police. More effective, 
internal and external supervision systems need to be devised, including supervision by 
People's Congresses at various levels. 
Wei Jianxing, secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
argued that 1najor corruption cases peaked during 1993-1997, and have started to decline in 
recent years in Beijing. Mayor Liu Qi, at the National People's Congress, asserted that by the 
2008 Surmner Olympic Games China would be free of corruption and further stated that, "All 
the major preparations will be made public on the Internet, and the process of preparations 
227 Lening Zhang, 'White-Collar Crime: Bribery and Corruption in China ', Crime and Social Control in a 
Changing China , edited by Jianhong Liu, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 2001 , 32. 
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will be made transparent."228 Also important will be the introduction of the 'Sunshine Policy', 
which requires officials to declare all private interests to the government, including activities 
such as building or purchasing a property, sending children to study abroad, or arranging 
weddings for their children. 
2. 3 Education 
In order to reduce illiteracy, the quality and quantity of education in China needs to be 
increased. Education participation, especially by girls, should be encouraged in poor and rural 
areas. Financial burdens on poor families need to be eliminated and adequate education 
provided should derived from public funds. According to the China Human Development 
Report, the State Education Commission and the Ministry of Finance initiated a National 
Project for Implementing Compulsory Education in Poor Areas. Under this program, 
education was pro1noted during the years 1995-2000, with the total funding estimated at 10 
billion yuan. 229 Funds were spent on training school teachers, principals, and staff, supporting 
school construction, and buying teaching materials and equipment. 
Special educational efforts have been made in Yunnan to fight drugs. For instance, 
drug enforcement officials were invited to give special lectures and videos on drugs were 
shown to students in Longling Middle School in Yunnan. 230 Public trials in schools were 
also conducted. Students who were caught for smoking had to pay a fine of 2 yuan and attend 
a study session. A hefty fine between 100 and 300 yuan was imposed if the same students 
were caught twice. This was because the school viewed smoking as a preliminary step 
towards heroin use. In this way, both the students and parents were alerted to the need for 
pa1iicular concern over drug problems. But action in a few locations is not enough if 
education is to make an effective contribution. Resources have to be distributed and applied 
228 
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throughout China. The Chinese government has not had a national strategy for drug and HIV 
education. 
2.4 Social Efforts 
Increasing Public Awareness 
One of the simplest and most effective aspects in China's drug policy is raising public 
awareness. Lessons learnt in one place have to be retained and shared, so that the entire public 
can become aware of the hann drugs pose for the Chinese nation. Through various media 
such as the press, magazines, films, radio and television programs, drug information has been 
widely conveyed to the public. 
Exhibitions have been one fundamental approach by the Chinese government. This 
approach was particularly prominent during May to late June in 1998. Some Chinese were 
co1npletely unaware of the impacts of drugs; they knew nothing about the in harmful effects .. 
For exa1nple, the public was generally ignorant of how the HIV virus is spread, and the role in 
it of intravenous drug use. The proportion with any knowledge was less than 15 percent 
according to the World Policy Journal in 2002.231 Anti-narcotic exhibitions such as that held 
at the Chinese Military Museum in Beijing have aroused sensitive and emotional reactions 
fro1n the public. The Beijing exhibitions was attended by 1.66 million people, on some days 
exceeding 20,000 visitors, according to the Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China. The exhibition included factual information, statistics, real 
opium poppies, photographs of drug addicts who died from AIDS as a result of sharing 
needles, and details about the problems caused by drugs and how addicts are rehabilitated.232 
However, efforts in promoting public awareness, like school-based education, have 
been patchy and inconsistent. Sometimes national and provincial authorities have tried to 
suppress information rather than circulate it and encourage open discussion about narcotics 
and AIDS.233 According to the BBC News in 2001, the Chinese authorities have prevented a 
7 6 year old doctor, Gao Y aojie, from travelling to the Washington DC to receive a 
hu1nanitarian award for her work on health and human rights at the annual Global Health 
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Council Conference. 234 Another example involves the novel Shanghai Baby by Wei-Hui. 
The Chinese government burned 40,000 copies in April 2000 because it touched on the issues 
difficult in Chinese culture, particularly female independence, and sexuality, themes of which 
the Chinese government disapproves. In other instances, while stories about AIDS /HIV 
cases were published in Chinese newspapers and magazines to commemorate World AIDS 
Day, none of the stories concerned Chinese cases. 235 The Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndron1e (SARS) case also has revealed a reluctance on the part of Chinese authorities to 
1nake information about problematic issues publicly available. The number of deaths was 
understated, either as a result of misclassification or internationally, the World Health 
Organization concluded. 236 
It is therefore difficult not to assume that the Chinese Communist Party attempts to 
rule the people by maintaining control on the state-run media. This has been done by 
withholding information, blocking web sites, filtering the Internet, and banning or interrupting 
trusted information sources such as Google or the BBC websites. The Chinese government in 
fact, has always believed that they can solve the problems immediately by themselves and that 
the more informed people are, the more difficult it is to maintain control. However, covering 
up information on drug epidemics, AIDS and SARS can result in a serious costs in lives. The 
Chinese cultural use of drug and ancient attitudes towards them have been discussed earlier in 
Chapter 2. This has resulted in many false beliefs and lies about drugs. Awareness raising 
campaigns 1nust be carried out throughout out China and must penetrate into the remote areas 
of Yunnan and Guangxi, where local villages and farmers lived. China needs to launch 
educational cainpaigns to raise the public's awareness of the virus. Only then can the people's 
beliefs and behaviour be changed. 
Rehabilitation 
Under Chinese law, rehabilitation of drug addicts has been made compulsory.237 
Investigation and registration of drug addicts has been carried throughout China. 
234 Dr Gao is retired gynaecologist who began campaigning about AIDS in 1996, using her pension to help fund 
educational material. However, the Chinese authorities refused to approve her passport application and had 
accused her of working for anti-China forces. 
'China Bars Aid Activist Visiting China' , BBC News, 31 May 2001 . http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/1362119 .htm. 
235 World AIDS Day is December 1. The theme is ' refuse drugs, and prevent AIDS '. 
236 For further information on SARS and its impact on Asian economies, see Chang Ching-hsi, 
'The Economic Impact ofSARS ', Exchange, no. 69, June 2003 , 32-35 . 
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Rehabilitation can take different forms , ranging from confinement and compulsory treatment 
to lectures, legal and moral education, strict behaviour modification, and participation in 
various sports and labour programs. Those who fail to rehabilitate are sent to 'reeducation-
through-labour centres' which are managed by judicial departments.238 
The Chinese government has introduced a number of provisions relating to drug 
addicts and rehabilitation programs. For instance, the Procedures for Compulsory Drug 
Addiction Rehabilitation was initiated by the State Council in 1995. These deal with 
administration, construction of rehabilitation centres, rehabilitation measures and welfare 
provisions. 239 The Guiding Principles for Commonly Used Therapies to Opiates Addicts and 
the Procedures for the Control of Pharmaceutical for Drug Addiction Treatment aim to set a 
standard level for rehabilitation throughout China. The Regulations on Forcible Termination 
of Drug Use were issued in 1995, and making it compulsory for drug addicts to receive 
treatinent. 240 The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
reports that in the year 2000, China had approximately 746 compulsory rehabilitation centres 
and 168 treatment and 'reeducation-through-labour centres'. 
In places like Kunming, rehabilitation has been managed by the local communities 
the1nselves. An outstanding example is the community on Wuguo Road in Panlong district 
in Kunming which includes 500 households. Once a member of a community is found to be 
addicted, a small co1mnittee or group will be formed, including local policeman, parents of 
the addicts, and officials from the Public Security. The self- established committee will 
monitor the drug addict' s behaviour, give advice, and persuade the addict to quit and 
rehabilitate.241 The committee will also be responsible for finding suitable jobs for the drug 
addict after rehabilitation has been successfully managed. Another interesting initiative in 
Kunming involves traditional herbal medicine. Instead of relying on methadone, a heroin 
substitute commonly used to ease withdrawal, addicts receive only herbal capsules of its local 
237 According to Professor Han Jisheng of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and researcher at the Nerve 
Science Research Institute (Beijing University College of Medicine) , acupuncture is believed to help in the 
rehabilitation of drug addicts . The use of low frequency electric pulses to stimulate points is said to restore drug 
addicts to normality and the percentage of drug addicts turning back to drugs can be reduced to approximately 70 
percent. See 'Acupuncture Points Work for Drug Rehabilitation', China Today, March 2003 
http: //www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/20023/focus.3.htm 
[Accessed 11 April, 2003] 
238 Narcotics Control in China , 20. 
239 Narcotics Control in China , 21. 
240 Liu and Situ, Crime and Social Control in a Changing China , 48 . 
24 1 Certain sorts of actions may hinder rehabilitation efforts. Sometimes, people have move out and migrate to 
urban areas. This makes it hard to keep track of drug addicts . In other cases, the family may be too ashamed to 
admit that a member of a family is addicted, making it hard to extend help. 
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invention.2420ther provinces have also established their own community-based rehabilitation 
centres, including those in Guangxi, Inner Mongolia and Guizhou.243 
However, despite these measures, rehabilitation generally has not been successful in 
China. A principle factor is the lack of sufficient funds, which leads to inadequate 
rehabilitation facilities and inadequate skills. It is likely that rehabilitation has been more 
successful in certain areas where funds have been 1nore readily available, for exainple in 
Beijing, but not in a remote province like Yunnan. So1netimes, unofficial rehabilitation 
centres have been established. These are centres without official support and are usually of 
low quality and standard.244 The generally low standards of rehabilitation reflect China's slow 
progress in coming to grips with drug issues. Examples of poorly conducted centres include 
the centre in Baoshan, where addicts were chained up and had to sleep in smelly crowded 
rooms on dirty floors with no beds, and no medical assistance was on hand. In other places, 
like Dehong Prefecture in Longba Township of Longchuan Country, addicts were confined in 
wooden cages three metres long and one metre wide. 
Another factor in the generally low standard of rehabilitation programs in China is the 
lack of centres provided by non-government and international organizations.245 Because most 
of the rehabilitation centres are government run, punishment and treatment of addicts have not 
been kept separate. This makes it difficult for addicts to come to regard rehabilitation in a 
positive way. More non-government drug treatment centres need to be set up to help provide 
voluntarily advice and supervision.246 
In other countries, some rehabilitation programs have been particularly successful. 
What is needed above all for a program to work is a friendly supportive network, where the 
addict are well informed, protected and loved as they return back to their communities. For 
exa1nple, in Thailand, the Buddhakasettra Foundation in Chiang Mai works with drug abuse 
issues, providing vocational skill training in weaving and chicken raising, and other income 
generating activities as well as support in overcoming the addiction. Addicts are also given 
242 Joe McDonald, 'Chinese Fights Heroin Habits with Herbal Medicine' , Jade Campus, 
http: //www.jadecampus.com/News/AP20June99.htm [Accessed 2 August, 2003] 
243 The private sectors has also made contributions to rehabilitation program. The Yunnan Tin Company, for 
example established its own rehabilitation centre for drug addicts. Drug addicts and their parents have to pay a 
deposit of 200 yuan under a contract to be rehabilitated. Penalties and fines will be imposed if the drug addicts 
failed to fight their addition. 
244 Zhou, Anti-Drugs Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History and State Building 139. 
245 However, there are groups such as the Communist Youth League Organization, trade unions and women 's 
associations that are actively involved. 
246 Kurlantzick, World Policy Journal, 74. 
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both formal and info1mal education and religious instruction. The Duang Pratep Foundation 
is a program that seeks to train youth leaders to become familiar with drug abuse issues 
through the 'New Life Project' in Bangkok. Activities include sports competitions and 
awareness raising campaigns, involving parents and families. In 2001, the puppet show of the 
Duang Pratep Foundation was demonstrated on the UNDCP training pro gram. The Konkuat 
Group teaches young people how to enjoy themselves and be free fro1n drugs and crimes. The 
project will target secondary schools, but also primary schools students, as many students in 
pri1nary schools already use drugs. 247 
In South Australia, DrugBeat is a successful rehabilitation program, which aims to 
rebuild the addict' s self-esteem and self-confidence. Under DrugBeat program, each person is 
treated as an individual rather than as a drug addict. They receive broad assessment and 
opportunities, detoxification, reintegration and maintenance. Close counselling and support 
programs are provided and family members become involved in the rehabilitation process. 
The centre is noted for a 1 OOo/o success rate in detoxification and approximately 78% success 
for long-term treatment, on an annual budget of around $1 million.248 
3. Policies toward Ethnic Minorities: China & Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
Narcotic control in China requires cooperation between the different ethnic groups 
throughout China. China has made sure that all minority groups have maintained regional 
autonomy, with substantial control over their own areas and internal affairs. The Chinese 
Government White Paper states that at the end of 1998, there were five autonomous regions, 
30 autonomous prefectures and 120 autonomous counties, and 1,256 ethnic townships.249 
247See 'Krongkam Lerk Soop Fin' (Anti-Opium Smoking Program), ADRA Thailand, 
http ://www.adra.or.th/thai/projects/drug.htm [Accessed 13 July, 2003] The ADRA Projects in Thailand have 
been established for almost five years . The main aim of the program is to help rehabilitate drug addicts and 
ethnic groups in the province of Phetchaburi. During the first round, fifteen people were sent to the rehabilitation 
centre for one month, with a 70 percent success rate. On other rehabilitation programs in Thailand, see 'Primary 
Prevention of Substance Abuse: Local partners Thailand', World Health Organization , 
http: //www.who.int/substance abuse/undcp who initiative/thailand.shtml 
[Accessed 30 June, 2003] 
248 G. Humphries, 'Newsroom: $1 Million Boost to War on Drugs: Reclaiming Lives and Reducing Crimes' , 
Canberra Liberals, http: //www.canberraliberals.org.au/newsroomdet.asp?ItemID=503, [Accessed 15 August, 
2003] 
249
'National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China: Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities ', Government 
White Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, Beijing, 2000. 
Despite rapid national growth and numerous poverty relief programs, there still exists ethnic discrimination in 
China. Is there specific or deliberate discrimination toward certain minority groups through either formal or 
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Minorities of the Greater Mekong Subregion also require strong attention. The 
'Greater Mekong Subregion' (GMS) comprises of all six Mekong nations: Cambodia, Laos, 
Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan Province in the People's Republic of China.250 The 
Mekong growth quadrangle includes parts of Yunnan, Burma, Laos and Thailand. Ethnic 
minorities in the GMS are diverse and, as discussed in Chapter 4, have been heavily involved 
in cross border trade and the flow of drugs from Golden Triangle. 
Poverty and poor educational levels are important in our discussion of drug use, drug 
production, and trafficking among ethnic groups. There is a strong relationship between 
ethnicity, poverty, poor health and limited education. The lack of adequate income and living 
conditions are n1ajor factors that cause minorities to beco1ne involved in activities such as 
opiu1n growing and drug trafficking, as mentioned earlier. The impact of recent economic 
modernisation and loss of communal facilities may have further to reduced health and 
educational facilities for poor minorities. Since poverty and education are the most significant 
indicators and are most relevant to my discussion, I have chosen to discuss them in detail in 
the following sections. 
3.1 Eliminating Poverty Among Ethnic Minorities 
The People's Republic of China considers poverty reduction as an important goal. 
Many of China's poorest people come from ethnic minority groups and a considerable number 
of the1n cope with their deprived economic situation by growing poppies, especially in 
mountainous regions of China. Although crops such as maize, melons, cucumbers, beans and 
rice are grown, opium provides a higher income. These hill people pa1iicularly grow opium 
because the crop provides them with extra cash to purchase needed commodities and 
household goods. Opium suits their needs. The crop was easy to grow and does not spoil. 
Since poppy plants have to be grown in high elevations, there is no competition from 
lowlanders, resulting in a secure livelihood. 
informal policies? Or is this a result of geographical factors and historical circumstances. Probably both are true 
to some extent. 
250 
'Greater Mekong Subregion' , Asian Development Bank 2003, http: //www.adb.org/GMS/default.asp 
[Accessed 30 June, 2003] 
See From Golden Triangle to Economic Hexagon-Recent Development Proposals for Regional Economic 
Linkages in Mainland Southeast Asia by David Murray. 
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More than 100 million people from national minorities live in central and western 
China, where econo1nic development is very much behind the eastern region. The 
government has directed 1nore state and foreign investment to minority areas for water 
conservancy, power and communications projects. According to the World Tibet Network 
Nevvs in 1999, poverty alleviation programs were conducted during 1995-1998 in minority 
regions. This brought clean drinking water to 11 million poor people, and helped to bring the 
pove1iy rate in China's five minority autonomous regions down declined from 12.4 percent to 
6.9 percent. 25 1 Development of infrastructure facilities in minority areas included new 
highways, roads that extended 69,000 km, and the opening up 667,000 ha of farmland. 
Special funds were given to poor areas during the period from 1996 to 1998. The 
state extended 16.95 billion yuan in Central Government funds to 257 poor ethnic minority 
counties. Other measures included cooperation and help from international organizations 
such as help from the World Bank in poverty alleviation. The World Bank established a plan 
in 1995 that aimed to help the poor minority areas with a budget of US$ 610 million. The 
program covered 43 poverty-stricken ethnic minority counties in Guangxi, Yunnan, Inner 
Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang Uygur autonomous regions, Guizhou, Qinghai, and other 
places.252 
The issue of poverty is important also for the ethnic minorities that live in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion. The Asian Development Bank argues that in Thailand, the average annual 
income of ethnic groups of the hill is approximately one-twenty-fifth of the national average. 
The rate of poverty in Laos is high and poverty increases with the concentration and 
remoteness of ethnic groups.253 There is little doubt that low literacy, limited education and 
poor health standards are all linked with uneven income distribution, poverty and attraction to 
opium as a cash crop. Sometimes, policies that target poor areas generally may not benefit 
local minority populations, who need programs targeted specifically at them. However, there 
are also problems with poverty-alleviated programs more generally, as stated in the United 
Nations Development Program Poverty Report for 2000: 
251 
'China admits ethnic conflict, poverty among minorities ', World Tibet Network News, 27 September, 1999 
252 See 'More Poverty Relief Goes to Ethnic Minority Areas ', People 's Daily, 22 October, 2001 . 
253 
'Health and Education Needs of Ethnic Minorities in The Greater Mekong Subregion', Asian Development 
Bank 2003. · 
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Much of the success of national poverty programmes rides on "targeting" benefits to the poor. But most 
programmes still assume that external agents deliver the benefits and that the poor are passive 
beneficiaries - the traditional safety net or social welfare model. Little wonder that the poor often 
complain that they never see the benefits - while delivery agents complain that poverty persists despite 
their good intentions and scientific methods.254 
One of the ongoing plans in the GMS is the human development strategy, aimed at 
reducing poverty and increasing in labour productivity. Under the GMS Program, the GMS 
countries are giving priority to areas such as the development of resources for higher 
education, better access for ethnic minorities to education and training, and other basic social 
services. Health care and control of HIV/AIDS and malaria is another regional priority. 
Disease control has beco1ne increasingly urgent due to growing cross-border trade and 
population move1nent. This is a critical issue when one considers the spread of diseases such 
as AIDS. 255 
3.2 Promoting Education Among Minority Groups 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, cultivation of the opium poppy has a long history in 
southwest China. Opium production was a customary local industry, and people remained 
ignorant of its harmful effects. In general, they were not educated that it was wrong to grow 
opiu1n. It was co1nmon to use opium for medicinal, religious and recreational purposes, and 
while addiction was common enough, it was not until unrefined opium gave way to heroin 
that the addiction problem became intense. 
Education is essential for the economic, social and cultural development of minority 
groups in reducing their involvement in opium production and consumption. One policy the 
People's Republic of China has introduced to improve education is bilingual teaching, 
enabling minorities to learn their own languages. Other developments include promoting 
ethnic schools and increasing funding. Since 1990 the Chinese government has added 4 
billion yuan, approximately US$483.68 million, to the annual education budget of ethnic 
254 
'Overcoming Human Poverty', United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Poverty Report 2000, 
~-ttp://www.undp.org/povertyreport/execienglish.html [Accessed 20 June, 2003] 
_)) 'ADB 's Role in the Greater Mekong Subregion Program', United Nations Development Programme, 
December 1999 http: //www.undp.org.vn/forumsl/forums.htm [Accessed 1 May, 2003] 
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regions to assist education. 256 China had 12 ethnic universities and institutes, 59 ethnic 
teachers' training schools, 158 ethnic secondary vocational schools, 3,536 ethnic middle 
schools, and 20,906 ethnic primary schools by 1998.257 In Yunnan, where the economy has 
been underdeveloped and required special attention, the central government has extended 
extra financial support. Statistics from the Yunnan jiaoyu bao (Yunnan Education Report) 
indicate that in 1995, 103 out of 127 counties and cities received state financial support. 
A1nong the projects initiated for minorities by the Central government in 2000 were 
'Co1nprehensive Quality Training Program for the Primary and Secondary Teachers in Ethnic 
Minority Poor Regions of the 21 st Century' and the 'Project for Helping Poor Regions in 
Co1npulsory Education'. 258 
The Ministry of Education argues that educational initiatives have been successful, 
noting that 51 per cent of the 700 counties with regional autono1ny have eliminated illiteracy 
an1ong young people who have co1npleted nine-years of compulsory education. This is 
outstanding when co1npared to the situation in 1949, when 80 percent of minority people were 
illiterate.259 Table 10, illustrates the development of education of ethnic minorities over the 
last fifty years. Decisions regarding the establishment of schools, type of local education 
programs, methods of school management, course contents, language of instruction and 
procedures for enrolment have been decided by the organs of self-government in the 
autonomous areas. Decisions have been made to suit the particular characteristics of the 
region as well as complying with the educational policies and laws of the state. 
256 
'China Improves Education of Ethnic Minorities ', People's Daily, 13 June, 2002. 
257 
'National Minorities Policies and Its Practice in China: Promoting the Common Development of Ethnic 
Groups, Government White Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, 
Beijing, 2000. 
258 See Lessons in Being Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest China by Mette Halskov 
Hansen and Ethnicity, Education and Empowerment: How minority students in Southwest China construct 
identities by Maryjo Benton Lee. 
259 
'China Improves Education of Ethnic Minorities ', People's Daily, 13 June, 2002. 
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Table 10: Educational Development in National Minority Autonomous Areas in 1952 
and 1998260 
Item 1952 1998 
Institution of higher learning 11 94 
Students in institution of 0.45 22.64 
higher learning (10,000 
persons) 
Secondary schools 531 13 ,466 
Students in secondary school 20.94 529.64 
(10,000 persons) 
Primary schools 59,597 90 ,704 
Students in primary schools 467.31 1,240.90 
(10,000 persons) 
Source: 'National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China: Promoting the Common Development of All 
Ethnic Groups ', Government White Paper. 
Educational policies among the minorities in the Greater Mekong Subregion is also 
improving. According to the Xinhua News Agency, an elementary school been established on 
the border of China and Burma with financial aid of about 50,000 yuan from the police office 
of Jinghong City of Xishuangbanna in the province ofYunnan.261 In Thailand, the ADRA 
Project has initiated the project 'Krongkam Sanap-sanoon Lae Songserm Dam Kam Siksa' 
(Education Support Progra1n), seeking funds for the support of local hill tribes and the 
unprivileged in the northern parts of Thailand, promoting drug awareness activities, providing 
infrastructure such as classrooms, water tanks and libraries. Even so, there still exist large 
inequalities.262 The situation in Lao is similar. Although there have been increases in the 
nu1nber of primary school enrolments, illiteracy has persisted because it is very difficult to 
find teachers who are skilled and qualified in the very remote areas of the Greater Mekong 
Subregion. Isolation and a lack of familiarity with print and electronic media result in low 
260 We have to be cautious when relying on official statistics concerning illiteracy and school enrolment among 
ethnic minorities. Sometimes, the local government and school only reports the number of children in primary 
schools who ' start ' and not those who 'drop-out' . Those who have joined in a short-term literacy course are 
regarded as literate, while those who have not attended school but manage to read the local language in 
1nonasteries are classified as ' illiterate'. Also literacy may not only mean the student is able to read Chinese, it 
may be that the ethnic students are literate in other scripts. See also Mette Halskov Hansen, Lessons in Being 
Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest China , University of Washington Press, Seattle, 
1999. 
26 1 
'School for Drug Addicted Kids Established' , Xinhua News Agency, 20 June, 2003. 
262 
'Krongkam Sanap-sanoon Lae Songserm Dam Kam Siksa' (Education Support Program) , ADRA Thailand, 
http ://www.adra.or.th/thai/projects/education.htm [Accessed 13 July, 2003] 
See also 'Krongkam Hai Kwam-roo Reang AIDS ' (AIDS Awareness Program), ADRA Thailand, 
http: //www.adra.or.th/thai/AIDS/education.htm [Accessed 13 July, 2003] 
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motivation among the hill tribes. Adult literacy classes have often been hard to maintain, 
especially those carried out in Thailand.263 
One of the projects completed by the Asian Development Bank was 'Study of Health 
and Educatinn Needs of Ethnic Minorities in the GMS', approved on June 1998. Another 
project on health education, 'ICT and HIV/AIDS Preventive Education in the Cross-Border 
Areas', began in January 2003. The project, which has total funding of US $1.85 million 
develop learning 1naterials for highland 1ninorities, and poor population and vulnerable 
groups.264 Another notable program focuses on 'Preventing HIV/AIDS Among Mobile 
Populations in the GMS' .265 Mobile populations have played a significant role in 
international drug trafficking as well as the spreading of HIV/AIDS, as noted in Chapter 3. 
4. The Han Chinese 
Migration of the Han into the Yunnan province has escalated over the past 20 years. 
The Han now dominate commerce and business, including the sex industry. According to the 
UNICEF and HIV/AIDS in East Asia and Pacific Regional Office, although much of the 
Jingpo (Kachin) and Dai population are seriously affected by HIV in Yunnan, the epidemic 
has spread to Han populations since 1989.266 This was largely the result of blood transfusion, 
the sharing of needles, and prostitution. The epidemic spread from Ruili in Dehong to the 
prefectures surrounding Kunming, with an overall infection rate of approximately 50 percent. 
According to the survey conducted in Longchuan County, Yunnan in 1994, already 
n1entioned in Chapter 3, drug taking among the Han increased during the mid- l 980s and 
peaked during 1988, probably due to the increased availability of refined heroin. While an 
average Dai and Jingpo started using drugs at the age of 20 years, the Han Chinese tended to 
start one year earlier. 267 There is no clear evidence to explain this age difference. 
263 
'Health and Education Needs of Ethnic Minorities in The Greater Mekong Subregion' , Asian Development 
Bank 2003. 
264 
'ICT and HIV/AIDS Prevention Education in the Cross-Border Areas", Asian Development Bank 2003, 
www.adb.org/GMS?Projects/reta-6083.asp [Accessed 20 June, 2003] 
265 See 'Preventing HIV/ AIDS Among Mobile Populations in the GMS ' , Asian Development Bank 2003, 
www.adb.org/GMS?Projects/reta-588 l .asp [Accessed 20 June, 2003] 
266 
'China: The Epidemic', UNICEF and HIV/AIDS in East Asia and the Pacific, http: //www.unicef.org/eapro-
hivaids/countries/china epi.htm [Accessed 17 August, 2003] 
267 Wu et al. , Addiction , 1679 
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ar 
A" ith ther mino1ities throughout Yunnan and the rest of China, some Han Chinese 
e ial ttention :fi:01n the Chine e government in handing drug problems. These 
oorer Han Chine e, with deprived living tandards and low educational levels. In 
r n ar the Han ha e beco1ne ab orbed in the natural population, being involved with 
drug trade, pre mnably since drug smuggling is an easy task with high income. Mo t 
i and gang member are largely Han Chinese. Triads were in fact historically part of the 
oliti a re is an e of the Han Chinese to the Manchu dynasty. How can the Han Chinese be 
ontrolled? Mo t of all there i a greater need for massive public awareness on the drug 
e id 1ni a well as increasing cainpaigns against official conuption. The development of the 
o try i a challenge for everybody and this is especially true as cross-border 1novements 
ring in different kind of people, but at the same time, negative consequences. 
5. Coope:rative Drug Policv :Initiatives in Southeast Asian Countries 
Ac ive role have been adopted by China and Southeast Asian countrie to co1nbat 
illicit drug dealing and drug trafficking in the last decade. Hundreds of national, regional and 
in ema ional drug control organizations have worked together to establish plans and policies 
to fight drugs abu e and drug trafficking. Policy-1nakers of Southeast Asian countries, mainly 
the ASEAN group, and China have joined together to e tablish network to increase 
ooperation.268 China has signed n1ore than 30 bilateral trea ies with 24 countries, among 
them he ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) Plan of Action on Drug Abuse 
Control and the UN Drug Control Prograni (UNDCP) Mekong Sub-Regional Grouping 
Action Plan. 
The ASOD Plan of Action on Drug Abuse Control, initiated in 1994 aimed at olving 
drug problems particularly those arising from the Golden Triangle, with a particular emphasi 
on law enforcement aimed at reducing illicit drug supplie and production, on treatment and 
rehabilitation, and promoting drug education and further research. In 1993, the UNDCP 
Mekong Sub-Regional Group Action Plan similarly targeted illegal drug production and 
trafficking with China joining first with Burma, Lao and Thailand then in 1995 Cambodia 
268 
'ASEAN and China Cooperative Operation in Re pon e to Dangerou Drug (ACCORD) -Bangkok, 
Thailand, 13 October 2000', Association of Southeast Asian Nations, htto://www.a eansec.org/645.htm 
[Accessed 10 July, 2003] 
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and Vietnam. The budget of the plan was US $15 million, directed at law enforcement, the 
issue of drug-related chemicals, and ways to strengthening ethnic communities around the 
Mekong region. 269 By strengthening ethnic communities in accordance with their cultures, the 
welfare of the hill people, has been promoted in ways that go well beyond increasing 
resistance to drugs. 27° China has also recently joined the ASEAN and China Cooperative 
Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD), a program initiated by the United 
Nations in 2000.The goal of this plan is to make China a drug free zone by the year 2015.271 
Increased inter-government control within the Mekong Region is another strategy that 
could lead to drug reduction in the Golden Triangle, as mentioned earlier in discussion of 
ethnic minorities. Some regulations and initiatives relating to the Mekong Region have been 
initiated in the province of Yunnan, for example an opium poppy control alternative 
development pro grain, as outlined by Wu Shiyin from the Office of Narcotics Commission in 
2003. This has been carried out in Burma and Laos by Yunnan Provincial Administrative 
Office for Opium/ Poppy Control Alternative Development Efforts in the Border Areas of 
Neighbouring Countries. A plan to develop a model replacement crop program in Shan State 
(Burma) has also been presented. There have been demonstrations of alternate crop such as 
lemon grass, vegetables, peanuts, castor, and safflower. This is being implemented by the 
Kunming Jili Economy and Trade Development Company.272 
Examples of successful crop substitution programs can be found in Thailand. Thai 
farmers have to a great extent increased their income with crops 10 or even 100 times more 
profitable than opium in 2003. Markets gained new Thai products, at home and abroad. Under 
the Royal Project, King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand and the late Princess Mother (the 
king' s mother) stated that opium poppy plants would not be destroyed unless satisfactory 
alternative crops existed. Immediate removal of the hill people's main source of income 
would put them in danger.273 Successful crop substitution programs in Chiang Rai, the 
northern Thai province, have involved cool climate fruits and vegetables, including potatoes, 
cabbages, taro, tomatoes, red kidney beans and 'Doi Tung' coffee initiated by the Doi Tung 
269 Chalk, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 98. 
27° For example in Thailand, the chance for villagers and hill tribal people to practice their culture began to re-
established by the end of 1990. Local leadership promoted local culture, with indigenous textile and handicraft 
productions being encouraged. Educated tribes people have been encouraged to become local teachers, NGO 
workers, or engage in private enterprises. In Thailand, Thai citizenship has been extended to members of 
minority groups, and infrastructure and living standards significantly improved. 
271 The plan was supported by more than 30 governments and 15 International Organizations. 
272 
'Workshop on Drug Control Initiatives in the Greater Mekong Subregion', Asian Development Bank 2003 , 
http ://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/Mekong/Proceedings/hrd-drug.asp [Accessed 30 June, 2003] 
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Development Project. 274 The 'Krong Kam Ran Kaffe Doi Tung' (Doi Tung Coffee Gallery 
Project) raises money for deprived hill tribes and coffee growers of northern Thailand. 
Another principle target is the cross-border trade in drug-related chemicals. Chemicals 
necessary for the conversion of opium to heroin are produced and transported through 
neighbouring regions to the factories in Burma. The drugs that are manufactured 1nove in the 
opposite direction. Under the Memorandum of Understanding on Drug Control, signed by 
China, Thailand, Laos, and Bunna in 1993, cooperation is to be maintained on the issue of 
illicit cross-border trade. Cross-border cooperation has been difficult at times due to political, 
historical and security concerns, and the issue of national integrity. This plan thus seeks to 
promote efficiency in cross-border law enforcement, with priority being given to the border 
areas of China. 275 To 1nake an impact on international crime, such cross-border cooperation is 
essential. 
According to the Mekong Working Group on Human Resource Development 
(WGHRD), 36 projects were initiated to direct resources in the GMS concerning the areas of 
ethnic 1ninorities, HIV/ AIDS, and production of illegal drugs in 2002.276 The number of 
projects and costs can be seen in Table 11 . Assisting cross-border develop1nent has been the 
n1ost significant concern, with an estimated cost of US$ 83.2 million. This included a 
program to support opium crop substitution. Of the 32 projects providing technical assistance, 
ten have been to reduce drug use, HIV/ AIDS and human trafficking, nine to support education 
policies and acade1nic projects and others have to pro1note the health and education demand 
of various ethnic groups in the subregion. 277 
274 Yuwadee Tunyasiri, 'US lauds Thailand for drop in opium poppy substitution: Crop substitution scheme a big 
success' , Bangkok Post, 7 August, 2002. 
See also, Munnithi Mae Fah Luang Nai Phrabrarom Ratchuprathum: Doi Tung (Mae Fah Luang Foundation: 
Doi Tung) , http: //www.doitung.org/index.htm [Accessed July 28, 2003] The Doi Tung D evelopment Project 
was originally initiated by the late Princess Mother, Her Royal Highness Princess Srinagarindra on 1988. Doi 
Tung is a mountainous area of 150 square kilometres in Chiang Rai in the n01ih of Thailand and is part of the 
Golden Triangle. Inhabitants are poor and have long depended on opium as their main cash crop. With the 
in1plementation of the royal project, aimed at rehabilitating the lives of the people living in the area, villagers 
received training in skills needed to grow new crops and to in1prove and market their handicrafts. It has been 
said that the per capita income increased from 3,772 baht to 12,155 baht and the goal for the year 2002 was to 
raise per capita income to at least 30,000 baht. The villagers now use their increased earnings to buy more and 
better food, clothing, radio and television sets and to improve their homes. 
275 
'Law Enforcement: East Asia', United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
http: //www.unodc.org/unodc/law enforcement eastasia.html [Accessed 10 July, 2003] 
276See 'Developing Human Resources and Skills Competencies- GMS Flagship Initiatives ', National Economic 
& Social Development Board, http: //www.nesdb.go.th/data index/area dev/data 07/menu.html [Accessed 3 
July, 2003] 
277 
'Developing Human Resources and Skills Competencies- GMS Flagship Initiatives' , National Economic & 
Social Development Board. 
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Table 11: Classification of Human Resources Development (HRD) Flagship Pro1ects 
Loan Technical Assistance 
Project 
Classification Number Amount (US$M) 
Group 1 
projects-
Address cross-
border HRD 
Issues 
Group 2 
projects-
Projects on 
academic and 
research 
networking 
Group 3 
projects-Labour 
market 
cooperation 
Group 4 
projects-I CT 
and technology 
development 
issues 
Total 
3 
0 
1 
0 
4 
70.0 
0 
15.0 
0 
85.0 
Number Amount (US $M) 
14 13.2 
9 3.0 
6 0.8 
3 6.9 
32 23.9 
Total 
17 83.2 
9 3.0 
7 15.8 
3 6.9 
36 108.9 
Source:'Developing Human Resources and Skills Competencies- GMS Flagship Initiatives', National Economic 
& Social Development Board. 
6. The US and International Perspectives 
International cooperation in combating drugs has been necessary in recent years. The 
United States has become increasingly concerned with the drug issue in China and its relation 
to Southeast Asia during the last decade. Since China became a destination point and a 
tranship1nent location for Burmese-produced heroin, providing a route through Southern 
China to Hong Kong, Macau and other commercial and maritiine centres, heroin is readily 
forwarded to other regions like North America, Australia, and Europe.278 The amount of 
heroin trafficked from the Golden Triangle to the United States has increased in recent years. 
One major approach by the US in controlling drugs in the Golden Triangle region has 
been through various international organizations. The three major ones are the United Nations 
278 Heroin has continued to be transported through Thailand in recent years, however, the number of heroin 
traffickers has dropped due to tighter border security. In Thailand, heroin moves from the north to Bangkok and 
to southern Thailand for export by air and sea. 
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Drug Control Program (UNDCP), the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL), and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The UNDCP, which was 
established in 1991, initiates many programs aimed crop substitution and drug eradication in 
opiu1n producing and transit countries. Improving legislation, reducing drug demand, and 
institution building are other principle targets of the UNDCP.279 The INTERPOL, on the 
other hand, is concerned with the promoting police cooperation at the international level. 
This includes drug law enforcement, cooperation in information exchange between countries, 
and gathering information on illicit production and the distribution of narcotics. The F ATF, 
founded in 1989, is primarily concerned with international money laundering, mainly from 
the sales of narcotics. The F ATF works at both national and international levels to counter 
money laundering, formulating strategies and making recommendations. 280 
Bilateral cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the United States 
started in 1984, when contact between US and Chinese authorities was established through 
joint 1neetings. China has repeatedly sent delegations to attend international drug control 
meetings held by the United Nations, the International Criminal Police Organization, the 
World Custo1ns Organization and the World Health Organization in 1984. The govermnents 
of the two nations signed the Sino-US Memorandum of Cooperation in Narcotic Drugs 
Control in 1987. The US Customs Service (USCS) has also provided training in narcotic 
control to Customs officers in Beijing. 281 Chinese delegations participated in the 17th and 
20th UN special General Assembly sessions on drug control in 1990 and 1998. This signifies 
that the Chinese government was willing to take part in anti-drug policies initiated among the 
international community. 
The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report states that the US and China 
enhanced their joint anti-drug control efforts in 2002. This was the result of visits by 
American officials to China, including the Director of the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP) in 2000 and the former Director of Intelligence of the ONDCP in 2001 as 
well. Good working relations have been established, leading to the first Sino-US 
intelligence-sharing meeting in October 2002 in Beijing.282 Both the US and China officials 
have cooperate closely in terms of coordinating intelligence- sharing meetings and trans-
279 Chalk, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 100. 
28° Chalk, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 101. 
28 1 Joint Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control of 
the United States Senate , 17. 
282 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2002, US Department of State, 
http: //www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/ [Accessed 2 July, 2003] 
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national investigation, developing Chinese law enforcement capabilities and exchanging 
information on drug threats. 
As mentioned, in the part low levels of law enforcement and poor coordination of 
effort have hindered narcotic control. Increased cooperation from the Chinese side is 
certainly important for improved joint investigation, enforcement, and gathering counter-
narcotic intelligence. The opening up of China's narcotic effort for international cooperation 
is expected to contribute strongly to the investigations of the US Drug Enforce1nent 
Administration (DEA). 
Despite all the anti-narcotic programs and initiatives mentioned, success has not been 
as great as hoped. The shifting of trafficking routes by drug dealers has been one major 
obstacle.283 Also drug trafficking methods vary from one region to another and detennining 
factors include not only the transit countries, but also the method of transpo1iation available 
and the ethnic groups that inhabit the region. Another obstacle is the sophisticated networks 
linking different organizations. Heroin trafficking operations are not run by single 
individuals, they involve various brokers, exporters, i1nporters, and many intermediaries. 
This makes drug tracking and detection difficult because by the time authorities are alerted to 
the fact that heroin has reached a designated area, ownership of the drug product and 
shipment has changed. Therefore, officials find it difficult to obtain evidence of drug 
ship1nent and sale relationship between producer, distributor, and transporter. 284 
Despite China's increased international collaboration, there is still concern that the 
Chinese government is still not as active or as cooperative in international drug control as it 
should be. US officials have criticised China's refusal to sign a Letter of Agreement (LOA) 
that would allow the US to establish law enforce1nent training and technical assistance in 
China. Also, though China has been willing to share its drug samples with the US, the 
sainples so far have been very limited. 
In its relations with Burma, the US has been doing what it can to reduce drug 
production in that country, and reduce the amount of heroin entering the US. However, here 
too there have been obstacles. Cooperation between Burma and the US has been limited and 
283 Drug Control: US Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia: Statement for the Record by Jess T Ford, 
Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs 
Division , United States General Accounting Office, United States, 1996, 5. 
284Drug Control: US Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia, 6. 
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the US has not provided assistance to Burma for combating narcotics. The major reason for 
this is Burma's bad record of human right violations and the Burmese government's negative 
attitude towards democratic govermnent. 285 The low cooperation is evident from the 1988 
incident when the US stopped foreign aid to Burma, including one of which included 
financial support for drug control programs.286 The situation is complicated by the fact that 
most of the Burmese opium-producing region is not under the strict the control of Burmese 
authorities and that the Burmese military is deeply involved in the drug trade. This makes it 
difficult to track down trafficking patterns and criminal organizations. 
The prospects for greater cooperation in drug control are poor unless the Burmese 
position on human rights and political participation shifts. One suggestion is that the drug 
issue should be put in the hands of an international taskforce. Rather than allowing military, 
political and economic conditions of Burma to stand in the way of serious drug control action, 
help and cooperation should be offered through the United Nations and other international 
organizations acceptable to Burma. 
Inte1national support had also been available from the Thai side. In order to promote 
drug control, joint 1neetings have been held for police and law-enforcement officials. For 
example, police from the People's Republic of China attended training courses on law 
enforce1nent and counternarcotics at the US-Thai International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA) in Bangkok on 2002. 287 Good cooperation has existed between the United States and 
Thailand since the early 1970s in terms of reducing opium production and heroin trafficking. 
A notable incidence occurred in 1994 when Thai police were able to capture 10 
leading me1nbers of Burmese heroin trafficking organization. This was with US support.288 A 
more recent case in June 2003, involved the arrest of Mr. Laoda Sansi and his sons in the 
285 Drug Control: US Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia, 3. 
286 All international assistance was frozen, including assistance from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and IMF loans, UNDP economic development projects, bilateral assistance from Japan and other 
countries. See Andrew Bosson, 'Sowing Disorder: support for the Burmese junta backfires on China' , China 
Rights Forum Journal; no. 3, 2002. 
Also see Eric Tagliacozzo, 'Border permeability and the state in southeast Asia: Contraband and regional 
security' , Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 23. no .2, 2001, 254-274. 
287 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2002, 20. 
288 Drug Control: US Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia, 4. 
For details on US-Thai cooperation in narcotic control, see 'Tracoop Laoda Big Ya Sep-Thid' (The Big Leader 
of the Heroin Trade Caught), Thairath Newspaper, 13 June, 2003. 
For other recent news of the drug-related cases in northern Thailand concerning ecstasy and 'ice' drugs, see 
'Khao kam-jhabkoom ti nha-sonjai ' (News on Interesting Drug Cases), Samnagngan Khanna Kammakarn 
Phongkhan Lae Phrabphram Ya Sep-Thid (Office of the Narcotic Control Board) 
http ://www.oncb.go.th/document/c2-workl9-1-03072501.htm [Accessed 17 July, 2003] 
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northern province of Chiangmai in Thailand. This was the result of the combined efforts of 
approximately 50 Thai policemen and members of the US Drug Enforcement Agency based in 
Asia. Mr. Laoda Sansi and his group, who belong to the Lisu minority, were powerful dealers 
in the drug industry. They were caught planning to transport 'ice' tablets worth one billion 
Thai baht fr61n Thailand to Cambodia, Europe and America. 
7. Conclusion 
In recent years, China has established links with other countries to fight drugs, not 
only with the United States, but also Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and the ASEAN 
countries. Cooperation has taken many forms , involving international policing, international 
anti-drug information exchange, judicial cooperation, and programs for the social and 
econo1nic development of ethnic minorities involved in drug production. This has resulted in 
some reduction of transnational drug-related cases.289 In targeting drug proble1ns, an attitude 
of flexibility and sensitivity has to be maintained since many countries and ethnic minorities 
are involved. Despite the various measures initiated among the Southeast Asian countries, 
1nuch more will have to be done to prevent future problems. Since the Greater Mekong 
Subregion is changing socially, economically, and politically, drug eradication efforts have to 
be seen in that context. 290 Since each country may have their own problems and priorities, 
and their own reduction techniques, there has to be ongoing exchange of information and 
ideas. Only in that way can there be an overall understanding of what can be done and what 
cannot be done. 
289 Narcotics Control in China , 34. 
290 
'Workshop on Drug Control Initiatives in the Greater Mekong Subregion ' , Asian Development Bank 2003 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The main aim of this study has been to examine the scope of drug and drug problems 
in contemporary China, tracing historical roots and influences. Throughout the early history 
of China, drugs were seen as having more than medicinal value. In the Chinese culture, drugs 
were related to longevity, im1nortality, and religious objectives, as was also the case in some 
1ninority cultures. Opium was popular for relieving pain and increasing stamina. Opiu1n was 
believed to heal the mind, reduce distress and anxiety, and alter the perception of an 
individual. Although opium had long been considered as a desirable drug, excessive usage 
and heavy medical dependence resulted in widespread addiction during the nineteenth 
century, as illustrated in the first chapter. Drug problems grew as the availability, production 
and distribution of local opium increased within China. This coincided with increasing 
foreign i1nports. By the beginning of the twentieth century, China was consuming ninety-five 
percent of the world's opiu1n supply, as well as being its major producer. 
Even though opium cultivation was suppressed during the early Republican Era, it was 
not strictly enforced until 1949 when the People's Republic of China was founded. After the 
Kuo1nintang have been defeated by the Communist in 1949, opium cultivation persisted in the 
Shan State ofBu1ma and the region of the Golden Triangle. The KMT had forced local 
inhabitants and hill tribes to pay taxes for their opium cultivation. Although the communist 
goverm11ent had declared that opiu1n cultivation and opiu1n use had been eradicated in 1952, 
the activities, together with drug smuggling, continued in the remote areas of southwestern 
China. The ability of the Chinese government to police the border areas was constrained by 
the difficult topography and cross-border trade conducted by ethnic minorities. There was 
widespread drug smuggling throughout mainland Southeast Asia during the 1950s, though it 
is difficult to know what quantities entered the People's Republic. 
The US Central Intelligence Agency was also involved, apparently on the grounds that 
it was fighting Communism. It supported the drug activities of warlords and high military as 
long as they seemed useful allies. The political instability and tensions of the 1950s and 1960s 
resulted in many different parties becoming involved in the drug trade. This included 
members of the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang Army, Chinese warlords, Shan warlords, 
Lao officials, Thai generals, South Vietnamese leaders and Hmong leaders. The drug trade 
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prospered in the Golden Triangle, partly because of the weakness of the Burmese government. 
This led to sharp production of heroin in response to international demand. As China 
progressed with the economic reform in 1980s, the country became a 1najor transit point of 
international drug trafficking, as well as a site of production and consumption. 
The drug epidemic has had a profound impact on the social, economic and political 
sectors of China as well as neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia. The global drug trade 
has undermined the political and social fabric of many countries and it is vital for us, to tackle 
the problem syste1natically as citizens and as nations. However as this study has shown, the 
difficulties are extreme. 
Most important of all, the Chinese government has to strongly admit that drug use is a 
serious national problem. In a social environment with a long tradition of opium consumption 
and production, wide public awareness campaigns should be under-taken, not only on the 
most serious crimes, but also minor drug cases in remote regions of the southwestern 
provinces. The cases of HIV/ AIDS and SARS have verified that a unified social norm on 
drugs has not been addressed due to the ignorance of the Chinese officials. Since the Chinese 
government has often been restricted by the public perception of being a drug-free nation and 
one with a high reputation, unpleasant infonnation on issues like drug epidemic has been kept 
quiet. Sometimes, the fight for drugs has been carried out underground, perhaps by highly 
motivated groups, but without wide participation and sufficient financial resources. People's 
traditional attitudes on drugs have not been changed especially along the bordered areas of 
China and Burma, where drug dealing are still recognized as acceptable. Not until the 
attitudes of corrupted officials and the weakness of both external and internal controls are 
handled, can people's behaviour and drug crimes be properly managed. 
Apart from promoting the economic and social development of the southwestern 
region, as noted in Chapter 6, closer international cooperation is required. Increasing drug 
dealings in the People 's Republic suggests that China and the countries of the Golden 
Triangle, cannot handle the problem themselves. Since the national and international security 
has been weakened and has resulted in insidious and corrosive effects, global trade in heroin 
must be solved immediately to prevent further social, economic, political and health threats. 
Comprehensive commitments and obligations within the international communities 
concerning drugs are needed, and antinarcotic activities at all government levels must be 
improved. The examples of the CIA and the ignorance of the US participation in Burma's 
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drug affairs have undoubtedly demonstrated that political situation can seriously deter 
effective efforts in countering drugs. If cooperative initiatives were to work, they would 
require greater degree of political will in the international community. Only when there is a 
cormnon adoption in fighting drugs, can substantial progress be made to curb drug problem in 
the People's Republic of China. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Education Index By Province 199529 1 
Province Education Index 
Beijing 0.86 Shandong 0.74 
Shanghai 0.85 Hubei 0.73 
Tian.iin 0.83 Sichuan 0.74 
Liaoning 0.80 Fujian 0.72 
Jilin 0.80 Henan 0.74 
Heilongjiang 0.78 Shaanxi 0.73 
Shanxi 0.79 Jiangxi 0.73 
Guangdong 0.79 Ningxia 0.67 
Hunan 0.75 Anhui 0.72 
Guangxi 0.75 Guizhou 0.64 
Xin.iiang 0.75 Yunnan 0.64 
Inner Mongol 0.74 Gansu 0.62 
Jiangsu 0.77 Qinghai 0.57 
Hainan 0.75 Tibet 0.36 
Zhejiang 0.75 
Source: CHDR, 62. 
A d" 2 P bl t· St f f o· P d t· . N th Th "I d 1917 ppen IX . ro ema IC a IS ICS on lIUm ro UC IOll Ill or ern aI an , . 
Area Area Cultivated Amount of Raw Metric Weight 
(RAI) Opium 
Chiang Rai 1,000 100,000 tamlung292 6,000 kilograms 
Nan 750 75,000 tamlung 4,500 kilograms 
Den Chai 100 10,000 tamlung 600 kilograins 
Total 1,850 185,000 tamlung 11,100 kilograms 
Source: Renard, Opium Reduction in Thailand 1970-2000:A Thirty-Year Journey, 34. 
29 1 CHDR, 62 . This table shows the inequality in the education component of the Human Development Index by 
province in China. 
292 A tamlung is equal to 4 baht in weight, or 60 grams. In the old system of weights and measures of Southeast 
Asia, 100 tamlung equals 1 viss, a term still used in Burma. 
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